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The Network of Authority, An Editorial *O. Glenn Stahl* ii

Articles

The Orientation of Presidential Appointees *Rufus E. Miles, Jr.* 1

The Honolulu Metropolitan Area: A Challenge to
Traditional Thinking *Charlton F. Chute* 7

Higher Education and Training for Adminis-
trative Careers *John A. Perkins* 14

Changing Patterns in the Philosophy of Management *Carl F. Stover* 21

The Organization of Child Welfare Services *Gladys M. Kammerer* 28

The Nature of Administrative Loyalty *T. W. Fletcher* 37

Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"
. *Virgil B. Zimmermann, Louis J. Kroeger, Edwin O. Stene* 43

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Next Step in Case Studies *Herbert Kaufman* 52
The Inter-University Case Program: Cases Nos. 24-38.

"The Decision-Making Schema": A Reply *Herbert A. Simon* 60

P I & E *E. A. B.* 63

Developments in Public Administration 67

Society Perspectives 88

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THE NETWORK OF AUTHORITY

IN the environment of "the organization man" every work day produces classic examples of worshipful observance of the sacrosanct division between "line" and "staff." The observance is more often than not in ritual rather than in substance.

In both public and private enterprise care is taken to couch directives so that they accord with the "line of command." It is common, too, for concern to be expressed when power and directional authority do not fit the proper preconceptions, when leadership does not appear to come from the "right" sources. Many an administrative decision (including errors and excuses) is the product of this genuine conviction that "line is line and staff is staff and ne'er the twain shall meet."

It is ironical that such determinations are usually made on behalf of a chief executive by assistants who are themselves "staff" but who actually wield great power. The virtues of simplicity and good communication are frequently sacrificed on the altar of an unverified definition of administrative authority.

I find more realistic a contrary theory—that "line" and "staff" are hardly distinguishable as indicators of power status; that the terms are merely convenient for identifying (1) those functions of an organization that are direct subdivisions of its program purposes and (2) those that are oriented principally to its inner form, its sustenance, and its methods; that it is more useful to view these two types of specialization as intersecting lines of authority than as primary versus incidental functions, especially in the public service.

There are a number of considerations that lead to this conclusion:

1. The conventional criteria of the line function or "operations" appear to be: (a) supervisory command—giving orders and instructions; (b) decision-making on "cases"; (c) producing a product or a service; (d) dealing with clientele groups in connection with any of the first three. The conventional criteria of the staff function appear to be: (a)

planning; (b) research; (c) advice; (d) the absence of "command." How many organizational entities can be found that exemplify one of these sets of criteria to the exclusion of the others? The "pure" staff unit, according to the above measures, is so rare as to be almost nonexistent. It is simply a fact of administrative behavior that executives come to lean on staff units to exercise assigned portions of their "command" authority. Often this is done by clear and unequivocal delegation.

The classicists will say: "Ah yes, but this kind of staff exercise of command is appealable by the 'line' [one senses a tinge of the deity in use of the word]; it won't necessarily stick." But how is this distinguishable from a decision (even under a delegation) by a so-called "line" official? Is it not reversible upon appeal by *other segments of the line*? Furthermore, is not the authority of "staff" realistically effective when practicality dictates that the "line" *not* appeal its determination?

The command function exercised by staff units—even by some that give the most lip service to the sharp distinction between line and staff—is genuinely effective authority when it makes sense to do it this way, when it saves an executive's time, and when it is accepted by the operating divisions. Line operators who are the most vigorous in their denunciation of power exercised by staff units commonly use their own staff units in the same manner.

2. The breakdown of distinction between line and staff is further illustrated by various activities in which there is an inescapable need for organizationwide adherence. Subordinate echelons in an enterprise cannot be allowed to go their own way on such matters as budgeting, pay, or career planning. Career planning, for example, by its very nature must embrace standard policies and methods for in-hiring, mobility or even planned rotation in assignment, training that spans divisional lines, and promotion systems that imply movement and release of people. The concept of

the individual line supervisor being the basic locus of the personnel function or the budget function is satisfactory up to a point but utterly unrealistic when one considers many organizationwide features of personnel and budget objectives.

On a somewhat different plane than the internal managerial functions are such activities as public information and legal counsel, likewise referred to as staff in character. Here, too, we find certain compulsive features in their day-to-day operations that become binding on the line. All of these fields are illustrative of work that requires coordination at the widest possible levels and therefore a pattern of conformance in which a staff unit itself must assume the controlling role, because there is no one to do it short of the executive himself or one of his personal assistants who is just as "staff" as a specialized unit.

I am not precluding that methods of a staff unit, in arriving at decisions, should embrace extensive consultation with and participation of other organizational segments. The only point at issue here is power status.

3. Because a staff activity has a particular specialization as a trade-mark it is no less an "operation." So-called line activities are simply *specialized segments* of the end-purpose functions of the enterprise. They are just as susceptible to provincialism, to organizational myopia, as are the so-called staff activities. Indeed, the staff activity is often the more likely one to have the Olympian point of view, to see the forest as a whole. On top of this consideration, every staff unit that achieves any size comes to have an internal operating task of its own. Its relationships with other staff units and many features of its behavior and orientation are identical to those of any program subdivision of the organization. When one gets down to the core of the subject he is likely to find that "all God's chillun" are operators.

4. Staff functions usually have more to do with *how* something is done than *what* is done. They customarily represent the framework and the boundaries within which program operators may perform. This has special significance in the public service, because the manner in which governmental functions are

administered is frequently as important as the functions themselves. Means, if not paramount, are at least central to our whole political structure—constitutional, legislative, and judicial, as well as administrative. The Administrative Procedure Act in the federal government is tied by this common denominator to the Budget and Accounting Act and the Civil Service Act, as well as others, even though superficially they seem to be quite different kinds of controls. They all prescribe the guidelines within which programs must be carried out.

It is futile to pontificate that every operator must have *authority commensurate with his responsibility* so that he can be held accountable. This is usually interpreted as freedom from restraints and limitations of various sorts; yet these very restraints and limitations are *part of the responsibility*, not something extraneous to it. We must come to the view that the director of a public program is responsible not just for program ends but for achieving them *within* the controls, however wise or pointless they seem to be at the moment, that are established by legislative, judicial, or higher administrative authority. This is not to say that legislatures and courts are in their proper orbit when they try to regulate "administrivia." I would be just as insistent on executive prerogative as I am on erasing some confusing notions about its exercise of authority.

In conclusion, then, would it not make sense to divest ourselves of the abracadabra that divides "line" and "staff" into incongruous kinds of activity and to recognize that *all* such activities are simply specialized subdivisions of an organization's work? Because some of them, called staff functions, develop only by virtue of the existence of the organization and operate to sustain it does not detract from their necessity or their importance. They may be no more incidental to end purpose than individual program subdivisions themselves, for there may be end purposes as to *means* that override single immediate program objectives. This is neither to be deplored nor applauded; it is simply a fact of organizational life that is inescapable, and peculiarly so in the public service. When specialists of program and sus-

taining activities are equals, there is more incentive to reconcile conflicts at low levels and less disposition to push decisions up the hierarchy.

I find it convenient to think of the work of an enterprise as a network, a grid, or a check-board in which vertical program subdivisions are interlaced with horizontal sustaining activities. The chief executive sits in a position at a top corner from which he holds both the vertical lines and the horizontal lines. They are all lines; for controls are exercised in both directions at once. Where they intersect there is potentiality for conflict or at least the necessity for reconciliation, but such a conception breeds the settlement of issues where they are first detected. This constitutes half the dynamics of running an organization.

No purpose is served in fighting this phenomenon in the name of confining staff and line to their respective hypothetical roles. Let's relax and enjoy it! It at least saves us from guilt complexes, makes everyone's behavior more open and above board, lubricates communication channels, and facilitates decision-making at a given point in the hierarchy on the common-sense basis of a combination of the requisite information and capacity, without preoccupying us with who has the right to do what to whom.

O. GLENN STAHL

*Director, Bureau of Programs and Standards
U. S. Civil Service Commission
Member, Editorial Board
Public Administration Review*

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The Editorial Board welcomes letters of comment from PAR readers on articles in the *Review* and other public administration matters. Some will be published, depending on subject, quality, and space. All will be helpful in planning and evaluating *Review* policies.

The Board also welcomes manuscripts from the practitioners, researchers, and teachers of public administration based on their experiences and studies. These will be considered for publication as articles, subject to the Board's judgment on substance, style, length, and other editorial matters.

Both letters and manuscripts should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief at the ASPA office, 6042 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

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in this number

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
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The Orientation of Presidential Appointees

By RUFUS E. MILES, JR.

Director of Administration

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

SELECTING top-flight men for the policy-making executive posts of the federal government and motivating them to accept appointments and stay a reasonable period of time are, without doubt, among the most important and most difficult problems of government and politics. They are matters to which increasing attention must be paid if this or any administration hopes to keep from being overwhelmed by problems of steadily growing complexity.

Closely related to the selection and retention of competent policy-making executives is the facilitation of their adjustment to their new posts. Obviously, if such officials can be assisted to orient themselves to their new environment with a minimum of embarrassment and with some degree of wisdom and expedition, the general effectiveness of government will be materially improved.

A good start may have a marked effect on how long an official is willing to stay, and whether he subsequently refers to his experience as a "rat race," without smiling, or as an experience he will never regret. Comments made frankly or casually to prospective future candidates for high appointive office by those who have been through the experience are influential in conditioning the minds of potential future governmental leaders. The beginning is often the most important determinant of later attitude toward government service.

The Problem

THE importance of this matter has now been formally and officially recognized by the President and his Cabinet. At a Cabinet meeting on August 2, 1957, the President approved a policy paper which was designed to establish a systematic plan for the orientation of newly appointed, top-level, noncareer officials of the federal government. This means, primarily, presidential appointees to top-level federal posts in the executive branch. This was the first action by any President which recognized that the orientation of new appointees was a matter of enough importance to merit not only presidential attention but also the establishment of a systematic plan to deal with the problem.

The plan approved by the Cabinet and the President was developed in response to a strongly felt need. The occasion of an almost complete change in the top officialdom of the government in January, 1953, had brought this need forcibly to the attention both of continuing career people and of newly appointed officials. Although President Truman had issued a directive in the closing months of his administration instructing top appointive and career personnel to be as helpful as possible to incoming officials, including the preparation of whatever written materials seemed essential to "brief" the new officials, the briefing which resulted from this general directive was

very spotty and left much to be desired. The material followed no common pattern and could not be said to represent a system or organized plan for conveying to the new appointees a carefully selected body of knowledge needed by new appointees.

Although some consideration may have been given to the idea of establishing a continuing governmentwide plan for orienting presidential appointees prior to 1953, there is no evidence of it. The first real impetus toward a continuing governmentwide plan came from the Defense Department, which, in turn, drew its inspiration from the *Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense* of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. The report was published in June, 1955, and revealed, among other things, that the average tenure of civilian presidential appointees in the Defense Department and its predecessor departments in the preceding ten years had been less than eighteen months. The report recommended a concerted effort to lengthen the tenure of such top officials.

Secretary Wilson exhibited his personal agreement with the report in two ways. He set a good example for his subordinates by remaining in office for four years and eight months, nearly equal to the combined service of his four predecessors. He also issued a directive in March, 1956, calling for a departmentwide effort to extend the tenure of presidential appointees (primarily under secretaries and assistant secretaries of the three military departments and of the Department of Defense, itself) and directing the establishment of an organized system within the Department of Defense for orienting such officials to their new positions immediately following their arrival in Washington.

Even before this directive became operative, Secretary Wilson sent a copy of it to the White House, suggesting that the part relating to the orientation of newly appointed officials might be applied generally within the executive branch. He also called attention to the fact that parts of the orientation plan might best be developed and operated by the White House or the Executive Office of the President on a governmentwide basis rather than by individual departments for their own use. The

White House was much interested in Mr. Wilson's suggestion, since it reflected a need which was so obvious that no one doubted its merit. The White House asked the Bureau of the Budget to explore the feasibility of Mr. Wilson's proposal.

After careful consideration of the matter, the Budget Bureau made a favorable response and submitted specific suggestions for a governmentwide plan for the orientation of presidential appointees. In connection with the bureau's recommendations to the White House, the author was asked to make suggestions based upon a study of this subject. The study was made possible by a Rockefeller Public Service Award, made in February, 1956. In this connection, I think it is worthy of note that in the course of numerous interviews with current and former presidential appointees and political scientists during the fall of 1956, only one official was indifferent to the idea of establishing a governmentwide system of orienting newly appointed top officials. The rest were all clearly affirmative, many with real enthusiasm. None was negative.

On August 2, 1957, Secretary Wilson's recommendation to the White House, translated into a specific governmentwide plan of action, was laid before the Cabinet and the President, and was approved. Under the new plan, each executive department, agency, board, and commission has been provided an outline of the types of subject matter to be covered, and, with some assistance from other agencies, has been asked to put flesh on the bones of the outline. Each agency is expected to be prepared, on short notice, to give its new appointees a short course in how the federal government operates in general, and how the new appointee's position and responsibilities fit into the larger pattern.

Elements of the Program

THE prescribed elements of each orientation program, to be provided individually to each new appointee as early as possible following appointment—prior to taking the oath of office, wherever feasible, and even prior to Senate hearings related to confirmation, if possible—are as follows:

1. Such information (supplementary, of course,

to that which the appointee already has) concerning the Constitution of the United States, the separation of powers and the organization and functions of the Executive Branch and its relationships with the Legislative and Judicial Branches as may be pertinent to the appointee individually, particularly within the context of his Agency's functions.

2. The external relationships of the department or agency—with:

a. The Congress.

b. The Executive Office of the President including the White House Office.

c. Various central agencies such as the Civil Service Commission, the General Accounting Office and the General Services Administration.

d. The other departments, agencies, boards and commissions including participation in interdepartmental bodies.

e. State and local governments.

f. Non-governmental groups.

g. The public and the press.

3. The organization and functions of selected departments, agencies, boards and commissions whose programs are of particular interest to the appointee.

4. The Hatch Act; the merit system and excepted positions.

5. Conflict of interest legislation and the anti-lobbying act.

6. The organization and procedures of the department or agency including its legislative and budget processes and security programs.

7. The authority, duties, and responsibilities of the appointee described as precisely as possible.

8. Agency programs (background, status, objectives and problems) and guidance concerning Presidential or agency policy in areas of concern to the appointee.

9. Identification of those persons in the organization and in other parts of the Government who occupy key positions with respect to problems in the appointee's area of interest.

10. Information needed to facilitate the personal adjustment of the appointee including protocol, housing, taxes, schools, pay, insurance, retirement and other benefits.

Orientation programs are expected to be tailored to the needs of individual appointees, emphasizing personal discussions with various high-level officials, including, wherever possible, the appointee's predecessor. Written materials are to be provided where appropriate. Each department, agency, and commission was asked to be ready to undertake the orientation of new appointees by October 1, 1957.

There are several aspects of the above outline which relate to matters of administration policy or to the operation of parts of the government other than the particular agency of a new appointee. In order to assure adequate coverage of such subjects, and to avoid having each agency duplicate the efforts of other agencies in preparing presentations on matters of general interest, the following assignments were made:

1. In the case of secretaries of departments and heads of principal agencies, either the President or the Assistant to the President will, as is customary, identify and discuss with the new appointee the major policy issues with which the Administration is concerned in the appointee's area of responsibility.

2. A representative of the Bureau of the Budget, designated by the Director, will describe to each appointee the organization and functions of the Executive Branch of the Government and its relationships with the Judicial and Legislative Branches.

3. The Department of State will have one or more individuals available to inform appointees (and their families) on protocol.

4. The Department of Justice will have one or more persons available to inform appointees on conflict-of-interest statutes, the anti-lobbying act and related problems.

5. The Civil Service Commission will have one or more persons available to inform appointees on civil service laws, procedures, and policies, including the merit systems, excepted positions and the Hatch Act.

6. Each Cabinet Assistant (a person designated by each Department to provide liaison with the Cabinet Secretary) and, in non-Cabinet agencies, the Executive Assistant to the Agency Head or Chairman will be available on request to inform appointees from other agencies on the work of his department or agency and its inter-agency relationships; to act as liaison officer with the White House and with other agencies on this program and to give leadership to the program within his department or agency.

7. A representative of the White House staff will be available to discuss with each new appointee the President's standing requirements for good staff work on matters of White House and interdepartmental concern, and to describe the existing procedures for ensuring this. (For subordinates of agency heads, this briefing will be arranged in each case through the agency head.)

8. The Cabinet Secretariat, in its continuing ca-

capacity as a liaison office with the departments and agencies, has been designated to facilitate the conduct of this program.

These features constitute the essence of the government plan. It is based on four principal assumptions: (1) that the government itself has the primary responsibility for orienting its new appointees, (2) that such orientation has to be available to fit the convenience of each new official and must be geared to fit his individual needs (and therefore cannot normally be handled on a group basis), (3) that the responsibility for the development of suitable material for orientation must be assigned realistically, in terms of where the personnel and the information essential to conduct such a program are most readily available, and (4) that central stimulus and direction from the White House is needed, both to get the program going and to keep it going.

Limitations and Values

IT is too early to evaluate the operational effectiveness of this plan. If well executed, a government-operated plan of this kind seems to me to be one of the many foundation stones in the process of government. Too much should not be expected of it. It has limitations which I shall discuss briefly below. But it does represent the first presidential recognition, in the form of a definite plan of action, that the administration of the federal government is such a complex and important business that no one without extensive experience in it can begin functioning at full potential as a federal official unless he is provided a carefully conceived and executed breaking-in period. Much credit is due the administration for this forward step in public administration.

Though this new governmentwide plan is basically sound, it has several limitations. Some of the limitations are inherent in the fact that the plan is intragovernmental. There are at least temporary limits on the extent to which and the rapidity with which the government can lift itself up by its own bootstraps. The government has no alternative but to try to do so, since no other suitable body is available to provide such a service. In a subsequent article, I shall develop the thesis that there is at least temporary need, and a very real oppor-

tunity, for a nonprofit organization to provide, among other things, supplementation, stimulation, and support for the newly established intragovernmental system for orienting presidential appointees.

The limitations of a government-operated plan of orientation are several. First, when there is a change of administration involving party turnover, there are so many changes in the top officials of the government that many of those who, in a continuing program, are relied upon to contribute extensively to the orientation plan would themselves be leaving and possibly would not be available for assistance. In any event, the points of view of the outgoing and incoming officials are likely to be so different that the receptivity of the new officials to the basic philosophy and specific ideas of their predecessors may be something less than warm and enthusiastic. This leaves the job of orientation almost exclusively to career service personnel. To the extent that the orientation is conducted through oral briefing sessions, supplemented by written materials (and it may be noted here that most of the incoming officials seem strongly to prefer oral briefing, supplemented by concise written material), this may throw the career civil servant into the position of acting as tutor to his new superior. This is a particularly ticklish role for a subordinate to play. He cannot know how much or how little his new boss knows. If he assumes he knows less than he actually does, he may be committing the sin of talking down to him; if he assumes he knows more than he does, he may omit important material needed to fill in blank spots in the new official's knowledge. There is the added problem that when one party stays in power for a long period, even the career civil servants will be assumed by the incoming administration to have been so warped in their points of view that the wisdom which they stand ready to impart may be regarded as having questionable value. No simple remedy for this limitation is evident.

A second limitation derives from the nature of the responsibility, and the realistic necessity of assigning various elements of the responsibility on a decentralized basis throughout government. The effect of this decentralization is to have the function performed by many dif-

ferent people, most of whom are busy with other pressing matters, and on whom this devolves as a minor element—at least timewise—of their total occupation. It is the kind of responsibility which, in competition with operating duties with fixed deadlines, is bound to be laid aside, deferred, and in some instances done only when White House pressure is applied. With the White House preoccupied with such hot issues as international affairs, the budget, and school desegregation, the problem of fitting this into the schedule of already busy officials is self evident.

Below the White House level (and perhaps even there), it is unlikely that any single individual will be assigned to work full time on the matter of orientation of new appointees, except possibly for short periods of time in the Department of Defense. The function is almost certain to be handled, therefore, on a "when, as, and if time permits" basis. The limitations of such a fractional-time approach appear self-evident.

Two things could be done partially to offset this handicap. One is for the President, as he appoints each new official, to send a letter to that official or to the Cabinet officer who is his superior, emphasizing the importance of this orientation work and asking that the necessary time be taken to go through this orientation program—even if it means temporarily deferring the assumption of the full responsibilities of office. A general order of this kind, with continuing applicability, would save presidential signatures but probably would be somewhat less effective. The second is to appoint a competent full-time person to the White House staff who would assist the Secretary to the Cabinet in seeing that this program has good solid content and is presented in an interesting and effective way. Such an individual would be a staff counselor to all the departments in the development and operation of their programs. This seems to me to be particularly necessary during the initial phases of the program until it develops to a stage of usefulness which will assure its survival. Quite possibly, a permanent full-time person (if he could actually be kept working on this assignment rather than being pulled off to work on some of the more pressing White House issues)

might make the difference between a well-executed program and a mediocre one.

In this general connection, there is one small aspect of the program to which the White House might give thought. Sometimes the trappings of a program convey a sense of importance which is otherwise lacking. Thought should be given to appropriate means of conveying the sense of importance which the program merits. Such things as presenting each new appointee with a very attractively printed copy, embossed with his name on the cover, of the Constitution of the United States, accompanied by a copy of Edward S. Corwin, *The Constitution and What It Means Today* (11th ed., Princeton University Press, 1954), might serve to give emphasis where it is especially important, and recognition to the program as a whole. No single aspect of the orientation seems to me more important than a keenly refreshed recollection of the content and meaning of the Constitution.

A third limitation is that the plan makes no provision for orienting the wives of new officials, except in one very limited respect. Wives are permitted to be included in one briefing session on the subject of official protocol. The adjustment of wives to Washington is oftentimes more difficult than for the officials themselves. The officials, after all, are welcomed into a going organization which becomes their official family. Their wives, however, have no clear niche in the community. In order to be reasonably happy most of them must find such a niche, and this is by no means easy. There are wide variations in the kinds of activities which may enlist their interests. Nobody has any clear responsibility for helping them through this hard and lonely period; it is sheer chance whether congenial and generous souls show up and help them.

Admittedly, this is a difficult sort of service for the government to provide. And it would be self defeating if it were overorganized. But it is clearly a problem related to the operation of government to which some satisfactory solution needs to be found. The length of stay of appointive officials in Washington is more influenced by the happiness of their wives than we are prone to recognize. Perhaps a partial solution might be found in having

the national committee of the party in control of the executive branch of the federal government recognize this as a problem worthy of their attention to the extent of hiring one or two women whose sole duty would be to aid the wives of appointive officials to find a niche in the Washington community which would challenge their interests and make them feel at home during their stay. I commend this idea to the Republican and Democratic National Committees for consideration.

Another limitation relates to the scope of the orientation. The program has no link to the literature and the continuing study of public administration and political science. No bibliography or discussion of nongovernmental sources of further information is included in the program outline issued to all departments and agencies. The orientation is not placed in the context of its relationship to an art and a struggling science. Standing alone, without this link, the orientation program seems unconnected with the efforts of many careful, scholarly, and wise people to organize and record the lessons of experience in the field of government. Perhaps this is simply a reflection of the inevitable gulf between men of action and men of observation and reflection. But I do not think we need to assume that the gulf must always be as broad as it now seems. In part, at least, the initiative to bridge this gulf, must, I think, come from outside the federal government. This general problem is a matter about which I shall have considerably more to say in a subsequent article.

Last, an orientation program of this kind does not attempt, and perhaps should not try, to cover some aspects of the role of presidential appointees as politicians. Many such appointees come to their positions very much puzzled about their proper relationship and responsibility to the party machinery, and about whether to use obvious or subtle means for assuring that the party obtains credit for the Administration's creditable activities. This

may be the kind of thing which is best left to the sense of feel of each individual, taking his cue from a combination of his own inclinations and the behavior of the President and other top officials of the government. In any event, the profession of partisan politics has not yet reached a level of esteem in the United States which would assure favorable reaction to the official inclusion of this subject as an element of the formal orientation of presidential appointees. Hopefully, some day it will.

Despite these, and possibly other limitations, the new governmental plan for orienting top-level noncareer officials is a small milestone in the improvement of public administration. It is the first concrete action by any administration to help men who are appointed from successful careers in business and professional life to convert their skills so as to be able to administer large public agencies without serious mishap. If an official comes to government equipped with the basic skills of general administration, an orientation plan of this kind should help him adapt them to the somewhat different art of public administration. It should help him steer around some of the quagmires and bear traps into which he might otherwise blandly walk. It should accelerate his adjustment and permit him to reach his potential effectiveness sooner. It should improve his first impressions, if he is new to the federal government, reduce his initial frustrations and thus, perhaps, contribute a bit to keeping him longer and improving the acceptability and drawing power of federal service at the top appointive levels. It should reduce, somewhat, the wear and tear on his associates, superiors, and subordinates. And it may, if skillfully executed, open up to him some avenues of thought and consideration relating to the improvement of the public service which he can, if so disposed, pursue later, as opportunity arises or occasion demands. The net result should be a modest leavening of the public service.

The Honolulu Metropolitan Area: A Challenge to Traditional Thinking

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A FEW months ago that usually unemotional paper *The Bond Buyer* described Hawaii as "a paradise and a paradox," and also "an exciting adventure, a state of mind, and a chain of enchantingly lovely islands." It is indeed all of these things, and more, but in this paper it will be interesting to concentrate on those aspects of Hawaii, and particularly Honolulu, which throw some light on our traditional thinking about the government of metropolitan areas on the mainland.

First, to set the background, a few words descriptive of the Hawaiian Islands as a group and particularly of Honolulu, our country's only metropolitan area in the Pacific, would seem in order. The Hawaiian Islands are remote, being separated by over 2,000 miles from our West Coast cities and from the nearest islands in the Pacific having populations of any consequence—namely, Samoa and Tahiti. They have been called "the most isolated of important land areas." The Hawaiian Islands are the largest group in the Central Pacific, covering 6,412 square miles of land—about equal to the area of the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. The 1950 Census reported a total population for the Territory of Hawaii of about a half million.

NOTE: This article is based on talks given before the New York Metropolitan and Cleveland Chapters, American Society for Public Administration, on November 14 and 18, 1957, respectively.

There are eight important islands in the Hawaiian group, of which the most significant for our purposes is the Island of Oahu on which is located the Honolulu metropolitan area. The population of Oahu has grown recently at a greater rate than that of the continental United States as a whole, and it is now estimated to constitute 75 per cent of the population of the entire territory. By way of contrast, the other counties in the territory, like many of our rural counties on the mainland, have lost population continuously since 1930. The rate of population growth on Oahu was 27 per cent between 1930 and 1940 and 37 per cent between 1940 and 1950; according to the most recent estimates of the Territorial Board of Health, it has been 17 per cent since 1950 (to July 1, 1957).

Oahu is about 40 miles long, and 30 miles wide and of irregular shape. It has an area of approximately 600 square miles—about the size of an average county in the eastern United States.

The points at which the Honolulu metropolitan area enlarges our thinking about metropolitan areas generally may be conveniently discussed under the following nine heads. You will note that they represent, either in pure or in mixed form, matters that are governmental, economic, geographic, legal, social, or technological.

1. The definition of a metropolitan area.

2. The nature of the governmental problems of a metropolitan area.
3. Intergovernmental cooperation and certain other administrative problems.
4. The theory of municipal home rule, and its limitations.
5. The economic characteristics of a metropolitan area.
6. The equalization of governmental services and of the burden of supporting them.
7. Some implications of a limited supply of land in metropolitan areas.
8. Conservation of natural resources and metropolitan areas.
9. A solution of our metropolitan area problem of racial segregation.

The Definition of a Metropolitan Area

THE official definition of a metropolitan area in the United States, as given by the Bureau of the Census, has always involved two primary ingredients: (a) an incorporated central city and (b) suburbs that were either incorporated or unincorporated. Strictly speaking, Honolulu does not fit this definition. The entire Island of Oahu is incorporated as one unit of local government—a municipality with the name "The City and County of Honolulu." Historically, its government was patterned on that of the city and county of San Francisco. At present, for example, the voters of the entire island elect a mayor and a legislative body, called the Board of Supervisors, consisting of seven members elected at large. There are no other units of local government on Oahu of the type so familiar to us on the mainland, such as school or other special districts.

Even though, legally, the entire island is one municipality, the Bureau of the Census considers it a standard metropolitan area, and it is so listed. This recognition by the Census of essence rather than form is a triumph of realism.

From another point of view, standard metropolitan areas on the mainland "suffer" from not having a natural geographic boundary or limit. Rivers and bays can be, and have been, bridged over or tunneled under. No mainland standard metropolitan area, to my knowledge, is located on an island so remote as to be barred from continuous urbanization.

The situation is quite different in Honolulu. Here the nearest important island is Kauai, 63 miles to the northwest; and in the other direction the island is Molokai, 23 miles to the southeast. With the minor, though significant, exception of making land by the "fill" process (of which more later), the future expansion of the metropolitan area of Honolulu is rather rigidly limited by the geographic barrier of wide channels of the Pacific Ocean.

This illuminates, I believe, the nature of the problem of most of our largest metropolitan areas on the mainland. They do not have limiting boundaries of the type found on Oahu, and with the long-term trend of population growth and urbanization they are merging into urban regions extending for hundreds of miles.¹

The point can be illustrated in economic terms. On the mainland today one can always choose to live a little farther out, where more open land is available, and where it takes a few minutes longer, and costs a few cents more, to commute to the central city. By contrast, if one worked on Oahu and didn't want to live there, his next alternative would be to commute by airplane to Kauai, which is only a half hour away but involves a round-trip cost of \$19, which is a little too expensive for daily routine.

The very real geographic bounds to the growth of Honolulu as a metropolitan area point up, by contrast, the fact that there are virtually no inhibiting natural barriers to the extension of most urban regions of the mainland at this time.

The Governmental Problems of Metropolitan Areas

SOME observers have suggested that the political problems of a metropolitan area emerge entirely from the presence of a multitude of local government jurisdictions, and that when they are integrated into one unit no metropolitan governmental problems remain.

A preferable definition of the *political* problems of a metropolitan area, I suggest, describes them as the political problems of a large

¹ See Charlton F. Chute, "Today's Urban Regions," 45 *National Municipal Review* 274, 334 (June, July 1956).

concentration of mainly urban people; they include, but are not dependent upon or limited to, the form of structure, and the number, of the units of local government involved.

As will be developed in subsequent points, there are metropolitan area problems on the Island of Oahu even though there is only one unit of local government on the entire island. Here it will be enough to state that it was the problem of providing political representation for rapidly growing new residential areas which was mainly responsible for the creation of the first home rule charter commission, for no supervisor lived in certain of these areas. Here is one of those hardy perennial questions in the government of metropolitan areas which has by no means been solved. It will undoubtedly become more acute as our metropolitan areas and urban regions become more populous, as well as more extensive.

A second political question involves the relationship of a metropolitan area with the nonmetropolitan areas adjacent to or near it, for, as will be brought out later, a metropolitan area should be vitally concerned with nearby areas. This concern may take such forms as responsibility for correcting too low a level of governmental services in nearby territory or concern for the conservation and enhancement of natural resources in nearby territory.

A third political question is financial. For example, what public expenditures (or projects) should be undertaken? Who shall pay the bill? What taxes or other revenue-raising devices should be adopted? To what degree should a metropolitan area spend money on planning and building projects for the long-run future of its area and nearby territory or, on the other hand, restrict its budget to short-run needs? Should special taxing districts be permitted within one municipality, so that residents wishing higher quality government service can use this means to pay for it?

One hypothetical example may illustrate most of these points. A basic responsibility of local government is to do what it properly may to encourage a sound local economy—to make a community "a good place to earn a living." The population of Hawaii is a young one, and growing rapidly. Many additional

jobs will soon be needed. The prospects of getting these jobs through sugar cane, pineapples, or federal government expenditures are very limited. The best answer, according to an official study, appears to be in the expansion of the tourist industry.²

On Oahu and other islands are highways which do not provide a circuit tour because they have not yet been extended through very rugged terrain. It would undoubtedly be more interesting to a tourist to drive over a circuit, instead of having to retrace his route. Building the needed highway would be expensive and would find its greatest justification, probably, in the additional attraction it would constitute for tourists, rather than in service to the local economy. The political questions are: (1) Should the completion of any of these circuit highways be attempted now, or should they be postponed to the distant future? Would the building of all of them simultaneously constitute too heavy a financial burden? (2) Should the circuit on Oahu be built first, or the ones on the other islands? Which would be of the greatest benefit to the metropolitan area of Honolulu, in the short run and in the long run? (3) To inject a highly controversial element into the picture, should the needed highway construction be financed, say, by legalizing horse racing in Honolulu and taxing pari-mutuel betting? In other words, should gambling be officially permitted and encouraged in a metropolitan area, in order to finance highway construction there, or perhaps on a neighboring island?

Intergovernmental Cooperation

It is frequently assumed that the political and administrative problems of metropolitan areas are those of local government, with which the state and federal governments have no concern except as they may remove legal obstacles or otherwise enable local governments better to meet their responsibilities.

One aspect of government on Oahu throws this assumption into strong relief. Hawaii is, of course, a bastion of the military power of

² See Governor's Advisory Committee on the Tourist Industry, *The Role of Government in the Development of Hawaii's Visitor Industry* (February, 1957).

the United States in the Mid-Pacific. At Pearl Harbor, which is quite near downtown Honolulu, and elsewhere on Oahu are great concentrations of military facilities and manpower. There are important interrelationships between these federal agencies and the government of the city and county of Honolulu. In considering the metropolitan area problem of Honolulu, to shut one's eyes to the importance and significance of living with these federal agencies would be unthinkable.

For example, the Navy has developed its own water system, tapping the same vast underground reservoir of fresh water as does the municipally owned water system which serves downtown Honolulu. The two systems are interconnected with mains so that, in the event of a breakdown, either can provide water to the other. No bill is presented for payment, the user reimbursing the lender with an equivalent quantity of water at a later date. To plan future metropolitan water facilities on Oahu without considering the federally owned and operated water utilities would be the height of folly.

Municipal Home Rule

BASICALLY, the theory of home rule charters rests on the belief that there is a body of governmental decisions and services which are "local" rather than "state" in character. What happens, however, when one locality grows until it accounts for 75 per cent of the population of the "state"—and still continues to grow? When this one locality is the capital city, as in the case in Honolulu, and the territorial offices are across the street from the city hall, and the Governor is a resident of the big city, the situation is quite different from that on the mainland, where we say that Albany, or Sacramento, or Jefferson City just doesn't understand our metropolitan area problems.

Moreover, it means that about 75 per cent of the voters in the state or territory live in the metropolitan area of the capital city. It should not surprise us if state policy and the policy of the big home rule city become the same thing in many cases.

Economic Characteristics

IT is often said that "a metropolitan area is a social and economic unit." To what extent is this true of Honolulu?

Without pausing here to inquire what these words mean, or what the current trends may be, it should be said that the insular nature of the Hawaiian Islands, and the formalized and recorded nature of their freight and passenger traffic, make it possible to measure aspects of the economy with an accuracy that is impossible on the mainland.

The Hawaiian economy is based on four main elements: sugar cane, pineapples, defense expenditures, and tourism. Tourism is increasing rapidly in importance. Studies made by the Bank of Hawaii point out that Hawaii is part of an *interdependent* economy. The two largest industries produce food primarily for export.

Two-thirds of the food consumed in the Territory is imported. Hawaii is a mass production agricultural economy geared to export trade. . . . For obtaining all the things that Kansans need, for example, Kansas is as fully dependent on wheat and cattle as Hawaii is dependent on sugar and pineapples. San Diego is more dependent on defense activity for income and employment than is Hawaii. Miami, with a larger population than Hawaii, is far more heavily dependent on tourist trade. These areas are far from self-sufficient. But none of them, including Hawaii, are dependent in the same sense that they cannot "earn a living." They are interdependent.³

In one sense, however, the Island of Oahu is an economic unit, and this fact throws a curious light on some of our mainland metropolitan areas. The excellent water supply of the island is limited to the rain that falls there. Oahu is not close enough to other land to permit piping in water from a distance, as has been done on Long Island. In this sense it is different from a New York, a Los Angeles, or a San Francisco, which bring their water from mountain sources a hundred or more miles beyond the limits of the standard metropolitan area.

³ Bank of Hawaii, *Islands at Work—The Economy of Hawaii in Action* (July, 1954), p. 31.

The Equalization of Taxes and Services

THERE is space here to mention only two points. The assessment of property for taxation in Hawaii is a function of the territorial government, in great contrast to our usual mainland practice. This work is reported to be well done. No complaints were heard of competitive underassessment, of the need for equalization of assessments, or of the existence of colonies of tax dodgers, such as are heard so frequently on the mainland.

The school function in Hawaii has two aspects: (1) the *operation* of schools is a territorial function, whereas (2) the provision, care, and maintenance of school *buildings* is a responsibility of the county government. The claim is made that a child attending a rural school gets the same quality of education as does the child who lives in a wealthy neighborhood.

The Limited Supply of Land

ON OAHU there is a much greater general awareness, it seems to me, of the very limited supply of land in the metropolitan area than is to be found in any mainland standard metropolitan area with which I am familiar. This is true in large part because of the relative scarcity and high cost of land for residential development. Much of it cannot be purchased, but is available on leasehold only. The purchase price or rental is usually quoted on a square foot basis. The result is that house lots tend to be smaller on Oahu than is probably true on the mainland. Most new construction seems to be of the single-family detached type. On a tropical island of perpetual summer, where flowers bloom all year around and orchids can be raised in the yard with almost no care, it is easy to understand why most people prefer at least a small lawn and garden. On hearing of some mainland suburbs which are zoned for one- or two-acre plots, a long-time island resident expressed great amazement.

There are still many square miles of tilled land in sugar cane and pineapple plantations, and also untilled land which will doubtless be converted into attractive housing developments. Many such changes took place in the

fifteen months between my first and second trips to Honolulu. The metropolitan area is growing and changing rapidly. Many informed people expect to see the day when agriculture will be crowded off Oahu; indeed, cattle ranching, which once flourished on the windward side of the island, has now virtually disappeared.

In 1950 the population density on Oahu was 598 per square mile—a figure exceeded only by the states of Rhode Island (749) and New Jersey (643).

The tourist industry is, at present, the branch of the local economy which is usually regarded as most likely to expand in volume and in employment opportunity. But its growth must be based on some unique qualities, things to be found only in Hawaii, and not on trying to imitate other resorts, such as a Las Vegas or an Atlantic City.⁴

The heart of the Hawaiian tourist industry, geographically, is Waikiki, which, "with only one-hundredth of 1 per cent of the land of the Territory enjoys 70 per cent of the tourist trade." But the Waikiki area has become crowded, and seems destined to become even more so. New beach land was created there last year by "fill" for Henry Kaiser's new hotel, reminiscent of a project some years ago which transformed the city dump on the ocean front into beautiful Ala Moana park and beach. Today plans are going forward to widen the beach at Waikiki, to by-pass much of the traffic which at certain hours congests its main thoroughfare, and, it is hoped, to provide sites for even more large tourist hotels.

Honolulu is a modern city which long ago lost its last "little grass shack" for native housing. But such a structure, associated in the public mind with the beach at Waikiki in song and story, must inevitably be provided and is, in modern artificial form, by those who cater to the wants of the tourist.

Many visitors will increasingly seek something of the "original" Hawaii—less of the modern artificial large-city atmosphere and more of the uncrowded "natural" legendary island paradise. If Oahu were the

⁴See Research Committee of the Hawaii Visitor's Bureau and the Tourist Industry Committee, *Hawaii's Visitor Industry 1955-1965* (July, 1955), p. 35.

only island in Hawaii, the future of agriculture and the tourist industry there might be somewhat cloudy. Fortunately, there are other islands in the group, of which we shall mention only one. Called the Big Island, or the Orchid Island, it is more than twice as large as all the other islands combined. It has a sparse population of only 17 per square mile compared with Oahu's 598. The official name of this island, like that of the group, is Hawaii.

It has much to attract the tourist: rich historical associations, the only active volcano in the islands, the mountain of Mauna Kea rising over 13,000 feet above sea level where one can go skiing in the tropics in winter, black sand beaches, the second largest cattle ranch in the United States, the only district in these islands where coffee is grown, and hunting and deep sea fishing for the sportsman.

Man does not live by metropolitan areas alone. It is fortunate for Honolulu's future that its many attractions, both natural and man made, are complemented by the rural atmosphere and natural wonders on the other islands of the group.

Conservation of Natural Resources

ABOUT 1925 the citizens of Honolulu had a real scare, for they thought their excellent underground water supply was turning brackish. Fortunately, it was not, but the scare had the salutary effect of bringing home to everyone the vital necessity of conserving this resource. Living on such a relatively small island, surrounded by miles of Pacific Ocean, forces attention to conservation problems that are sometimes treated fairly casually on the mainland. It is now realized full well in Honolulu that without conservation the *metropolitan area* may suffer irreparable damage.

It is realized that beaches can be conserved and built up as a great attraction to tourists, some of whom will return to become residents—or they can be destroyed. For example, it is predicted that within about five years sand will have to be imported for making concrete, because to deplete local reserves further may destroy a vital natural resource.

Legally, the beaches are public property, freely available to anyone between the marks

of low and high tide, and frequent walks run from the nearest streets or highways to the beaches to provide public access. This is in marked contrast to practice in the metropolitan areas of some Atlantic Coast states, whose policy tends to repel the resident of the area or the vacationing visitor.

It is also realized that large tracts of the limited land area of the island must be left in their natural cover to conserve the very fine ground water supply that is such a basic factor in the economy.

One reason Honolulu is so delightful is that its friendly hospitable people do so many things, by way of conscious social policy, to build and develop its natural assets.

The Problem of Racial Segregation

FINALLY, Honolulu deserves mention because it is, perhaps, the only metropolitan area in the United States in which the various races are not segregated. The complex racial composition is shown by the following figures, for 1950:

	Per Cent
Japanese	36.9
Caucasian	22.9
Pure Hawaiian and part Hawaiian	17.3
Filipinos	12.2
Chinese	6.5
Others, Including Puerto Ricans	4.2
Total	100.00

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1957, p. 921.

Honolulu has solved a problem which is becoming increasingly important and difficult in the large cities and their suburbs on the mainland. Unfortunately, space will not permit a detailed discussion of this matter here.

The above list of highlights is not intended to give the impression that these metropolitan area problems are all satisfactorily solved in the islands, or that other problems do not exist. It is recognized, for example, that while territorial operation of the public schools may give equalized service, it may leave much to be desired from the point of view of local citizen concern and participation.

In conclusion, you will be interested to know that a preliminary draft of the Honolulu charter is about to be released for public hearings. It provides for the strong-mayor form of city government. The mayor will have the aid of an appointed chief administrative officer, to be called the managing director. The problem of better political representation of the voters all over the island will be met by electing a city council of nine members instead of the present seven. One coun-

cilman will be elected from each of three rural districts, one from each of three districts into which the built-up part of Honolulu will be divided, and three will be elected at large.

Early in 1958, it is planned, the electorate of the city and county of Honolulu will vote on the adoption of their first home rule charter, which is designed to create a local government better prepared to meet the challenge of this fascinating and rapidly growing metropolitan area.

The Epistemological Method

As an alternative to brainstorming I would like to suggest an approach to solving problems that I call the Epistemological Method. . . . [This method] comprises the following six basic steps:

- Define your problem. There is no point in worrying about something until you are really sure you know exactly what the problem is that you want to solve.
- Work backward to discover the problems behind your problem. Always ask yourself "why" a solution is desired. Many people have worked out wonderful solutions to problems that they did not have to solve in the first place.
- Stop in your backward trek when you come to the "barrier of compromise," i.e., the point beyond which you are unable or unwilling to go in pursuing an ultimate solution.
- Outline step by step all the basic approaches toward a solution of the *fundamental* problem. Chart these approaches systematically and discard those that do not meet your requirements.
- Chart all the conceivable ways of *implementing* each approach to the problem.
- If the problem has been correctly defined, the basic problem uncovered, the approach and implementation possibilities thoroughly evolved, the probability is high that the best solution will emerge. Then make your decision and act.

After completing this epistemological process you will not only know what you are doing, and why you are doing it, but you will also know all the other possible approaches, and why you are not taking them.

—Bernard S. Benson, "Let's Toss This Idea Up . . ." 56 *Fortune* 146 (October, 1957).

Higher Education and Training for Administrative Careers

By JOHN A. PERKINS

Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

EDUCATION for public administration is best approached in its broadest context. Higher education in any of its manifestations cannot be properly considered apart from the social climate. Conversely, one of education's responsibilities is to help the social order overcome its shortcomings. In this reciprocity, education for public administration is no exception. In fact, the relationship between education and social progress is brought into sharpest focus when government and education for public administration are considered.

Attitudes toward Government

FIRST of all, we must forthrightly face up to prevalent attitudes and conditions affecting both the government and higher education.

Ours is an era of bigness. We have a big country, a big population, big business, big labor, one world. To speak of "little" government, as some good people would, is a *non sequitur*. Economic, social, technological, and political inevitabilities indicate that government, if it is to meet the needs of this era of bigness, cannot play a shrinking role in our society. This fact affects the obligations of a self-governing people and their educational programs as well.

Government in the United States has expanded at all levels, especially in recent dec-

ades. Between 1902 and 1955, state and local expenditures expanded thirtyfold, while our gross national product expanded only twentyfold. Local governments employ more than 5 million persons, 10 per cent of the nation's nonfarm workers. Similar statistics can be cited without end. However, they present only one side of the picture. Such figures can be countered by equally significant ones indicating the growing number and improving quality of services rendered—services producing a healthier, better educated, more economically secure society.

But students of governmental administration need not engage in a battle of statistics. It is sufficient to conclude the American people have had to look increasingly to government. However reluctantly, they have enlarged the functions and role of government at all levels.

In this development, the real issue is not so much the size and complexity of government, important as that is, but the responsible control of government by the whole people. In other words, has big democracy gone hand in hand with big government? A subsidiary question is, can big government be staffed to function in an efficient and responsible way? The first question relates to education of the whole citizenry. The second relates to the education of officeholders, be they political officials or civil servants.

Happily, this half century has witnessed a tremendous expansion in suffrage, both in law

NOTE: This article was an address before the Institute of State and Local Government, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 14, 1957.

and in practice. The voters are better informed and better educated.

These developments are commendable. The inherent danger in them, however, is that the citizen's interest in government is usually acute and active only when related directly to his self-interest. Two quite different illustrations come to mind. A recent *New Yorker* cartoon depicts a considerably inebriated gentleman hammering on the bar for service and declaring to the disapproving bartender, "In a democracy the customer decides when he has had enough." In Edith Hamilton's new book, *The Echo of Greece* (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1957), Isocrates laments that the Athenians of his day were thinking not of their duties as citizens but of their rights. They were looking to the state to guarantee not freedom as in the old days but privilege. Self-restraint must be the essence of citizenship if self-government is to succeed. This basic fact of self-government needs as much emphasis in American education as the tenets of communism receive throughout all levels and specializations of Russian education.

Another inherent danger is that as government grows bigger, whether at local, state, or federal level, it will become tradition bound. The status quo is defended out of a misconceived patriotism. Hence, there may be a failure to modify our governments when there is need to do so. The requirements of responsibility and efficiency so well known to students of public administration may go unheeded.

Responsible government, efficient administration—these are, essentially, a matter of competent, dedicated public officials supported by intelligent citizens. Present and future shortages of qualified personnel for business and industry, for teaching, and the other professions have been well documented. Happily, positive programs to alleviate these shortages have been initiated.

Yet, there has been little concern over the equally serious shortage of qualified personnel for government and its administration. In view of the essential role of government in our society, this failure to attract enough able people may prove fatal. Newcomers to the federal government inevitably are favorably impressed with the quality of administrative talent. To a great extent, however, these administrators

are the youth of the Depression grown to maturity and responsibility. Before long, many of them will be eligible for retirement. One hears it said, by those who know Washington well, that, at the present time and for some years past, sufficient numbers of men and women of similar competence and dedication have not been entering government service.

One of these highly respected professional public administrators confided:

In the last dozen years or so there has been nothing like the same number and talent recruited into government that there was in the thirties. Yet, the need for top-flight people is great. Government needs administrators with special talent in analysis and synthesis, with the ability to tear problems apart and put them together again with good horse sense. Beware of the doctrinaire fellow. Public administration requires men who can knit together the contributions of the specialists, who can achieve coordination through reason instead of by means of the big stick. Such administrators must be socially and psychologically healthy. For those who are qualified, government is an exceedingly exciting and challenging place to work.

Given such an attractive job description, why is public service not overwhelmed with applicants? Political scientists have sought explanations. With respect to pay levels, recruitment and promotion practices, training, and employee motivation, government service, especially at the upper levels, runs a poor second to private pursuits. These facts are but a syndrome. The malady is public attitudes toward government. Except in times of crisis many people are indifferent to government. When they do take an interest, it is in a spirit of indignation; often disloyalty, corruption, or inefficiency are assumed. The worst gets printed. The best doesn't make news.

Admittedly, it is dangerous to generalize about public attitudes. Actually, there has been a noticeable increase in the prestige of public employment since Leonard White's pioneering study in 1929. For the population as a whole, private employment per se is no longer held in higher esteem. But the appeal of government service remains low among college graduates, the very group most essential to the complex tasks of big government.

A recent survey of college students reveals self-contented indifference to politics and self-

centered conformity to the mores of our business society. Only 17 per cent of the collegians thought that participation in community affairs would be one of the three activities from which they would derive most satisfaction. Only 3 per cent gave useful citizenship top place in their plans for the future. The satisfactions of career, family, and leisure were overwhelming favorites.

The roots of such attitudes lie, of course, in our history. Our country was born in protest against overbearing monarchy. In exploiting the great promises of the industrial revolution in a land of economic virginity, restrictions of any kind, especially from government, were unwelcome. Then, too, the "shame of the cities" a few decades ago tarred public employment as a disreputable means of livelihood—a misconception which has not been altogether dispelled. As a result, those most needed as participants in government service shun it.

It is interesting to speculate, too, whether Americans, joiners by nature, have not so widely proliferated their loyalties among service clubs, social groups, humane causes, even institutions of learning, as to make it difficult for them to sense the primacy of loyalty to government.

We must also recognize several characteristics of our economic system at midcentury which add to the difficulty of recruitment for government service, particularly for policy level jobs. Taxes on individual incomes and inheritances give fewer people financial independence in the prime of life. Further, ever fewer people enjoy the freedom of self-employment. Instead, most work for large corporations. There the prize jobs with accompanying high income are to be achieved by career-long devotion. Job security and company-sponsored retirement plans also militate against sacrificing security to do public service.

To sum up, we have growing needs to be met by government. Yet, the process of government is unattractive, owing to our attitudes, our history, and our economy.

The Campus and the Capital

AT BOTTOM, the problem of staffing government depends upon changing public atti-

tudes and the individual's sense of duty. Recognizing this, we are suddenly and belatedly awakened to the community of interest between the campus and the capital. Unfortunately, there has been a hiatus between government and politics and the colleges and universities that is especially hard to explain.

Our so-called liberal education professes classical orientation. But is it really so oriented? Pericles, speaking for the Athenians, declared: "We do not allow absorption in our own affairs to interfere with participation in the city's. We regard the man who holds aloof from public affairs as useless. . . ." The avowed purpose of education in the schools of Athens was to prepare men for public service. No one can assert that American higher education has had as a first purpose the inculcating of a dutiful sense of public service. The history and the languages of the Romans and the Greeks have been of greater pertinence to American higher education than what these ancient self-governing peoples thought and wrote about. What we teach as philosophy they practiced as politics. To them humanism was not simply language. It was the day-to-day wrestling with human affairs.

If undergraduate higher education is to be truly liberal, its core subject might well be the study of government in all its aspects and the related social sciences. The social sciences, properly organized and taught, should create an indigenous twentieth-century humanism in the true classical tradition. Personal participation in public affairs will then inevitably be the role of the educated man. Only if this emphasis on social sciences is made in our colleges, and those social subjects thereby evolve this new humanism, will self-government be properly safeguarded.

Walter Lippmann rightly objects to the tacit assumption of present-day higher education. It assumes that "while education can do something to enable the individual to make a success of his own career, the instinctive rightness and righteousness of the people can be relied upon for everything else." What a dangerous assumption for a self-governing people!

In view of the danger, what ideally should happen within higher education for the benefit of all students and especially of those committed to careers in public service? First, train-

ing for public careers should be considered in relation to undergraduate education. So far as education is instrumental in determining values, it happens in the undergraduate years. The values inculcated and the subject-matter interest generated among undergraduates also determine to a great extent who will go into what fields of graduate study and what types of employment.

If public administration is to recruit sufficient numbers of talented youth, it may be that undergraduate education, particularly political science and other social sciences, needs a little reformation. Since World War II, the glamorous fields for students, faculty, and administration alike have been the physical sciences, pure and applied. Recognizing this situation, and determined not to lose their place in the academic sun, the classical subjects—languages, history, philosophy, and literature—have played upon the conscience of higher education. They have staged a rear-guard action under the guise of general education.

Meanwhile, the social sciences, lacking tradition and without glamor, may have languished rather than flowered. Mind you, I am not averse to the physical sciences or to the most traditional liberal arts subjects. But the first concern should be that the subjects most capable of preparing today's citizens for the kind of life so much admired in the Ancients receive due attention. The entire citizenry needs the background the social sciences offer. In fact, political science and cognate subjects, properly organized and taught, constitute the true general education for the twentieth century. If Plato, Isocrates, or Aristotle were teaching today, would they be offering their courses in the departments of languages or literatures? Neither history nor philosophy (as now taught) would be likely to attract them. Their subject-matter offerings would be classified as the social sciences. Yet, this true core of humanism is far from dominant in our undergraduate education.

Many undergraduates who go into professional fields other than public administration ultimately find employment in public service. But, given our present undergraduate curriculums, they are seldom exposed to the rudiments of government and administration. Undergraduates who never go into public service

will, of course, be citizens. But without considerably more background in political and other social sciences than many of them now have, they cannot provide the enlightened, high-minded base in the citizenry that is needed if professional public administrators are to function effectively.¹

Whose fault is it if faculty colleagues don't give the social sciences an appropriate place in the curriculum, if presidents and deans don't accommodate their budgetary needs, if the abler students choose other majors? In striving for objectivity and "scientific" respectability, social scientists have neglected even to propagandize their subject matter, not to mention admitting to its high social purpose. Perhaps the political science curriculum in general and courses in introductory public administration in particular are falling short of their opportunities—indeed, of their responsibilities. Might I mention, too, the wisdom of a new rapprochement between political science and public administration?

Graduate Programs in Public Administration

IT is with considerable temerity that I approach the meat of the matter: graduate programs in public administration. These programs have been somewhat on the periphery of my attention in recent years. My professional colleagues have given far more thought than I have to detailed curricular matters and their execution.

Nothing would please me more than to open my eyes, like Rip Van Winkle, and find everything changed—for the better. However, it is my impression that, for the most part, the conceptions and conundrums of a decade or two ago remain much the same; and, indeed, some of the impetus of that period may have declined. A few new courses, or at least course titles, may have been added out of a desire to emphasize the complexities and sophistication

¹If some think that, in view of current technical emphasis, training in public administration is unnecessary, they might be reminded that in Russia's technical institutes, according to their Minister of Higher Education, 10 per cent of the student's time is devoted to learning Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism to insure thorough indoctrination. Can Americans assume that preparation for self-government takes less time or is a less worthy object of study?

of this field. We are all anxious to gain for it highest professional status. At the same time, some curriculums in public administration are still eclectic congeries of courses offered by the sundry departments and schools composing a major university. Public administration programs are often a patchwork. Courses and the professors offering them often do not have as their *raison d'être* education for public administration. The faculty in public administration per se is still a very small, albeit devoted, one. It is augmented by conscripts from other disciplines and from operating units in the more respectable and efficient local public jurisdictions. That the nation's capital until recently was without a full-time graduate school of public administration also indicates less than to-be-expected progress.²

Whether the proper curriculum emphasis of professional students should be upon the fundamental and theoretical aspects of the subject or upon the intensely practical tool courses plagues public administration as it does other professions. To enrich their teaching, programs in public administration continue to affiliate themselves with the governments, mostly state and local. This has benefited faculty, students, and public officials. The national government, which is our "teaching hospital" par excellence, is seldom utilized, to

² Admittedly, training programs in public administration are offered in Washington, D. C., by some universities and through the government. In 1957, American University consolidated its programs in a School of Government and Public Administration offering a full graduate program for Master's and Doctor's degrees. In addition to internships and in-service projects, it also conducts professional institutes and a summer Public Affairs Laboratory. Through its "Washington Semester" program this school brings to Washington 200 students per year from 80 colleges. George Washington University's School of Government has a Master's degree program in public administration; it also conducts full-year advanced management programs for government agencies and special short institutes.

The Department of Agriculture Graduate School continues to offer courses in public administration. In 1945, the Civil Service Commission took over the interdepartmental management intern program, originally started in 1934 by the National Institute of Public Affairs. The Brookings Institution has just inaugurated a special executive training program for well-established public executives.

the detriment of both the profession and the government. The nation's capital should be a Mecca for graduate students in public administration.

Students in public administration are of two types—and are too few! First, there are those blessed ones with determination, zeal, and capabilities who, somewhat mysteriously, in spite of more and richer fellowships and more lucrative employment opportunities elsewhere, still want to be public servants. Second, there are those who, incidentally to their main professional objectives, elect a few courses in public administration. They are aware that government is a major employer of those trained in forestry, welfare, health, and education. They wisely recognize the need to become somewhat acquainted with administrative theory and practice as related to government. We have never quite satisfactorily accommodated both types, providing for them with equal enthusiasm courses equally well conceived for their respective needs.

It is my impression that education for public administration has not measured up to the needs of our time. Yet, the fault primarily is that our time does not recognize its needs. You have already gathered that I admire the ancient Athenians. They did make a fatal mistake, however, which we should not repeat. Their Golden Age was the fifth century, B.C. The great schools, the Academy, the Lyceum, and the school of Isocrates, did not flourish until the fourth century. Athens became full of educational fervor, particularly with respect to education for public affairs, as if in answer to a broad realization of governmental failure. This unfortunate historical sequence constitutes a lesson for the United States. We must not let misunderstanding, inefficiency, and neglect of government so impair our national strength that we belatedly look to higher education simply for an autopsy of failure. We must bring public affairs and public administration to the forefront in our universities as a sort of preventive medicine in this period of early national maturity. While ideally we might wish someone else could take the lead, the responsibility belongs inescapably, first, to those who teach public administration and, second, to those who practice it.

Getting the Facts and Being Less Tame

How are we to find the great strength needed for the task before us? Alfred North Whitehead offers one suggestion teachers of public administration are in a happy position to follow. He writes:

... firsthand knowledge is the ultimate basis of intellectual life. To a large extent book learning conveys second-hand information, and as such can never rise to the importance of immediate practice. Our goal is to see the immediate events of our lives as instances of our general ideas. What the learned world tends to offer is one second-hand scrap of information illustrating ideas derived from another second-hand scrap of information. The second-handedness of the learned world is the secret of its mediocrity. It is tame because it has never been scared by facts.³

For the large assignment facing them, teachers in public administration cannot be tame and they must have facts. In their intimate relationships with government, they are in a position, unique in academia, to relate themselves to the great problems of our day and their solution. Still more personal public service and governmental research are called for. Research is the elixir of professional leadership. As a nation we are devoting about 1.25 per cent of our gross national product to research. Of this \$5.4 billion, not more than 1 per cent is for research in the social sciences; moreover, only a very small part of this \$55 million goes for projects that will advance the art and science of government. Medicine offers a sharp contrast. It spends about \$340 millions annually on research, a 275 per cent increase in the last decade.

The medical schools, too, have evolved an enviable synthesis of research, teaching, and practice. From the basic sciences and preclinical studies, new facts are discovered. They are carried into the clinics and related to human ills. Many cures are effected in practice, owing to these facts. In the process, new problems are discovered by teaching clinicians and new theories are developed. These hypotheses are investigated in the laboratory, and the cycle repeats itself. Medical education has thus be-

come highly respected for its enlarged contributions to mankind. There is a striking parallelism of opportunity and method between medicine and public administration.

Progress against disease requires clinical facilities in the greatest centers of population where medical problems exist in infinite variety. For the same reason, progress in public administration depends upon relating its teaching, research, and students clinically to the greatest center of government in the free world, our nation's capital. There administration, its problems, and its facts will always abound. Second-handedness in studying them will never be adequate. Is it too much of a dream to suggest that every university having a major program in public administration should send its students sometime in the course of their training to our capital?

What a wealth of as yet unrealized possibilities Washington, D. C. offers teachers of public administration and their universities! The teachers over the country need only relate themselves in joint efforts with one another and institutions existing there. If done on a cooperative basis by the larger institutions, one can visualize a new and much needed structure—new in brick and mortar but, more important, new in conception and organization. The faculty might be drawn from the rich resources of our best existing graduate programs. They might serve on a rotating basis. If public administration follows medicine's example in relating facts to immediate concerns, its esteem within higher education will be equally high. But more important, public administration will make an enlarged contribution to society.

So much for facts. Now about being less tame. Within the graduate professional educational components of our great universities, public administration has been altogether too tame. The status of public administration on the campus is usually something less than a graduate professional school. It should be something more. Public administration must be brought from the status of a kind of stepchild, a Cinderella before the ball, to that of a queen among its presently dominating older sister schools of law, medicine and health, forestry, and social work.

Here the analogy may break down. Even a

³ A. N. Whitehead, *Aims of Education and Other Essays* (Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 79.

fairy godfather or two like the late Mr. Samuel S. Fels and Mr. Lucius N. Littauer will not in all likelihood be enough to work the needed transition. Obviously, such financial help is needed. More important is the need for professional leaders of public administration with a large conception of their role and with the courage and ability to put carriage wheels un-

der their ideas. The conception that must permeate the most conservative academic minds is that higher education for most of the professions is not complete, owing to the great probability of graduates working either within big government or with big government, unless students have a few courses in public administration.

Ten Guiding Principles for General Electric's Philosophy of Decentralization

Since philosophy is, by definition, a system of first principles, I should like to list . . . ten principles which express General Electric's philosophy of decentralization.

1. Decentralization places authority to make decisions at points as near as possible to where actions take place.
2. Decentralization is likely to get best over-all results by getting greatest and most directly applicable knowledge and most timely understanding actually into play on the greatest number of decisions.
3. Decentralization will work if real authority is delegated; and not if details then have to be reported, or, worse yet, if they have to be "checked" first.
4. Decentralization requires confidence that associates in decentralized positions will have the capacity to make sound decisions in the majority of cases; and such confidence starts at the executive level. Unless the President and all the other Officers have a deep personal conviction and an active desire to decentralize full decision-making responsibility and authority, actual decentralization will never take place. The Officers must set an example in the art of full delegation.
5. Decentralization requires understanding that the main role of staff or services is the rendering of assistance and advice to line operators through a relatively few experienced people, so that those making decisions can themselves make them correctly.
6. Decentralization requires realization that the natural aggregate of many individually sound decisions will be better for the business and for the public than centrally planned and controlled decisions.
7. Decentralization rests on the need to have general business objectives, organization structure, relationships, policies, and measurements known, understood, and followed; but realizing that definition of policies does not necessarily mean uniformity of methods of executing such policies in decentralized operations.
8. Decentralization can be achieved only when higher executives realize that authority genuinely delegated to lower echelons cannot, in fact, also be retained by them. We have, today, Officers and Managers who still believe in decentralization down to themselves and no further. By paying lip-service to decentralization, but actually reviewing detailed work and decisions and continually "second-guessing" their associates, such Officers keep their organization in confusion and prevent the growth of self-reliant men.
9. Decentralization will work only if responsibility commensurate with decision-making authority is truly accepted and exercised at all levels.
10. Decentralization requires personnel policies based on measured performance, enforced standards, rewards for good performance, and removal for incapacity or poor performance.

—Reprinted by permission from Ralph J. Cordiner, *New Frontiers for Professional Managers* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 52.

Changing Patterns in the Philosophy of Management

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WHETHER he recognizes it or not, every manager has a philosophy on which he relies in doing his job. It is rarely systematic or integrated. Typically, it is contradictory and inconsistent. If he expresses it in words, the description is likely to diverge to some degree from the philosophy he reveals in practice.

A moment's reflection should make clear why these things are true. Managers deal with complex problems in complex settings. As Herbert Simon points out, they cannot be objectively rational about their decisions because they cannot satisfy all of the conditions of rationality. They cannot know all of the facts about the situations they face. They cannot comprehend all of the implications of the alternatives before them, nor are they aware of the full range of possible alternatives. Their knowledge of the goals that should be served is limited and their ignorance of the full significance of these goals is manifold.

If the manager is to deal at all with the problems before him, he must simplify them, put them in a context he understands, relate them to some system, however imperfect, over which he has a command. He must analyze them in terms of ideas that have meaning to him and of values that he believes in and that

have significance for him. To make his job manageable, then, and to make himself in some measure rational, the manager must depend on a philosophy.

What Is Philosophy?

PHILOSOPHY can mean many things. For some, it signifies a love of wisdom; for others, a body of principles, a set of values, a world view, or merely a field of study. For our purposes here, perhaps a philosophy can best be viewed as a *system of ideas* which does three things:

First, it *defines what is true*—as when communism prescribes the inevitable decay of capitalist economies or democracy asserts that men possess inalienable rights; as when Newton posited the attraction of masses or Albert Einstein asserted that $E = mc^2$. What the philosophy states to be true may not be capable of empirical proof, and sometimes it may be patently wrong. Nevertheless, philosophy does attempt to describe the nature of reality in abstract terms.

A second thing that philosophy does is to *determine what questions are important to ask and to rule out others*. A believer in a natural law philosophy might think it important to ask what values the moral order of the universe would impose upon him in dealing with a particular problem. A casuist would ask what precedents existed for handling a

NOTE: This article was originally presented as a lecture in the Air Force Advanced Management Program at George Washington University, May 7, 1957.

matter, whereas a utilitarian would find such a question of secondary importance.

In his *Ethics for Policy Decision*, Wayne A. R. Leys¹ makes clear the relationship between philosophy and the asking of deliberative questions. The book was prepared for managers and others who are policy makers on this premise: "If policy makers read philosophical ethics for critical questions instead of answers, they may correct some sources of bad judgment." (p. 3) Every manager should read this book. Its first portion is devoted to an examination of the questions posed by various philosophical schools; the second applies these questions to case examples of policy-making problems in business and government. Here are some of the questions which Leys draws from different philosophical schools.

For the Stoics, he posits these questions, which reveal that every manager is indeed something of a Stoic:

1. What is not within our power?
2. What must be accepted as external conditions and what is intolerable because it destroys personal integrity?
3. To what must we be resigned in order to preserve our rationality and self-respect? (p. 190)

The Marxians, however, would be more likely to inquire in this vein:

1. What are the fundamental changes in the mode of economic production? What economic classes are created by these changes?
2. How are all issues related to the class conflict? How do class interests determine ideology?
3. What action in the immediate situation will hasten the final showdown in the class war, regardless of the interests of the individuals immediately involved? (pp. 190-91)

Finally, we might look to the semanticists, from whom we've recently heard a great deal:

1. Is your knowledge of fact confused by emotional language?
2. Does the language that you use prejudge the issues? Can you translate your description of fact into an expression that has a less or a different emotional meaning?
3. In choosing your course of action, do you select words (as a part of your action) to which other people will respond rationally? Are you en-

gaging in unimportant verbal quibbles? Are you expecting words to do things that words cannot do? Are you failing to engage in verbal ceremonials that are required by other people? Should you engage in verbal trickery in dealing with irrational or preoccupied individuals and groups? (p. 191)

The third contribution that philosophy makes is the *prescription of a set of values* useful in making decisions about right and wrong. You are all familiar with examples. The Judaeo-Christian system prescribes the Golden Rule, Aristotle the Golden Mean. In a more contemporary vein, democracy prescribes the rectitude of values related to human freedom.

As we move to an examination of management philosophy, specifically, it will be useful to keep these three aspects of philosophy in mind, for it is his philosophy which helps a manager (1) to define what is true, (2) to ask the right questions, and (3) to apply the appropriate values.

Philosophies in Practice

DIFFERENT approaches to management may often be related directly to different beliefs about what is true. A stark example of this point occurred in the period following World War II, when Sears, Roebuck and Company and Montgomery Ward and Company followed divergent business policies in competing for a common market.² Under General Robert E. Wood, Sears expanded, on the assumption that the economy was essentially healthy and would grow in the postwar period. Sewell Avery, believing that a depression was due, held the line. As a result, Sears advanced from 57.7 per cent of net sales for the two firms in 1940 to 68.6 per cent in 1950, and Ward's percentage declined correspondingly.

The values of the two leaders also differed. While both looked askance at the government's efforts to influence the economy, Avery's aversion was probably stronger. Possibly his failure to interpret the postwar period correctly was in some way related to his negative valuation of government economic activities. The interplay of values with perceptions of

¹ Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 286-301.

fact is not uncommon and holds many hazards for the manager.

Other revealing examples may be drawn from personnel policies and practices. Certainly, the personnel policy promulgated by an organization reflects in some measure the beliefs its leadership holds about what people are like and how they can be influenced to put out their best efforts. The sweatshop of the past was rooted in a depreciated estimate of the worth of the great mass of individuals. Today, factories and offices generally demonstrate a much different understanding.

In a similar vein, the questions asked about organization procedures reflect different views. "Are there enough controls?" is a common question in management, which when carried too far may well evidence an overemphasis on human frailty. How much better, and less frequent, is the question, "Is there sufficient individual opportunity?"

Values are implicit in all of these examples. Some personnel policies celebrate the organization, others celebrate man himself. Some view the individual as a commodity to be bartered, a machine to be exploited; others treat him with a basic humanity. What you do depends on what you believe to be right, on what your values are.

These practical examples help to demonstrate that a manager's philosophy doesn't exist in a vacuum. It is influenced by general social philosophies, by individual codes and temperaments, and many other factors. It is also influenced by the growing body of management literature and by the activities of professional associations. As managers are increasingly exposed to management training in schools of business or public administration, these influences are bound to grow. By the same token, the philosophical views of individual managers are reflected in their writings and other professional activities. This is a field in which practitioners, teachers, and researchers frequently exchange ideas, information, and even roles.

Thus, the literature and other professional activities in the field should provide useful clues to how management philosophy is changing or is likely to change. It is on these activities that primary reliance is placed for this

analysis, but it is tempered, inevitably, with observations of the administrative milieu.

From Folklore to Science

PROBABLY the most noticeable present trend in management philosophy is the growing belief that management can and should be a field of scientific inquiry and that the practice of management can be made more scientific. In a sense, this is the master trend, to which all others are related. For ease of reference, it might be called the movement from management folklore to management science.

The folklore of our field continues to have value. A review of some of the sprightly comments of the late Lent D. Upson, long-time director of the National Training School for Public Service and dean of the School of Public Affairs and Social Work at Wayne University, will refresh us and also our memories about what that folklore is like. In his *Letters on Public Administration*,³ he has these things to say:

Don't ask your superior to approve of plans you are sure of. The mere asking raises the question of expediency. If it is necessary to discuss a subject with a superior, it is usually well to bring a gang with you. One of your associates will think up the right answer while you are stumbling over it—or at least will confuse the issue so thoroughly that your superior will remain in the dark. Loud talk and confusion may snatch victory out of defeat. This administrative technique is particularly good at public hearings.

An alternative is always to bring in two plans—a good one and a bad one. Your boss will spend half the morning tearing your bad plan apart and then be so tired he will approve the good one without change.

Your subordinates have doubtless already learned these techniques. But what to do if one of them gets out on a limb indulging in them? Yank him back if he is a good man, a mayor's appointee, or the nephew of a heavy stockholder. Otherwise, saw off the limb after about the third error—or resign yourself. . . .

Occasionally ask the advice of your colleagues and subordinates on some current problem. It will flatter them and they may surprise you.

In some quarters, this approach is still pop-

³ Reprinted in part in Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration: A Book of Readings* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1953), pp. 332-33.

ular, and I for one hope that its brighter aspects will never be fully lost. But increasingly, men are coming to believe and to demonstrate that folklore isn't enough. Dating roughly from the 1920's, management has become an important object of scientific inquiry, and scientific tools have become more and more necessary in the field.⁴

Early contributors to this development were the "scientific managers"—among them, Henri Fayol, V. A. Graicunas, Luther Gulick, Lyndall Urwick, the Gilbreths.⁵ The approach of this school was primarily mechanistic, involving the detailed analysis of formal and structural aspects of organization and work processes. While it is the fashion among some contemporary students to criticize this school because it laid claim to too much scientific sophistication, its contribution is of lasting value.

A related early group placed greater emphasis on the human dimension. The Hawthorne experiments are the classic example of this approach, though hardly the most sophisticated. Here one recalls Mayo, Roethlisberger, and Dickson;⁶ Mary Parker Follett's dynamic administration;⁷ and, more recently, Robert Merton, Sam Stouffer, Rensis Likert, Alex Bavelas, Dorwin Cartwright, and a host of others,⁸ whose work carries such familiar and

appealing titles as group dynamics, motivation research, participative management, and the psychology of work.

A third group influencing this trend and providing a strong foundation for it includes men like Leonard D. White⁹ and John Gaus¹⁰—the historians and describers of management—whose principal contributions to the growth of a scientific temper have been the clear analysis of management problems, the exact recording of management data, and the stimulation of others in the field to grapple with its more important problems.

In the period since the war, the trend from folklore to science has had a major culmination, bringing with it more sophisticated methods, more powerful analytical tools, and a sounder general science of man and society. We now find not only social scientists, with their new-found sophistication, but also physicists, electrical engineers, mathematicians, biologists, and other specialists contributing to our understanding and practice of management. Operations research, the theory of games, and other specialized analytical tools are coming into play with much greater frequency.

With this prodigious development has come a better understanding of management. We now have a larger recognition of determinism in management action, reflecting our appreciation of determinism in all social activity. Events don't just happen, they are caused. Things heretofore regarded as necessary evils, ever-present problems, are now viewed as natural outgrowths of prevailing conditions and, hence, as subject to control or change.

We also realize, more fully than before, that management is an intellectual undertaking in which the powers of intelligent inquiry are more important than hunches. Greater emphasis is being given to ways of making man-

⁴ Perhaps the best recent example of this trend is the appearance of the *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Published by the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration at Cornell University, this journal is dedicated, significantly, "to advancing basic understanding of administrative processes through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis."

⁵ See Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (Institute of Public Administration, 1937), for examples of the approach of this group.

⁶ See Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Macmillan Co., 1933), and F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Harvard University Press, 1946).

⁷ Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (eds.), *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett* (Harper and Brothers, 1942).

⁸ For examples of this work see Robert K. Merton (ed.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Free Press, 1952), Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford University Press, 1951), Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (eds.), *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Row, Peterson and Company, 1953), and Rensis Likert, *Developing Patterns of Management* (American Management Association, 1956).

⁹ For example, see Leonard D. White's trilogy on administrative history—*The Federalists* (Macmillan Company, 1956), *The Jeffersonians* (Macmillan Company, 1956), *The Jacksonians* (Macmillan Company, 1956). A fourth volume, *The Republican Era*, will be published in 1958.

¹⁰ For example, see John M. Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1947), and John M. Gaus and Leon Wolcott, *Public Administration and the U. S. Department of Agriculture* (Public Administration Service, 1940).

agement a rational activity, to take out of it the guesswork and put into it the laws of probability.

Management is increasingly recognized as a social process, rather than simply as an exercise of authority and command, in terms of assigned responsibilities and functions. Our focus is on relationships among people, processes and currents, patterns of association and communication. It has moved away from the more formal statements of organization charts and books of procedures and the legal proscriptions of the statute books.

This broader understanding of what is true has led managers to elevate certain kinds of questions and to introduce others in their deliberations. These are the sorts of questions which reflect this change:

1. What are the underlying causes of the problem? Are they the same as those appearing on the surface?
2. What can the scholars, the scientists, and others with specialized knowledge and training contribute to solving it? What kinds of intellectual skills will be useful?
3. What is the social structure with which we are dealing? What is the informal communication pattern? How does it affect the formal relationships in the organization?
4. What are the major facets of the problem? How do they relate? What is the human dimension? What human relationships are involved?

In the realm of values, the changes brought by the growth of science in management are most difficult to grasp and describe. Viewed broadly, the increased emphasis on science has apparently led us to the incipient decline of values in management activity. It has emphasized management as a tool, to be applied to the service of any ends. In the process, the idea that the means used must be consistent with the ends sought has been dealt a serious blow.

The intrusion of prevailing scientific philosophies into management encourages the separation of fact and value, with arguments that the latter area is not subject to empirical verification by the methods of science. Values must be accepted as given. Once given, scientific techniques may be used to find ways of achieving their operationally defined elements in practice.

While the acceptance of this view may be essential to preserve the objectivity science requires, it presents two difficulties in management practice. First, it tends to discourage attention to value questions by raising doubts about whether they can be answered objectively and rationally. Second, it encourages a view of the world in which values are relegated to secondary importance. From both comes the danger that management will become an enterprise without values. Though scientific approaches may require that value questions be put aside in the course of studies and analyses of specific processes and problems, it must not be forgotten that value questions have an essential place in all management deliberations.

"From Morality to Morale"

A SECOND trend parallels and springs from the movement from folklore to science. Borrowing a title from David Riesman's provocative book, *The Lonely Crowd*,¹¹ I would characterize it as the movement "from morality to morale."

At root, this is the trend to human relations, but it involves much more than that. Implicit in it is the potential recasting of the entire spirit of management activity from getting the job done to keeping the people happy.

No manager familiar with the Hawthorne experiments can doubt the importance of the human dimension in management. With them has come the twentieth century industrial recognition of that old maxim, "it pays to be nice to people." The human relations movement carries with it the realization that if people are to do their best work and contribute the most that they can, they must feel that they have a stake in the enterprise, that they are important to it, and that their worth is appreciated.

In the period between the Hawthorne experiments and today, human relations has become a major item of faith for the manager, as it is, indeed, for the whole society. The human relations proponents are many and their approach has invaded management circles

¹¹ Yale University Press, 1950.

with what frequently amounts to a new religion.¹²

How has this trend influenced the philosophy of management? Most important, it has taught us to recognize important elements in the human world of bureaucracy. The organization appears as a social group and work a social activity. The individual brings to his job his total personality; he is not just a single-purposed automaton. Side by side with the formal structure of the organization exists an informal social structure that is vital to the individual employees and to the life of the organization itself.

From this recognition of different elements spring new questions, of which these are indicative:

1. What is the social environment within which we operate?
2. What persons and group affiliations influence attitudes and decisions?
3. How are human needs being met within the organization?
4. How will a proposed action be received by the individuals who occupy centers of informal authority?

The value considerations resulting from this development are varied and contradictory. On the one hand, the human relations approach, when taken seriously, enthrone the democratic ideals of maximum individual development and maximum human welfare. It argues for the greatest possible release of each individual's full creative and productive powers. It preaches that each participant deserves to receive essential satisfactions from his activities.

On the other hand, there is a danger that it will debase the individual, treating him as an object to be manipulated and emphasizing the group rather than the man. Human beings become objects to be shaped with the proper

psychological tools into instruments of the organization.

The value problem here must be faced directly. Unprincipled and unbridled application of human relations techniques could result in a subtle tyranny, frightening to contemplate. It could be sufficiently morally debilitating to undermine the entire field.

From Mechanistic to Dynamic Approaches

OUR third important trend in management philosophy is also an aspect of the first. It is the movement from mechanistic to dynamic approaches to management.

The mechanistic character of early "scientific management" has already been mentioned. It tended to treat organizational activity like a machine process, to emphasize its static and its repetitive aspects. More recently, we find a greater acknowledgment of the constantly changing nature of organizations, their participants, and their environment. From static features, the emphasis has changed to flux and process; from repetitive features, it has turned to evolutionary development.

This change of emphasis is apparent in the work of Chester I. Barnard,¹³ Herbert Simon,¹⁴ Talcott Parsons,¹⁵ and the less-well-known Peter M. Blau, whose major book bears the revealing title, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*.¹⁶ The emphasis here on movement and change leads quite naturally to problems of predicting the future under conditions of uncertainty, and thus moves us directly into the realm of game theory, probability theory, and operations research.

This trend, too, is affecting the philosophy of management. It has directed attention to the fact that an organization is a dynamic institution in a dynamic environment. It has

¹² For examples of thought in the human relations field, see Robert Dubin's excellent collection of articles and cases, *Human Relations in Administration: The Sociology of Organization* (Prentice-Hall, 1951). See also Thomas North Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Harvard University Press, 1936), Harold Guetzkow, *Groups, Leadership, and Men* (Carnegie, 1951), and S. A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton University Press, 1949).

¹³ Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Harvard University Press, 1938).

¹⁴ Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (2d ed., Macmillan Company, 1957). See also, by the same author, *Models of Man: Social and Rational* (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957).

¹⁵ Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937). See also Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Harvard University Press, 1951).

¹⁶ University of Chicago Press, 1955.

forced us to admit that the prediction of future organization status and the analysis of problems requires the application of sophisticated methods and techniques. Under this influence, we are led to ask questions of this sort:

1. What is the real nature of the problem? What methods of experimentation and analysis can be used to determine its perimeters?
2. What other problems in this or other fields are similar to it? How were they solved? Are those solutions applicable here?
3. What are the key variables influencing our situation?
4. What kind of strategy is appropriate?

The values perpetuated here are largely those of science itself. Full knowledge, tempered and reserved judgment, and a rigorous methodology are all advanced as good, because they will encourage results that work.

There are other trends, all interrelated in some measure with those we have covered, which could be explored if there were time. The movement from individualism to group action is one; the decline of legal in favor of social considerations, another. All of these spring from and contribute to a different understanding of what is true, what questions are important, and what values should be served in management.

Conclusion

I HAVE hoped to demonstrate that management philosophy is essential in the practice of management. Inevitably, it accompanies the act of managing, and it might be offered that the better the philosophy, the better the management. The more nearly the manager's philosophy defines what is actually true, poses the truly important questions, and prescribes the highest and most appropriate

values, the better his management will be. Good management judgment requires sound philosophical views.

Our society seems to be moving rapidly to its total bureaucratization. The action of managers in both public and private enterprise is likely to have an increasing impact on the material and spiritual welfare of our people. Already, in the age of nuclear warfare and radiation fall-out, managers hold the survival of much of the human race in their grasp.

Under such conditions, we cannot be content with anything but the best. Men in management positions must be truly exceptional. They must possess qualities that will enable them to decide wisely on the proper course of action. In the light of the developments we are seeing in management, and in the range of activities for which management is responsible, these are some of the characteristics which our managers must have: a broad, world-encompassing view, a scientific spirit, a knowledge of the methods and tools of science, a basic understanding of the social sciences and the humanities, talents in the integration of ideas and in the solution of problems, and, above all, an idealism that will guide and stimulate them.¹⁷

This is indeed a large order. Though it may not be achieved, it must certainly be pursued. Perhaps there is no better advice to leave with those undertaking such a task than these words offered by John M. Clark, professor emeritus of economics at Columbia University:

... if we do our best and if luck does not turn too strongly against us, we may hope, not to solve our problems, but to evolve with them.

¹⁷ For a further discussion of some of these qualities and their relationship to education for the public service, see Robert A. Walker, "The Universities and the Public Service," 39 *American Political Science Review* 926-33 (October, 1945).

The Organization of Child Welfare Services

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THE development of a new philosophy of program for any public agency has significant repercussions upon administration. Nowhere can this be seen better at the present time than in the human treatment fields which provide major problems in organization. Two such fields undergoing change in recent years for the emergence of treatment programs are child welfare services and mental health. This statement of concepts for the organization of child welfare services rests upon the belief that the study of this area of administration offers some unique opportunities to students of public administration for isolation of certain aspects of organization which may be common to other treatment fields today. Frequently, in the launching of treatment programs a break must be made with an older larger agency bogged down by a philosophy of custody only.

The persistent questions facing those interested in the organization of treatment fields are:

1. What programs offer a unity of purpose for logical combination in one agency?
2. What kind of internal organization should be used both for top policy determination and for the execution of programs?

In child welfare administration in the United States, no common pattern exists for bringing together social services to children and the institutional care of children. In

state-administered programs of direct services, the professional case work services to children are commonly separated from administration of institutions for children. At the local level of government there is, in contrast, usually a unification of institutions and case workers within a single agency.

The British, on the other hand, have attempted a more consistent approach to the organization of child welfare programs at both the local and the national levels. The Act of 1948 recognized the administration of children's services as a major function of local government, requiring each county and county borough to establish as one of its council committees a children's committee with a children's officer reporting to it. In many of these local British children's departments are found "approved schools" for juvenile delinquents in addition to the institutions and services for neglected and dependent children. At the national level in Great Britain supervision is exercised through a single integrated Children's Department with its own inspectorate.¹

Another organizational problem in the United States arises from the fact that until very recently most public child welfare agencies eschewed services to juvenile delinquents

¹ The Children's Department is a major organizational entity of the Home Office. Public assistance is administered by the Ministry of Health.

and preferred to leave the problem of treatment and care of such children to the so-called state reformatories or training schools and the adult parole systems. The training schools have often been found to be merely junior prisons,² and treatment facilities or professional staff such as psychiatric case workers, clinical psychologists and psychiatrists normally have been totally absent.

An additional consideration in organization of child welfare services in this country is that in almost all states such services have been placed in a general or functional welfare department primarily oriented to public assistance. In at least two states the department is a state health and welfare department whose programs apparently are unified by the vague concept that all deal with certain human problems arising from societal relationships.

Federal child welfare administrators have hardly been in a position to insist upon the organizational integrity of state child welfare services. Federal statutes have never contained a state organizational requirement in connection with child welfare grants.³ At the federal level a decade ago the public assistance group and the Budget staff were successful in having the U. S. Children's Bureau transferred to the then Federal Security Agency and downgraded in status within that agency.⁴ Without supporting leverage from the federal government and themselves usually lacking in training to handle the concepts of administration, child welfare administrators in most states

have not developed a rationale of organization. In only two states, Pennsylvania and Kentucky, have major statutory reorganizations for the integration of institutions and social services been effected since World War II, and in the latter the reorganization was abrogated in 1956 after a change in political control of state administration.⁵

Both practitioners and professors of public administration have shied away from any factual analysis of the work carried on by most agencies of government which treat the ills of human beings. It has been much easier to grasp the proper processes of budgeting, accounting, tax collection, and personnel administration. A broad function, such as revenue collection or conservation, is concrete, visible, consisting of many comprehensible procedures and cutting across many classes and segments of society. Because of their own lack of intensive knowledge of the human treatment fields, public administrators have been reluctant to theorize about the organization of these fields. The treatment practitioners, on the other hand, have been too infrequently exposed to training in public administration and its general concepts to articulate a theory of organization. The failure of these two branches of knowledge to pool their thinking about how best to carry on the treatment function usually has left the problems of organization to be solved by well-meaning laymen or politicians with limited understanding of public administration or the treatment fields.

² See Albert Deutsch, *Our Rejected Children* (Little, Brown and Company, 1950) which reports on fourteen state training schools; H. Ashley Weeks and Oscar W. Ritchie, *An Evaluation of the Services of the State of Ohio to Its Delinquent Children and Youth* (Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio State University, 1956); and Herbert A. Bloch and Frank T. Flynn, *Delinquency* (Random House, Inc., 1956), ch. 15. Many states still place their training schools in Departments of Correction with adult prisons, entirely cut off from the state's child welfare program, as, for example in Indiana and Tennessee, or with both mental hospitals and prisons as in Ohio.

³ States must merely offer a "plan" of social services to qualify for such grants.

⁴ Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development* (Harcourt Brace and Co., 1952), pp. 15-29. Only in 1957 did the new Children's Bureau chief regain the seat in the Secretary's "cabinet" lost over a decade before.

⁵ Pennsylvania effected a statutory reorganization in 1955. Kentucky in 1952 by statute organized a Children's Bureau within the Welfare Department and placed under it all state children's institutions and facilities as well as all child welfare programs and workers. In January, 1956, the Governor of Kentucky, shortly after taking office, issued an executive order splitting the Children's Bureau between two departments. The child welfare workers were transferred to the Department of Economic Security while the institutions and facilities remained in the Welfare Department. The Governor also in his order abolished merit system coverage over all employees affected by the order. After federal intervention, merit system status was restored to the child welfare case workers, but institutional workers have remained under patronage. The legislature enacted the provisions of the Governor's reorganization into the law. See Louisville *Courier-Journal* from January 14, 1956-March 3 1956.

The theory of organization suggested below departs widely from many of the ideas of the few persons who have written about general welfare administration. This theory has developed from a study of the philosophy, techniques, and administration of child welfare services to determine whether such work is amenable to a fusion or close alliance with other welfare programs. This approach seems to have been overlooked by those who have written about the organization of welfare programs.

The Content of Child Welfare Administration

MANY administrators still tend to regard all administrative processes as paper work or mechanics. To many, *function* is the essential and exclusive basis for organization. The newer approaches to treatment of problems of human personality, however, constitute a challenge to the functional concept or organization with its subordination of all procedure to broad function. Also, the inadequacy of the traditional approaches should soon be apparent from an examination of the actual work performed by a modern child welfare agency.

An effective child welfare program is designed to break the cycle in which the neglected and deprived children of one generation become the neglectful and disturbed parents of the next generation, to reproduce anew another generation of neglected, disturbed, or delinquent children. Such a program, therefore, consists of a battery of preventive *treatment* services and facilities to reach parents as well as children. For one thing, professional case work services are provided to parents and children in their own homes both to preserve the home and to help parents identify their problems and carry their responsibilities as parents.

Even the best case workers fail at times to keep a home together. In such cases the findings of modern child psychiatry point to early adoption or to placement in a carefully supervised foster boarding home as the best forms of substitute care. Each of these services requires the case work of a trained social worker. Institutional care in small homelike facilities is indicated, as a rule, for emotionally disturbed children, sibling groups who

should not be broken up, and adolescents who cannot meet the demands of adjustment to a foster home. Some children require intensive psychiatric treatment, and all children in an institution should have access to a social case worker. For those who are committed to public care because of an emerging pattern of delinquency that endangers them and others, treatment and training facilities are necessary, followed up by after-care supervision by trained personnel.

These are all treatment services to assist human beings on an individual basis, just as the medical doctor, psychiatrist, or clinical psychologist renders treatment to individual patients. The treatment process used by the two latter professional groups and by social case workers involves eliciting from the individual his accounts of situations, problems, and attitudes and the manipulation of the individual in such a way that he can recognize his own problems and commence his own planning of rational solutions to those problems.

These treatment tasks of the social work case worker require a specific battery of skills. Case work techniques involve intensive graduate level training in this country and constitute a field of *expertise*. The development of child psychiatry and child psychology within their mother disciplines has provided a field of basic knowledge for the evolution of treatment or manipulative skills in case work with *children*. As a consequence, child welfare work is becoming an identifiable, specialized field within the discipline of social work.

On the basis of the preceding definition of program and of the professional skills requisite to execute it, the following postulates for organization of the treatment services and facilities for child welfare work are proposed.

Organization by Technique

ORGANIZATION on the basis of the technique of child welfare case work as an identifiable, coherent treatment field is offered as a first postulate of child welfare administration. Actually, technique may be difficult to perceive as the basis for the organization around which child welfare agencies should be built. The reason for the difficulty is one of seman-

tics, for the use of the word "children" immediately suggests a clientele agency. This would, indeed, be true if all the needs of children and only children were ministered to. But, as a matter of fact, only the *particular* requirements of children and their parents for various types of case work services are treated. In a public child welfare agency it is the case work needs of the dependent, neglected, delinquent, emotionally disturbed, and deprived children, and their neglectful or baffled parents, which are met. The distinguishing factor, therefore, on which the agency should be built is not to serve all persons of a particular age group but to serve only a defined population segment who require a *particular kind of service*. For another kind of treatment—medical—these children may be referred to an entirely different kind of agency.

The issue of placing child welfare services in a department with other welfare functions has been a recurring theme because of a certain apparent logic which seems to be involved. This logic is derived from a broad assumption that all welfare services have a functional unity which overrides any technical differences. Following this assumption through an examination of all aspects of public assistance and of institutional programs for specialized groups—the blind, epileptics, the deaf, mental defectives, dependent children, juvenile delinquents, and in some states mental hospitals, prisons, and correctional institutions—one is hard pressed to find actual similarity in the procedures in these programs. The differences in techniques in these programs range from the clerical and subprofessional work of examining applicants for public assistance, to see that they meet the various means tests, residence, and citizenship qualifications, to the most highly professionalized modern technique of psychiatry, required as the core for mental hospital treatment.

Actually, these techniques are inseparable from functional differences. What unity can exist between a mental hospital providing treatment for emotionally disturbed patients and a penal institution maintaining in secure custody the most serious felons? Yet some states have thrown these two programs into

the same department of welfare because both involve institutions for wards of the state.

Unity of technique is implicit in the content of the public child welfare worker's job, as described by the American Public Welfare Association.⁶ Almost all of the listed functions, and all of the salient ones, are related to the nature of the professional training given to a discrete group of workers. Certain it is, however, that the unifying factor among the functions is not an all-embracing amorphous superfunction of "welfare," but a technical specialized training and set of skills for carrying on the social worker's case work services.

If the unity of process or technique in child welfare case work is fully understood, then a long-standing difficulty in working relationships which frequently results from the integration of child welfare programs with public assistance, and the supervision of child welfare workers by public assistance directors, comes into focus. One may well ask how workers whose skills are acquired through extensive professional training, and whose work assignments should require the exercise and manipulation of those skills and not mere clerical paper work, can work well or happily when they are submerged within an organization designed primarily to execute economic functions demanding for the most part merely routine recording and investigative work. Although public assistance administrators and some social workers have stated for over twenty years, since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, that public assistance work should have a social work content, the hard fact remains that in almost all states it has not developed beyond the clerical and subprofessional level.⁷

To ignore the bench marks of professional identification, status, and the nature of tasks involved in case work by confusing public assistance work with child welfare case work services is to fly in the face of an educational

⁶ Committee on Social Work Education and Personnel, *The Child Welfare Worker's Job in the Public Welfare Agency* (American Public Welfare Association, 1954).

⁷ One has merely to examine the job specifications for public assistance workers in many states to realize the subprofessional nature of the work.

development of major importance. That development is the building of the specialized technical graduate education required to perform an important set of functions. In the very tight labor market for trained social case workers, the only outcome of defiance of professional identification in organization can be the exodus of the professional child welfare staff to agencies which do recognize the fact of such identification. On the whole, the movement seems to be to the private agencies.

A study by the author of thirty-eight state child welfare structures showed that in these states that had integrated child welfare services into public assistance the development of the child welfare program in all but one had lagged in comparison with program development in partially integrated or nonintegrated states. Integration can be defined as the use of a single set of supervisors or even of workers or the interchangeability of case assignments between public assistance and child welfare workers. In some of the integrated state agencies entire functions or services had been slighted, as in Ohio, for example, where adoption service has been given little attention. Neither Ohio nor Indiana has been interested in extension of case work services to children in state training schools. On the whole, with only a few exceptions, the integrated states were failing to break new ground in the development of means of coping with their multiplying child welfare problems. In one of these states, the administrators confessed great difficulty in finding supervisors who could both oversee the technicalities of public assistance and furnish real case work supervision and consultation for child welfare.

Rational administration seeks to achieve unity of purpose or of process, or both. The skills required in a social service treatment program for children, which run the gamut from services to courts in some communities through the usual case work and placement activities to treatment centers for disturbed children, provide a basic unity for organization. The entire range of state or local institutions and services for the treatment of the social ills of children should be brought together in an integration other than the traditional union with public assistance. If the union of all children's social services and in-

stitutions is carried out, the artificial barriers erected in almost all states against case work services, rendered by trained child welfare case workers, to children adjudged and labeled delinquent would disappear. The label attached to a child would no longer be the deciding factor determining the agency into whose hands a child would fall. Instead, the diagnosis of the kinds of treatment prescribed, using certain specific skills all located in one unified agency, would govern. Thereby, the institutions serving delinquent children would be operated under the same direction with those serving dependent and neglected children. It would be no more difficult to assign a child welfare worker to a delinquent child needing foster home placement than to a non-delinquent child requiring this service, or to assign a psychiatric social worker to an emotionally disturbed child in an institution than to a purely dependent child or one still at home requiring case work help.

Unity of skills required to perform the essential services recognized as constituting the field of child welfare, then, should provide the major logic for organization. That logic will possibly lead to an independent children's agency in those states where there are no existing departments in which such unions can be effected. In others, the welfare department at both the state and the local levels may already have within it the necessary units which merely need to be regrouped into one organizational entity for child welfare services.

Placing the Expert on Top

THE second postulate for organization of public child welfare services proposes to place the expert "on top" and not merely "on tap." This postulate clearly runs counter to the tenets of many American and British writers on public administration who have long advocated the use of "generalists" in administration to direct all programs, however specialized. The American writers have cast longing eyes at England where the "generalist" remains supreme in the administrative class of the national civil service, but most of them have overlooked British local government. In the direction of local departments the specialist administrator is the rule rather

than the exception for many activities and, indeed, in some is required by national legislation.

The clearest understanding of the need for the specialist to direct a human treatment program at the action level of direct services can come from an examination of what has happened in mental hospital administration in many states. In mental hospitals the purpose is psychiatric treatment of human beings, not custody, which is subserved by social services, medical treatment of physical ills, occupational therapy, and even by the attendants and office staff. The mental hospital exists to treat one particular kind of illness, and psychiatry is the recognized specialty for such treatment. The psychiatrist, therefore, has been placed in charge as top administrator in order to direct the entire program to the treatment ends which must be served.

Similarly in child welfare, specialties other than case work may be used in a subsidiary way as a part of the over-all battery of services. Medicine, psychiatry, clinical psychology, education, and at a lower level even the house parents and recreational leaders, each play a role, adding to or enriching the case work services the child welfare worker can render. But, as in the case of the mental hospitals, the total program of the child welfare agency, which exists to serve the case work needs of children and parents in trouble, can be directed and judged, not by a mere expeditor or facilitator, but only by a trained professional specialist equipped to evaluate that special set of work techniques and attainment of program goals.

Because an administrator of a treatment program is required to make substantive judgments about treatment methods, successful direction of such a program requires a chief administrator thoroughly trained and experienced in the major skills used in the program. The better known treatment programs offer pertinent examples. In public health administration the chief administrator must be so equipped to evaluate the relative efficacy of techniques utilized for control of communicable disease that he can determine the validity of such proposals as transfer of staff, budget, and facilities from a program of tuberculosis control to one of polio vaccination. The chief administrator of a state department

of mental hospitals must be able to evaluate the applicability of shock therapy and the new drugs to the hospital population.

By the same token, the director of a child welfare agency must be capable of judging the effectiveness of diagnostic procedures in determining the types of treatment and placement required by children under care and the case worker's services in each type of placement. For example, a large number of unsuccessful foster home placements would require precise analysis of the reasons for staff failures at any of the numerous points from "intake" to supportive work with foster parents. The administrator must know the changing philosophies with respect to institutional programs in order to determine the best uses to which his own agency's institutions may be put. He must keep abreast of research findings in the child welfare field and know the type of child population received by his own agency in order to determine the feasibility of applying these research findings to his own wards. One of the staff functions which is needed in a modern public child welfare agency is research in the relative success of various techniques of treatment. Only the trained specialist in the position of administrative chief can evaluate the research findings of his staff on the agency's treatment programs.

The administrator of a treatment agency, on the other hand, should understand the tools of modern management in order that he may maximize the use of budgetary and manpower resources for the goal of his agency—treatment. As a matter of fact, from the strictly moral standpoint of the political values involved, such an administrator would seem to be under a special obligation to improve management in order to assist treatment. For example, he should understand the need for procedures analysis in order to free his professional staff from the burden of paper work. In a mental hospital the money saved in systematic supply and storage management has been used in some states to purchase new drugs for the treatment of patients.⁸ A child welfare administrator who can save travel

⁸ Such expansion of treatment was effected in Kentucky in 1954-55.

costs for his workers by systematic analyses of case loads with respect to area has additional funds for salaries of case workers to reach more children.⁹ A child welfare administrator, furthermore, will realize that certain fiscal procedures built up for other types of agencies must be examined critically for their effect on a child welfare program. For example, centralized purchasing of clothing is undoubtedly poor technique for a child welfare agency which tries to encourage consideration of each child as an individual with the right to express his own taste. But the management tools are merely tools and are no substitute for program knowledge. Only the skilled practitioner can know where best to apply in the program the resources saved through management improvement.

As mentioned above, British national administration has rested on the often-quoted principle of the "expert on tap and not on top." The system of "generalist" nonprofessional preparation for administration pervades the entire administrative class from which are taken the major career directors of specialized units. In the Children's Department of the Home Office the "generalist" administrative class holds all top positions but one. The national Children's Department sets standards and provides guidance to local government children's departments. The consequences on program of "generalist" direction are evident to one who understands modern theories of child welfare. Two illustrations are offered.

In the first place, the policy advocated by the Children's Department with respect to illegitimacy and adoption has been to encourage unmarried mothers to keep their babies for reasons of physical health of the children, irrespective of the effect ultimately on their mental health. Local children's departments were neither directed to offer case work services to the unmarried mother nor to act as adoption agencies for these women. The proportion of illegitimate children in public care, however, has been as high as one-third in many jurisdictions because so many unmarried mothers were later uninterested in caring

for their children or were incapable of making rational plans for their future. Trained social workers at the national level in charge of the broad policies would have understood the emotional instability of most unmarried mothers and the need both for case work services to such women and for a sound adoption program for the sake of the children involved—as well as to protect the public treasury from the excessive burden of public care of such children.¹⁰

The second illustration revolves about the failure of the Children's Department to move the local government units into a program of protective and preventive case work services to children in their own homes in order to prevent breakdown of the homes and the eventual assumption of public care for these children. An attempt to fill the vacuum created by neglect of protective case work services on the part of the Children's Department was being made in 1955 by the Health Ministry, which ordered its local "health visitors" to assume these responsibilities. That the vacuum actually could be filled by the Health Ministry's action is questionable, however, for the "health visitors" had no social case work training and were unequipped for the tasks assigned. Other examples of program omissions could be cited.

In summation, observation of British child welfare policies at the national level causes one to conclude that "generalist" administrators have caused serious program weaknesses.

Role of the Public

A THIRD postulate for organization relates to the role which the public and its political representatives can and should play in policy formulation and the structure through which that role is to be played in administration of child welfare services.

Policy in child welfare administration requires a solid foundation of research findings if it is to possess the continuity so essential both for rational program development and for the security and mental health of the child.

⁹ This was accomplished by the former Kentucky Children's Bureau in 1955.

¹⁰ Leontine Young, *Out of Wedlock* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954), and John Bowlby, *Maternal Care and Mental Health* (World Health Organization, 1952), pp. 93-108.

dren receiving agency services. The governing body and chief administrator of the agency must look to research in child psychiatry, child psychology, social work, and sociology for directional suggestion. Policy, therefore, will change but slowly, as in any treatment field, awaiting the construction of hypotheses, the development of research and measurement techniques, the selection of the population for study, and the recording and analysis of findings. Experimental research and objective findings of fact are the only acceptable bases for major policy change in a child welfare program because of the tremendous possibilities of damage to human personality involved in ill-conceived and unfounded policy modifications.

If substantive policy is to be based upon the results of research findings, we can then delineate the kinds of questions in the field of child welfare administration that the public and their political representatives can be considered competent to decide. In any state, of course, the legislature must establish the broad foundations of law for a child welfare program and determine the level of government responsible for providing direct services to children. The real problem then centers on the question of whether the public should play a role in administrative policy formulation. A strong case can be made for public representation through a board in the child welfare agency. Because laws must be general and flexible enough to permit program change in the light of research findings, the public may well insist upon a part in translating statutes into administrative policies and programs.

But the "public" in this case can be legitimately interpreted as a "special public" if understanding of program is sought as an important ingredient for policy-making. Claims to representation at this level can be made by recognized professional organizations concerned with child welfare and by general citizen groups evincing an interest in and knowledge of child welfare problems. This representation, therefore, will be in a board or commission which may be used for broad policy-making or for review of the general quality of administration, appeal of such decisions as license denials or revocations, and

protection of the agency's program. The last item involves positive education of the public and support of the child welfare program against partisan or uninformed attacks.

It seems both inappropriate and unwise to allow party affiliation to become a factor in board appointments if policies are to be based on the findings of the disciplines concerned with child welfare: psychiatry, psychology, social work, and sociology. Doctors have attempted to eliminate party activity as a primary factor in board appointments in the public health field by insisting upon provisions in the law for professional group representation on state and local boards. By such arrangements the policies of the guild have been substituted for those of the party. Similarly, professional groups involved in child welfare services might seek the same antisepticism from party politics by insistence upon professional group representation on child welfare boards. It is questionable that any professional group should preempt all seats on a board. It should be noted that the continuity of policy essential for child welfare program development can be aided by overlapping staggered terms for board members.

If the position of chief administrator is recognized as a technical one requiring a high degree of professional competence, then it is clear that the board or commission has a role to play in selecting the person to fill it. A board of professional and informed lay people is better equipped to judge qualifications for such appointment than is a Governor or other political chief.

Obvious as it may seem to students of public administration, it is not always clear to governing boards that public accountability by the professional administrator through the board necessitates delegation by the board to the chief administrator of full authority to direct all those activities for which he will be held accountable. For instance, in Britain the children's committees of councils decide individual cases, select all professional personnel in most jurisdictions, and dip into day-to-day child welfare administration. Clear delineation of the powers and responsibilities of the board and of the chief administrator is essential. With such demarcation the administrator's power would clearly be selection of his

staff, application of board policies to individual cases, and planning for the translation into actuality of the board's objectives. It should be his responsibility to study future agency needs and propose plans for carrying on the program, as, for example, to study case loads and to point to the need for different numbers or kinds of staff as case loads change. It should be the board's prerogative to adopt or reject the plans and allocate the funds available to the agency, thus determining the program emphasis for the year.

A final premise is the necessity for highly developed and practicable means of coordination among all agencies which can render treatment services to children. Stress has been laid on the fact that the work of the child welfare agency consists essentially of social case work services to children and parents and provision of institutional treatment facilities for children who cannot be treated in their own homes or in foster homes. There is also the need for close cooperation of the child welfare agency with other treatment agencies serving children. Such other agencies include child guidance clinics, juvenile court staffs, crippled children's services, local medical services and hospitals, and the mental hospital and mental hygiene agencies. Many techniques have been developed to forward coordination; they vary greatly with the nature of the services to be coordinated and with the amount of policy-making involved in coordination. Organization on the basis of process, as in treatment programs, increases the necessity for coordination among such programs and internally within such agencies. This necessity places a heavy burden upon administrators of such programs who must be sophisticated enough in administration to be cognizant of the need to direct continuous attention to the development and assessment of coordinating devices.

Conclusions

BECAUSE child welfare services constitute a field unified by technique rather than by function, clientele, or area, they present some unique problems of administration. The professional technique for such services, produced by specialized graduate level training, consists of social service case work specializing in

the child and his parents in their parental relationship. The primary purpose in the administration of child welfare services must be the facilitation of the practice of the technique, in order to reach as many children and their parents as possible who require case work services. Everything administrators do in this field must be judged on the basis of whether it promotes or impedes the social work treatment process for children. It is that technique, therefore, which must provide the basis for organization.

If the view is taken that the rendering of child welfare services is a treatment program involving a particular technique, then it is easy to keep in sight the need to bring together all treatment facilities and technical personnel to help children in social trouble. The purpose of administrative integration, therefore, will be to render the requisite services to children regardless of the labels courts or other agencies may have attached to children. The treatment needs of the child become the prime consideration in organizing.

Organization on the basis of technique requires support through leadership from a professional social worker at the head of the child welfare agency and support and broad policy guidance from a governing body in which both professional and informed citizen groups have representation.

The process basis for organization further demands development of effective coordinating machinery and procedures, both internally and externally. It must be remembered that this type of organizational basis increases the needs for coordination considerably beyond those created by functional organization.

Solution of the problems of organization and direction of child welfare services carries major implications for other treatment fields such as public health and mental health. The widening scope of such work and the recognition of public responsibility for its expansion will require increasing attention from students of public administration to these types of process agencies. If the postulates for child welfare have any validity for the field of public administration, they should be of some service to the other treatment fields and thereby serve to advance the study of public administration in general.

The Nature of Administrative Loyalty

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THE third Annual Southern California Conference, American Society for Public Administration, sponsored by the Los Angeles and San Diego chapters, held at the University of California at Los Angeles February 21, 1957, included a panel discussion on "The Nature of Administrative Loyalty." The participants in this panel were George Shipman, professor of political science, University of Washington; Fred W. Sharp, administrative officer, City of Pomona; M. D. Tarshes, county executive, Sacramento County; and E. J. Jones, Jr., organization and methods examiner, U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Pasadena. This article is a summary of the material presented in this panel.

What Are Loyalties?

LOYALTIES are a part of the individual's set of identifications, by which he relates himself to other people and groups sharing the social environment in which he lives. Through loyalties, which are emotional adjustments, the individual sorts out the different "pulls" he feels—to his immediate family, his parents and traditions, his religion, his economic or professional group, his community, and his political affiliation, among others—and establishes the kinds of priorities among these "pulls" that enable him to minimize conscious conflicts among competing identifications and to achieve a substantial degree of stability and consistency in his social relationships.

What part do loyalties play in the individual's life?

1. They give him identity in a complex world. Inevitably, the individual has multiple roles; he has to be several personalities because of the differences in his varying sets of social relationships. Each relationship meets some essential emotional need in the individual. Each gives him some degree of emotional security; by contributing support to a group, he gains support from the group. In total, the supports he receives supply the defenses he must have against the competing, and often conflicting, pressures of the world he lives in. The pattern of loyalties defines the person he is in relation to his special world.

2. There is a strong element of idealism in loyalties. Usually the individual projects, through his loyalties, an idealized model of the "self" he wants to be. As fast as he begins to realize this projected model, he is likely to push it further into the open space of the unattained. The sense of loyalties gives the individual the justification he needs to continue pursuing the mirage of his idealized self.

3. The relationships of loyalty lie beyond the formal terms of employment or affiliation. They usually provide the emotional context in which the formal terms are set. They are essentially extracontractual—a set of largely unspoken, not wholly defined, understandings.

4. The relationships of loyalty are two way. In return for the acceptance of obligations going beyond the formally enforceable terms, the person is entitled to recognition and support going beyond formal compensation. This is a "give-receive" relationship.

Every person has a network of loyalties—interrelated, interdependent, and not wholly

consistent. Individual loyalties compete for priority. The individual is continuously attempting to keep them in balance, as one situation after another pulls them into a different focus.

Administrative Loyalty

ADMINISTRATIVE loyalty expresses the role of the individual in his public service career. Probably the normal adult (a person regarded as having no important deviations from the acceptable attributes) has these centers of identification:

1. The work group—the people with whom he shares immediate performance responsibilities. In this group, he wants to be known as a “cooperator.” He *gives* reinforcement to group efforts, and in return *receives* reinforcement from the group.
2. The agency, the service, or whatever symbolizes the “program” group. Here he wants to be known as a person of initiative and reliability. To obtain this recognition he *gives* an acceptance of personal responsibility for the appropriateness, the quality, and the vigor of his performance, and in return he *receives* a relative freedom of action on the job, a freedom from close, overbearing supervision.
3. The vocational or professional group to which he belongs. Here he wants to be recognized as a person who has acquired competence and who extends it continuously as a matter of personal responsibility. He wants to be accepted as a “professional” whose performance, in any situation and under the same circumstances, is as effective as that of any other well-qualified member of his profession. To this end, he *gives* reliability and the predictability of competence, with a rigid demonstration of self-supervision and self-discipline. He *receives* recognized status, authority attached to his judgments, independence and self-sufficiency in executing his role.
4. The community and the society. He wants to be identified with an important and continuing need, and to be accepted as filling this need in a respected way. Consequently, he *gives* a strong dedication to this role, accepting without protest whatever may go with it

—moderate income, slow promotion, periodic uprootings of his family to move from assignment to assignment. In return, he *receives* recognition, respect, and high status as a person whose contributions are highly valued by the society.

A person's loyalties will express his emotional needs, and the basic values by which he lives. And his values will usually identify the channels through which his inner needs are met with the most satisfaction.

In administration, the problem of loyalty may be expressed this way: how can the inner emotional needs of the healthy individual be expressed through channels that will contribute most effectively to self-realization, and to the needs of the society he serves?

Blind Loyalty and Disloyalty

IF THE identifications discussed above can be regarded as essentially healthy, there are others that appear to be pathological. Blind loyalty, for example, may reflect dependence upon parental authority. A tendency to protest and revolt may point to a maladjusted adolescent personality. A tendency to be highly individualistic, an unwillingness to share in cooperative efforts, may indicate an insecure person.

The thinking of management must be translated through employees, and what the supervisor thinks and believes is often reflected in the attitude of the employee. If a supervisor does not believe in the organization's policies and goals, blind loyalty to this supervisor can create havoc in the organization—not because management's organization policies are poor but because employees believe they are. Poor communication can cause doubts and misgivings, and loyalty to a supervisor who is out of tune with the organization's program can actually result in disloyalty to the organization itself.

The manner in which department heads and supervisors transmit directives of management to those below them may constitute a form of disloyalty to top management. There are many distasteful tasks in any organization. Supervisors must sometimes execute programs with which they do not agree. If, in carrying

out directives for such programs, the department head or supervisor gives an unfair picture of management—in such language as “what will those blankety-blank fools think up next,” or “I regret to have to post this memorandum but I have been ordered to,”—he is engaging in a vicious type of disloyalty. Failure of the department head to recognize that he represents management constitutes disloyalty on his part and causes instability in the ranks. This type of disloyalty can destroy an organization.

City managers, without exception, make loyalty on the part of their assistants a prime condition of employment in any position of trust and confidence. This prerequisite is important, for the assistant is in a position to undermine the manager in many ways. The junior executive can lose the feeling that he represents the executive, who is in responsible charge, and make decisions that reflect his own thinking and not the manager's, or he can build up prestige at the expense of the manager. Such intent or action—direct or indirect—is serious disloyalty.

Loyalty Conflicts

THE problem of conflicts in loyalty may or may not be a serious one for persons in administrative positions. The scope, or degree, of the problem varies considerably from job to job, and there is considerable variation in the types of loyalty conflicts that may arise on different jobs.

It has been suggested that in most administrative positions problems of divided loyalties often do not rise to a conscious level and that many decisions that involve conflicting loyalties are made rather automatically (or perhaps subconsciously) as a part of individual behavior patterns. It is suggested that such conflicts may have, for each individual, at least three levels.

1. A low level—where potential conflict is resolved by an automatic choice that does not involve a conscious decision. This is the level most frequently dominated by the “doctrine” or belief system that is shared by affiliated members of a group.

2. An intermediate level—where conscious

choices are made. These are probably the novel or unusual situations to which doctrine seldom directly applies. Typically, the choices are among analogies to more familiar situations. Usually, however, the individual is sufficiently consistent in his choices that others can regard him as a “stable” and “responsible” person. Probably the choice is strongly influenced by the individual's unconscious estimate of the social support or rejection that it will receive. Often it is identified with a symbol of legitimacy, such as “the good of the service.”

3. A critical level—where choices produce so much inner conflict that the individual feels that his personal equilibrium is threatened. For most people, these occasions rarely occur, and there probably is a strong tendency to avoid the situations that can produce them. Observation suggests that many persons attempt to avoid these conflicts by projecting the dilemma away from themselves into a sort of socio-drama (real or imaginary) in which the alternatives are played out without their emotional participation. Then the individual, as an observer, can assess the implications and make a choice with the feeling that the issue somehow decided itself. Actually, the forms of “completed staff work” and of “the decision-making process” can be used to supply this socio-drama in a highly acceptable way. Its use may well have important and constructive values. It may permit the persons involved to avoid intense anxiety, because the decision emerges from a legitimate social process; the impacts of individual eccentricities are minimized; and a high degree of social unity accompanies the result. Also, the use of the socio-drama may make it easier to absorb the decision, and its rationalization, into the doctrine of the organization. Altogether, a ceremonial process probably promotes group unity and produces a capacity to deal with situations that are beyond any one person's capacity for reliable behavior.

The question of divided loyalties of administrators cannot be confined within the limits of an administrator's job. For example, there is the rather obvious conflict between loyalty to family and loyalty to job. Because

of the exacting and time-consuming demands of many administrative positions, the persons holding them must often decide between family and the job. This is a type of conflict that is certainly not easy to resolve; it is a continuing problem that administrators must face from day to day and week to week.

But beyond personal loyalty obligations are the problems of divided loyalties that administrators experience in their positions. Each, in some measure, must consciously face problems that involve deciding where loyalty is properly due—with respect to superiors and subordinates, with respect to the community, and with respect to himself and his own integrity. There are certainly many opportunities for conflict between these various loyalty obligations. It is also certain that there are very few decisions in life and in jobs that are clear cut. In any difficult situation that involves conflict the choices of action available very seldom offer a perfect solution. Obviously then, one of the principal tools that must be used in reconciling conflicting demands is the process of compromise.

As an illustration, take a conflict between loyalty to superiors and loyalty to community. In this illustration, an administrator has an idea that he believes would be very beneficial to his organization and to the community if it were put into effect. He recognizes, however, that the legislative body that must approve the idea is not yet ready for it. At this point the administrator has at least two choices: he can press the idea at the risk of antagonizing the members of the legislative body and creating a spirit of controversy that may result in defeat of the idea and subsequent proposals, or he can put it aside temporarily with the hope that before too long conditions will be more suitable for its acceptance. In most situations of this type, the successful administrator will take the second alternative. However, it is necessary to go a step further and point out that in these situations of loyalty conflict the administrator must continually ask himself how far he can go in compromising on a given problem without completely compromising himself. He must always ask himself whether the compromise is a compromise of his integrity.

The loyalty relationship between subordinate and superior is probably given more consideration than any other. It is generally accepted that a loyal subordinate is one who recognizes that in addition to his obligation to obey and support his superior he must also on occasion advise and even disagree with him. Such advice and disagreement should be handled discreetly, with consideration for the superior's prestige and reputation. These situations, of course, vary considerably, but they can involve a conflict between loyalty to self (self-protection) and loyalty to the superior. The superior, in turn, has loyalty obligations to his subordinates and can often be put in a position of conflict with respect to his loyalties to two or more of them. For example, a city manager may be faced with two department heads who are not getting along with each other. In this situation most managers will attempt to find some means of reconciling the differences between them without sacrificing the loyalty he owes to both.

Another conflict in loyalty sometimes arises as a result of a difference between the community's view of the administrator's job and his own conception of it. This difference in view may result in a conflict between the administrator's loyalty to the community and his loyalty to his job and his profession. The community's attitude toward the job may have been created by tradition and custom—which in turn may have been affected by the attitudes and concepts of the administrator's predecessor.

There are no simple solutions to these problems of conflicts in loyalty. They vary with each specific situation and depend upon the attitudes of all of the individuals involved. Each situation must be approached on an individual basis. The administrator must always be conscious of the potential problems involved—and the answer to each of these problems must be found in the judgment and discretion of the individual.

Loyalty and Ethics

A CONSIDERATION of administrative loyalty and loyalty conflicts cannot be complete without some discussion of ethics. Ethics is the part of philosophy dealing with moral

and value judgments. Thus we have individual, social, professional, and, though seldom so expressed, administrative ethics that guide the actions of individuals in their personal, organizational, and social relationships.

From day to day, administrators are apt to give little thought to ethics, or for that matter, to administrative loyalty. But an administrator may experience his worst moments when he gains insight into the impact of his behavior and his ethical standards on those who serve with and for him.

We deal here with administrative loyalty in a democratic society. Certainly the Third German Reich had more than enough administrative loyalty, but it lacked a firm ethical base. In postwar Germany civil servants hastened to defend their earlier actions on the ground that the inhumanities of the administration were a result of policy made at some higher level, presumably by Hitler himself. Contrast with this the democratic approach to the administrative process which encourages diversity among individuals working towards goals mutually agreed upon. Administrative loyalty in a democratic setting implies a theory of ethics, though a theory of ethics is not necessarily the basis for administrative loyalty.

Developing Administrative Loyalty

How is loyalty in a public agency developed and maintained? What are the techniques? And is it worth the time and effort to generate, incubate, and nurture it? Sociologists tell us that there are some useful, systematic methods for guiding human behavior to create loyalty.

Humanity in relationships throughout the organization is the prime moving factor that develops and sustains loyalty over the long time. Rewarding on-the-job contacts on a day-to-day basis provide the intangible stuff that develops spirit and depth and resiliency in an organization so that it functions as a "going concern."

What are some of the components in the human relationship that inspire the spirit of loyalty?

1. A genuine feeling of concern for human

beings on the part of management, respect and understanding on the part of the rank and file for management problems and authority and for fellow employees.

2. A deep understanding of the goals, ideals, and methods of operation of the organization.

3. A "feeling of belonging" that builds unity in the organization and creates the attitude on the part of the individual the "he likes the outfit."

It is essential that the managerial leadership understand relationships among people—their needs, desires, and reactions—to insure that they will function effectively as team members. Loyalty can never be engendered through pay or fringe benefits if workers feel uncertain, frustrated, insecure in their jobs or have the feeling that management doesn't understand their problems.

How should human activity be guided to create responsiveness and loyalty? Here are some of the familiar general precepts:

1. Responsibilities should be clear and fixed. No person should have to be subject to the authority of more than one person.

2. A feeling of confidence and success must be engendered to maintain morale. This can be accomplished by allowing the employee to assume responsibility and increase his authority—in particular with regard to plans affecting his own future action. Having a part in group decision-making is also proving effective.

3. Changes should be carefully explained and should be understood by all.

4. Misunderstandings should be handled promptly. Every effort should be made to decrease and eliminate frictions. This can be achieved by bringing the people concerned together so that differing attitudes can be explored and reconciled. There must be regular contact with fellow employees and with the leaders who guide the destiny of the organization.

5. Jurisdictional disputes should be avoided, if possible, but settled promptly if they occur. It must be recognized that troubles and conflicts in any organization do not arise in the

abstract but develop out of concrete human situations.

6. A genuine interest in the welfare of the employee and of his family is important. For example, the attitude of management toward the older employee whose productivity is falling off can either create confidence in the organization or a feeling of insecurity on the part of the young employees.

7. Above all, there should be no special privileges or favoritism.

The heart of the management problem is to work out in detail the approaches and procedures for these precepts. Many of the outward signs of distress will disappear in thin air once a genuine effort is made to cloak these precepts with flesh and blood. Working out the details in a practical, understandable manner is vital, for loyalty cannot thrive—especially in the lower ranks—on intangibles not readily understood. A soldier may believe in democracy, but to be a good soldier on a day-to-day basis he must believe in his company and his sergeant and in the captain in charge. The best measure of the leadership and true management skill in any organization is the extent that loyalty permeates and

prevails down and through the rank and file of personnel and throughout the various departments or divisions. Loyalty is not achieved by the manipulation of the technician who may have acquired mechanical skills, the occasional pep talk or shot in the arm, or by the periodic picnic or the Christmas party. These may be helpful but alone they are, without exception, "the shuck and not the nubbin."

In Conclusion

IN SUMMARY, loyalty is a prime factor in enhancing the effectiveness of any organization, and its development is a goal worthy of intelligent effort and activity in any public agency. Its presence is the difference between a body with life and one without. It is something of the heart and not alone of the mind. It is built by the continuously intelligent handling of human situations to develop teamwork, personal satisfactions, and attitudes that make an organization a "going concern" in the best sense of the term. Loyalty insures the productivity and the work satisfaction that are the aspirations and legitimate goals in maintaining the effectiveness of any governmental agency.

Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"

A number of readers have questioned statements and conclusions presented by Malcolm B. Parsons in his article, "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines," published in the Summer, 1957, issue of *Public Administration Review*. Published below are major excerpts from three letters to the editor commenting on various points in Mr. Parsons' article.

TO THE EDITOR

Public Administration Review:

Because of the widespread current interest in comparative administration, the essay, "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines," by Professor Malcolm B. Parsons was indeed timely. Our professional colleagues, in academia and in government, should have more frequent opportunities to evaluate the successes and failures of overseas technical assistance. However, we should remember that few readers have independent sources of information concerning conditions in distant lands. Consequently, authors and editors alike have an obligation to insure that such articles are scrupulously accurate and balanced in their judgments.

Regrettably, Dr. Parsons' article fulfills neither criterion. Both tone and substance have, unfortunately, given justifiable offense to officials of the Philippine government. The damage to our international relations cannot be undone. But because I have some firsthand knowledge of the circumstances, I feel obliged to counterbalance, if not rebut, the distorted impressions conveyed in the article.

In the first place, it should be made clear that performance budgeting as developed in the Philippines was truly a joint enterprise, with Filipinos and Americans working side by side to create together a unique administrative mechanism adapted to the Philippine

milieu. Contrary to Dr. Parsons' assertions, the United States Operations Mission (USOM) never made a "major effort to install performance budgeting" as such. Instead of seeking to transplant American practices, the mission's public administration advisory staff always viewed its task as one of identifying major problems and of stimulating Filipino officials into using their own creative intelligence in the solution of their difficulties.

Let me illustrate by summarizing the early history of the budget and accounting project. By 1953 the USOM was already cognizant of and beginning to call attention to shortcomings in fiscal management. Accounting difficulties and auditing impediments, as recounted by Parsons, had been encountered in the execution of joint developmental projects. A mission adviser had worked for a year in the Bureau of the Treasury on the revision of certain accounting and disbursing procedures. While assisting in the establishment of clearing operations for government checks, he had gathered much valuable data regarding other fiscal deficiencies. The USOM view that the entire fiscal system needed study and extensive overhauling to adapt it to changes in scale and function was shared by many Philippine government officials. These considerations were presented to the incumbent budget commissioner who, while agreeing in substance, thought that a wage and position classification project to correct inequitable and

inadequate salaries deserved higher priority. Such a project was then launched under joint auspices, with technical advice and assistance supplied by the consulting firm of Louis J. Kroeger and Associates.

The election of a new administration and the appointment of Dominador Aytona as budget commissioner provided the opportunity for a further review of fiscal needs and prospects. The fact-finding and educational activity then in process hardly deserves Parsons' reference to agitation for budgetary reform. In fact, a March, 1954, study of the organization and functions of the Budget Commission, undertaken by the USOM public administration staff at the commissioner's request, made no mention of performance budgeting or of reform of the budgetary format *per se*.

The management consulting contract for a budget and accounting modernization project originated in this broad context of felt needs and unspecified solutions. Neither Filipinos nor Americans ever conceived it as a means for installing any "ready-made" system or panacea. The documents describing the project and requesting bids—which I prepared in collaboration with the budget commissioner—called for a thorough analysis of virtually all aspects of fiscal management. There was no prescription of any specific type of budget document or procedure. The terms "performance" and "program" were used in reference to the budget process only to indicate to potential contractors areas which they should be prepared to explore and consider. To be explicit, rather more emphasis was placed upon the accounting and auditing reforms than upon changes in budgeting. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that Commissioner Aytona already had at this stage rather definite ideas regarding a format for budget estimates and appropriation structure to which he applied the term "performance budgeting."

In the negotiations leading to the formal adoption of the project, there developed a mutual understanding that budgetary changes, if any, ought to serve two ends: (1) the form of the budget submission should compel attention by all engaged in the budgetary process to the purposes of governmental programs; (2) the budget should be an instrument which

would instill a sense of responsibility for accomplishments in all executives. The phrase "performance budget," without specific content, came to be applied to any budgetary process which might satisfy these objectives.

The commissioner's ideas on how these objectives might be achieved had been incorporated in a bill which he had previously drafted as the chief of staff to the Senate Finance Committee. Its provisions had grown out of a visit to the United States, extensive reading and study of budgetary theory, and his own auditing and legislative experience. This bill became the Performance Budget Act of 1954. The act was not, as Professor Parsons implied, either initiated or fostered by the mission. The USOM staff did not comment upon the bill until after it had been reported out of committee, and then to the effect that caution and further study were probably advisable. Our limited participation may have been partially responsible for changes in the paragraph requiring immediate and total adoption. Language was substituted providing for a two-year development and installation period. The act was passed in both houses of Congress by unanimous consent without floor debate in the closing fifteen minutes of a constitutionally limited session. It is reasonable to infer that favorable negotiations looking to the securing of a group of management advisers encouraged the budget commissioner and his congressional colleagues to take the calculated risk involved in its passage.

Pursuant to the new obligations placed upon him by this act, the budget commissioner dictated a shift in the emphasis of the contract project. The contemplated preliminary fact-finding survey was shelved and all hands were quickly assigned to the urgent task of devising a budget format and procedure which would satisfy the mandate of the new law.

I have told this story in some detail to emphasize how seriously Professor Parsons underestimated the role of Philippine officials. No one should fail to understand that with respect to performance budgeting, Commissioner Aytona was master in his own house. All the rest of us were servants. The functions performed by the consultants supplied by

Booz, Allen and Hamilton, supplemented from time to time by the USOM, were primarily these: The gathering of information on existing practices and conditions, its analysis and summarization in a form the commissioner could use; the formulation of alternative courses of action with estimates as to probable consequences; and training Filipinos in the techniques of data collection, analysis of problems, and in the creation and statement of proposed courses of action.

On the basis of all the information available to him, including his own extensive prior experience, the commissioner made his decisions. With policy and goals thus established, the consultants worked out details of forms, instructions, organizational structure, training programs and the like required to carry those decisions into effect. Yet even on matters of detail the commissioner and his staff revised, rejected, or supplemented the suggestions of the American technical advisers. The result was an almost entirely new kind of budgetary process adapted at every step of the way to Philippine problems, conditions, and objectives.



The article referred disparagingly to the "idealistic" and "sophisticated" character of the reorganization plans issued by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission and again slighted the role of Filipinos in preparing those plans. The author has overlooked two salient features of this endeavor.

In the first place, from a structural point of view the Philippine Republic has long had a reasonably well-designed administrative establishment. Certainly its broad outlines were as suitable to program budgeting as was the U. S. federal system upon which it was modeled. In many respects the Philippine executive branch was better organized than half of our state governments. But what might be tolerated here because of our abundant financial resources was not wholly adequate there. Thus the commission out of its own sense of need was driven to formulate and propose sophisticated solutions to complex problems.

Second, all reorganization plans derived

their substance from the will of the commissioners, not that of Kroeger's consultant-advisers. Several of Mr. Kroeger's initial recommendations as to the scope and depth of the project—seconded by the mission—were rejected by the commission. Many specific recommendations met a similar fate. Members of the twelve-man commission spent hundreds of hours in conferences with department officials, members of the public, and one another. No American proposals were accepted until and unless the commissioners themselves were fully convinced that they were both usable and beneficial in the context of Philippine conditions. Many specific provisions could never have been conceived by Americans but grew out of the commissioners' own ripe experience as executives and legislators.

By virtue of hindsight we could argue that a more humble and evolutionary approach might have been better, but even now we cannot deny the tremendous educational impact which the total effort has had. The plans obviously called attention to two major deficiencies—inadequate staff facilities for planning and service operations and lack of executive and secretarial control over semiautonomous bureaus and subunits. Where, through commission inquiry and conference, the significance of these facts has been perceived, substantial reorganizations have taken place even without specific authorization. As a result, several departments are already much better coordinated and more effective instruments of national policy.

So far as performance budgeting is concerned, one shortcoming of the reorganization proposals should have been noted. No serious attempt was made to come to grips with excessive organizational rigidity stemming from legislative prescription of even minor structural details. In most instances, the implementation of an approved plan merely substitutes an equally inflexible new structure. This will be a serious handicap in the administration of a budget having for its rationale the transferability of resources to activities of greatest need and priority. On the other hand, and fortunately, there has been more flexibility in practice than in law. New staff and coordinative units have been established as proposed

despite formal rejection of authorizing orders. Budget and personnel offices, for example, have been formed at the departmental and bureau levels by the assignment "on detail" of persons to those functions.



In the course of his article, Dr. Parsons appropriately pointed out obstacles which administrative improvement and performance budgeting must overcome. But the present situation in the Philippines is by no means as dismal as he has depicted it. Extensive studies of accounting, mentioned as a conspicuous deficiency, have been completed. Revised systems of accounts—not mere bookkeeping changes—have been formulated with assistance from Booz, Allen and Hamilton for such diverse functions as public works, public schools, and hospitals. More importantly, teams of Filipino accountants and analysts have been trained for this purpose and will be engaged for perhaps a decade in devising for one agency after another the specialized accounting and performance reporting needed to complement budgeting. This activity could hardly have been initiated without the motivation provided by a prior change in budgetary process.

Gains on the personnel front have also been made, though they are perhaps less dramatic. The Bureau of Civil Service at last report had tooled up to give a number of specialist examinations never before attempted. Strides have been made in establishing registers of eligibles for various classes of positions. The comprehensive classification plan devised with Kroeger's assistance has now been put into effect. A sizable group of trained analysts is capable of keeping titles and job relationships up to date.

The baleful effects of political influences, both partisan and personal, constitute a more thorny problem. None who cooperated in stimulating other administrative changes minimized the length of time required to modify political mores. We did observe, however, that patronage did not prevent the assembling of staffs which were as competent as the society could supply wherever agencies were strongly goal motivated. Furthermore, creative ingenu-

ity may find means of circumventing the most pernicious of political machinations.



Whether Commissioner Aytona was wise in insisting upon the initiation of what has come to be called "performance budgeting" cannot be appraised in terms of its possible effectiveness in an ideal situation. Rather, a sound evaluation of his judgment and that of the USOM in supporting his endeavor must be based upon a comparison of preexisting with present conditions and upon a forecast of the future. This, Dr. Parsons did not attempt.

Permit me, therefore, to review concisely, relevant conclusions reached in my 1953 survey of Philippine administrative management.

1. A common lack of planning and goal-setting in most bureaus and departments.
2. Great gaps in communications between superior and subordinate officials.
3. No institutionalized process by which priority needs could be evaluated and resources transferred from one program to another.
4. Bureaus and subagencies that were well-nigh independent satrapies, subject to highly centralized controls on appointments and other nonessentials, but uncoordinated and relatively autonomous in their program decisions.

These are, of course, broad generalizations, oversimplified and undoubtedly too baldly put. We were, of course, aware of numerous exceptions and modifying qualifications.

Today, and largely as a result of performance budgeting, none of these observations would be nearly so widely applicable. The bureaucracy's attitudes toward governmental functions have changed or are in the process of change. There is a new and invigorating emphasis on accomplishments. No longer can a bureau chief say without embarrassment that he has no program for the next fiscal year. Throughout the administration there is a conscious effort to define objectives and to modify policy and administration so as to achieve them.

Departmental secretaries now have and use information concerning bureau operations not hitherto available to them. Top officials receive, examine, and use statistical, accounting,

and other reports to discover trouble spots and take remedial action. Evidence piles up that resources are being shifted from less to more essential purposes. To an increasing extent supplies and miscellaneous supporting facilities are being adjusted to complement manpower expenditures. In sum, the budget process is becoming a significant tool of management on all levels.

The performance budget, even though only partially effective, has thus reinforced other influences compelling executives to become leaders rather than mere officeholders. It has on innumerable occasions induced them to make the critical decisions by which their organizations have become institutions infused with positive values, not mere aggregates of individuals. The goals toward which the budget commissioner and the USOM were reaching in 1954 have been attained beyond our expectations.

Another byproduct, contributed by the management consulting staff, has been the formulation of a five-year fiscal plan. The organization and data collection machinery have been provided for a sophisticated analysis of fiscal trends and policies in the President's annual budget message. In long-run national interest and public welfare, this accomplishment alone might be well worth the United States dollars invested in the budget project.

It is my profound conviction that many Philippine political leaders are learning the invaluable lesson of political maturity that effective administration and sound policy in the public interest are also good politics. This is the prerequisite of democratic government. Effective administration—by whatever means it may be won—is in the Philippines a *sine qua non* for the democratization of political power which will make more fundamental reforms possible. U. S. funds and technical assistance have assisted measures designed to make progress toward that goal. The modernization of fiscal machinery has been an essential component in that program.

Only the future can reveal the extent to which the administrative machineries so painstakingly constructed will enable the Philippine people and their officials to solve the vexing social and economic problems which

confront them. Their cause should not be prejudged, or their efforts belittled.

Sincerely yours,

VIRGIL B. ZIMMERMANN

formerly Organization and Management Specialist 1952-1956, and Acting Chief Public Administration Division, 1955-1956 U. S. Operations Mission to Philippines

TO THE EDITOR

Public Administration Review:

"Performance Budgeting in the Philippines," in the Summer, 1957, edition of the *Review* strikes me as unfortunate in attitude and erroneous in many points of fact.

As one who has had a part in the administrative improvement program in the Philippines, and as one greatly impressed by what this "showcase of democracy" has accomplished in the few short years following enemy occupation and the equally devastating effects of both conquest and liberation, I should like to join others who will undoubtedly speak out in protest and rebuttal to Malcolm Parsons' article.

It was our privilege to work in the Philippines from August, 1953, to February, 1957, assisting in the development of a national government personnel classification and pay plan, and in general government reorganization. Our contracts for this work were with the budget commissioner, who was also chairman of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission. While performance budgeting was not one of our direct concerns, our close working relationship with the budget commissioner enabled us to understand how he regarded this tool as one of the essentials in an all-out effort to improve administrative practices, as a step toward the broader goals of social and economic progress.

Others closer to the development of the performance budget probably will comment on its details. I should like to limit my observations to those points with which I was most directly concerned. Parsons discussed "four . . . related problem areas," including personnel and organization, and it is on these two that

I wish to offer comments based on the combined experience of twenty-two members of my staff over a three and one-half year period.



The article refers to the personnel classification system as not yet implemented. Technically this was so when the article appeared; but since then, President Garcia has signed all necessary implementing documents and the plan with accompanying increases in pay is in effect.

Most disturbing is the allegation that "the new classification system is based on existent position titles, wages and personnel." The reverse is true. The classification plan is based on actual current duties and responsibilities of the employees as they described them in detail, verified by their superiors, and verified further by interviews and observations of the work of nearly 30,000 of the 183,000 classified. In fact, so widespread was the search for the facts, that in remote parts of the country the classification analyst was the first representative of the national government to have visited from Manila since prewar days.

Similarly, a salary survey, to which every important employer in the Philippines contributed data on prevailing practices, was the basis for forming a completely new pay plan. Under the old plan, nearly half the employees were receiving the minimum salary of 1,440 pesos per year. The new plan recognizes that many have duties which justify a substantial differential over that minimum.

In no case and under no circumstances were considerations of existing title and existing salary a factor in determining the new classification. Any classification plan must relate to existing personnel. They are doing the job to be classified. Classification identifies and describes what it finds.

If organization and staffing are to be changed, that is another matter. It was recognition of this principle which lead the Philippine Congress to create a Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to improve the organization and operations even while the classification of what existed was already under way.



This leads to the second item—organization—where again the article conveys a most inaccurate picture. Parsons says "In the main, the commission's proposals have been idealistic, formulary schemes for improving executive direction, coordination, and control through a more functional alignment of activities." Something about the tone and context makes this use of "idealistic" seem like a nasty word. There is an element of idealism in any government reorganization effort. We always seek the perfect answer even while aware that we shall have to settle for less.

The approved reorganization plans were based on the considered practical judgment of the twelve members of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission. Four were members of the Philippine Senate; four were members of the House; and four appointees of the President—the budget commissioner, a utility executive, a college president, and a retired military officer who had also served as civil aviation administrator. The congressional delegation included the majority floor leaders of each house and the chairmen of key committees directly concerned with reorganization.

This was no body of visionaries. They were realists, fully cognizant of the existing condition and devoted to its improvement. Their review of reorganization proposals was painstaking. Their devotion to their job was exceptional. Reorganization plans which were approved did not merely shift functions into new patterns. A fundamental change in the operation of the Presidency was approved; new machinery for administrative improvements through a Council of Administrative Management was provided; notable decentralization from Manila to the field was accomplished, with appropriate machinery for managing field operations; the whole machinery for economic planning and development was revitalized; a new Department of General Services was created, the head of which is to have Cabinet rank; services of the government were realigned to deal more effectively with labor relations, agrarian reforms, fiscal operations, and many other functions vital to improving the economy and strengthening the social structure of the country.

A fairer picture of the progress toward reorganization would have been given had Parsons mentioned that the reason only one reorganization plan was approved in 1955 was that Congress was allowed by law only thirty days to veto plans or allow their automatic enactment. In view of the volume and complexity of the proposals, Congress wisely delayed action and extended the law into the next session to allow more time for approval.

It is significant that the thirty-three plans approved in 1956 were generally those which had been first considered in 1955. The twenty rejected in 1956 were mainly those related to government corporations, which had not been included in the 1955 program. The batting average of the approved plans is indeed impressive when one considers the field of government organization proper.

Having first damned the reorganization proposals as idealistic, Parsons in a footnote charges extreme practicality (which he seems to find equally undesirable) when he says that a "cursory examination" shows the 1956 plans to have "lines of compromise . . . necessary to get either legislative or agency support." Of course there was compromise. Where in successful administration or legislation is there not? But most of the change was not in principle, but in refinement of detail which an extra year of time made possible. This is far different from the implication that everything was rejected in one year and then approved only after extensive revision to satisfy administrative and congressional critics.

In his reference to reorganization, and in other places throughout the article, the author refers to the introduction by Americans of administrative ideas too advanced and sophisticated for this underdeveloped country.

Perhaps the "cursory examination of the details" to which he refers should have been more thorough. No concept was put in any plan which did not first have the understanding and acceptance of a task force of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission; then the understanding and acceptance of the entire commission, after hours of

debate; and finally the approval of the President and the Congress.

Our staff guided the thinking—but never sought to influence it—in the early stages, but in times of decision we respected the principle that we were guests and advisers in another country, not entitled to any voice in their decision on such vital matters. The verbatim transcript of the meetings of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission is a mighty tome. We are proud to point out that in hundreds of thousands of words, members of our staff are seldom quoted, and then only in answer to questions or in presenting data requested by a member of the commission.

To be sure, there are imperfections in what is being done in the Philippines. Many of the same shortcomings can be found in the state capitols, the county court houses, the city halls, and even in the vast edifices of the bureaucracy in Washington, D. C. These imperfections will always exist, because we can never stop the services of any government long enough to reconstruct to perfection each piece of the ideal administrative organization, in its correct order, and at precisely the right time. We improvise as we go; but with purpose and principle underlying our improvisation.

With that understanding, performance budgeting in the Philippines, and all that accompanies it, represents a tremendous step forward, the significance of which is only slightly diminished by the imperfections of the program in its early stages.

Above all, the development is of and by the Filipinos. American money and technical advice have *helped*, but not *directed* or *forced*—for force and direction are not a part of American technical assistance, either in principle or in practice.

Very truly yours,

LOUIS J. KROEGER
Management Consultant

TO THE EDITOR

Public Administration Review:

The article by Malcolm Parsons on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" re-

ports the observations of one who was in the country when the first performance budget for all agencies of the administration was before the Congress. As another observer, at an earlier stage and currently, I have reached different conclusions. I was aware of all the facts presented in Mr. Parsons' article, and to the informed reader there were indications that the author was aware of other facts which I judged important; yet I cannot agree that even the facts that were presented as evidence justify the positiveness of his conclusions.

The article is attached to a convenient handle of "performance budgeting"; but it presents a general criticism of Philippine public administration, followed by the conclusion that the United States technical assistance mission was in error in its attempts to assist in the improvement of administrative services. The introductory factual account is essentially correct, but much too brief to permit the reader to judge the validity of the generalizations and conclusions—hence the danger that unwary readers will draw factual inferences that are not valid and that the author probably did not intend.



A few examples of misleading implications or likely reader inferences will suffice to illustrate my point:

1. Mr. Parsons criticizes freely several aspects of Philippine administration; but his references to the line-item budget, which he defends by implication, are significantly brief and uninformative. He does not mention how the detailed listing of positions and salaries has been used as a device whereby congressmen force the removal of officials who are "uncooperative" on matters of patronage, and otherwise control appointments, promotions, and other administrative actions. Instead he permits the American reader to assume that the budget system was essentially the same as the typical object-classification budget in the United States. He also draws his reader toward the inference that the line-item budget is somehow more indigenous to the Philippines than the performance-type budget. Neither of these assumptions would be correct.

2. The author argues that accounting re-

form (cost measurement and a change in the concept of legal responsibility) should have preceded an attempt to install a performance-type budget. Interestingly, the Bell Mission, which he cites, found that "the complexities and cost of the accounting operation in the Philippines may be attributed to the method of appropriating funds"¹—that is, the line-item appropriation based upon a detailed line-item budget. Which, then, should be sought first, a reform of the accounting system or a revision of the budget? The Philippine government chose to start with the latter.

3. A performance budget could not succeed, according to Mr. Parsons, because of inadequately trained personnel and a broken-down civil service system. The reader would infer that personnel reform and training should precede budget reform. True, the Bell Mission placed greater emphasis on the need for personnel reform. Early efforts along that line were marked by the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration under a United States government supported contract with the University of Michigan. The United States Mission was prepared to extend further assistance; but at that time the leaders of the Bureau of Civil Service apparently hoped to return to the prewar status described by an American author as "an improvement on the Civil Service as it exists in the United States."² They did not look with favor on mechanization; and, in keeping with American technical assistance policy, aid would be given only on request. The Budget Commission, on the other hand, saw possibilities of improvement in several areas, and was anxious to avail itself of American assistance.

But suppose that the "major effort" had been aimed at personnel reform. Almost surely such a program would have been hampered, and subject to justifiable criticism on the ground that no personnel reform could be successful so long as positions and salaries were fixed by detailed line-item appropriations.

¹ *Technical Memoranda (Appendices) on Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 61.

² George A. Malcolm, *American Colonial Careerist* (Christopher Publishing House, 1957), p. 130. See also J. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines* (The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 143.

4. Mr. Parsons seems either to take the view that performance budgeting is a failure unless it is in full operation and all anticipated benefits are realized within a few years, or else to contend that virtually no benefits have been derived from the efforts and the money expended for assistance. I would challenge either conclusion.

With regard to the first possible viewpoint, I refer the reader to the quotation at the close of this commentary. And the second viewpoint seems hardly to be supported by experience. The budget reform spurred several extensive training programs inside and outside of the Budget Commission, and it has been a factor in providing increased employment opportunities for graduates of the Institute of Public Administration. Accounting methods have been improved, and the new allotment system has provided justification for training of accounting and cash-disbursing officers. Partly because of the budget changes, the auditor general has agreed to withdraw from the detailed preaudit and to place increased reliance upon the postaudit. Even though patronage-minded congressmen should succeed in restoring a full-fledged line-item budget, many of the benefits derived from the current experiment will doubtless be felt for several years to come.

5. Mr. Parsons does not tell the reader that the United States Overseas Mission stood ready to give assistance in all of the areas he mentioned, but that requests must be forthcoming and necessary legislation is a prerequisite to an active assistance program. Pressure for legislation is vulnerable to the charge of intervention. The budget law was passed, and so the opportunity was provided. The reorganization act was passed, and there was an opportunity to help bring about results more beneficial than had followed two previous reorganization acts since Philippine independence was attained.

This question of legislation has an important bearing upon the author's contention that problems of economic development "need to be met directly."

6. The Parsons article, with its emphasis upon "a major effort to install performance budgeting," tends to leave the reader with a distorted picture of American technical assistance activities in the Philippines. It does not mention the efforts of tax consultants; it does not mention improvements in the land registration program; it does not tell that a great amount of effort has been exerted to deal directly with problems of economic development; and it does not point out that the United States Overseas Mission stood ready to give assistance, upon request, in any or all of the areas cited by the Bell Mission as being in need of improvement. Perhaps the author could not be expected to discuss all of these activities; but the fact remains that omissions, together with the positive generalizations, lead readers to mistaken inferences of fact.



With all of the varied activities of a pioneering technical assistance program, there were bound to be some errors, some programs that did not come up to hopes or expectations, and many areas of service which have not yet had an impact upon the economic development of the Philippines. But an evaluation of the technical assistance program should be made in the light of the following statement, made in 1950 by the Bell Mission, with reference to the entire program of economic and administrative reform that it recommended:

No one must expect that even so comprehensive a program as this will quickly or automatically remove all the ills of the Philippine economy. What it can do is to provide an environment in which the people of the Philippines can work out a reasonable solution of their problems.³

Sincerely,

EDWIN O. STENE

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of Public Administration,
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³ Economic Survey Mission, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Next Step in Case Studies

By HERBERT KAUFMAN, Yale University

THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CASE PROGRAM: CASES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY FORMATION. Published and distributed for the ICP by the University of Alabama Press, University, Alabama.

No. 24. THE ARMY FLIES THE MAILS, by Paul Tillett. 1954. Pp. 80. \$1.40.

No. 25. THE BATTLE OF BLUE EARTH COUNTY, by Paul N. Ylvisaker, and THE BATTLE OF HARRISON COUNTY, by Gary Brazier. 1955. Pp. 28. 50¢.

No. 26. DEFENDING "THE HILL" AGAINST METAL HOUSES, by William K. Muir, Jr. 1955. Pp. 35. 50¢.

No. 27. THE CLOSING OF NEWARK AIRPORT, by Paul Tillett and Myron Weiner. 1955. Pp. 52. \$1.00.

No. 28. THE IMPOUNDING OF FUNDS BY THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, by J. D. Williams. 1955. Pp. 33. 50¢.

No. 29. THE MICHIGAN ATHLETIC AWARDS RULE, by Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., Helenan Sonnenburg, and George Kantrowitz. 1955. Pp. 23. 35¢.

No. 30. THE PUBLIC ADVISORY BOARD AND THE TARIFF STUDY, by David S. Brown. 1956. Pp. 47. 50¢.

No. 31. THE TRANSFER OF THE KANSAS STATE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT, by Peter Bart and Milton Cummings, Jr. 1956. Pp. 24. 35¢.

No. 32. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, by Frederick C. Mosher. 1956. Pp. 55. 90¢.

No. 33. THE COTERMINOUS BOUNDARIES DISPUTE, by Edwin A. Read. 1956. Pp. 15. 20¢.

No. 34. FROM FOREST TO FRONT PAGE, by Roscoe C. Martin. 1956. Pp. 66. \$1.25.

No. 35. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: TWO GLIMPSES, by Gerald G. Schulsinger. 1956. Pp. 80. \$1.00.

No. 36. APPOINTED BY THE MAYOR, by William N. Kinnard, Jr. 1956. Pp. 15. 30¢.

No. 37. THE FLAGSTAFF FEDERAL SUSTAINED YIELD UNIT, by Paul W. Bedard and Paul N. Ylvisaker. 1957. Pp. 24. 35¢.

No. 38. THE NEW BEDFORD MANPOWER INCIDENT, by Kathryn Smul Arnow. 1957. Pp. 65. 85¢.

I

How does one go about convincing people that the study of Public Administration is at least as important as the study of other forms of animal life?" inquired Professor R. N. Spann, of the University of Sydney, several years ago.¹ "Let me end by reminding you," he added rather wistfully, "of the words of that great American administrative reformer, Mr. Louis Brownlow, 'Public Administration is one of the most important things in the world; but it has little sex appeal.' " In the cases published by the Inter-University Case Program (ICP), Professor Spann implied, may reside the resolution of this dilemma, and the appearance of fifteen additional case studies in the last three years tends to confirm this judgment. To be sure, they are not immune

¹ *Public Administration* (Sydney) 35:44 (Spring, 1953).

to criticism, but it is hardly likely that drabness will be the fault found with many of them; they may not be glamorous, but they are often "sexy."

They vary a good deal, of course, depending on the nature of the subject matter and the literary craftsmanship of the authors. Some I found particularly engrossing: William K. Muir's *Defending "The Hill" Against Metal Houses*, the story of the rebellion of a neighborhood against routine administrative approval of the construction of cheap metal buildings on its borders, is fast moving and crisply told. Paul N. Ylvisaker's *The Battle of Blue Earth County*, a reissue of his expert account of a local political leader's fight against state supervision of local welfare appointments, is thoroughly engaging, and now has an interesting parallel in Gary Brazier's short companion piece, *The Battle of Harrison County*. *The Closing of Newark Airport*, by Paul Tillett and Myron Weiner, captures much of the excitement and tension generated by a series of tragic and freakish airplane crashes in the streets of a crowded city. Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., Helenan Sonnenburg, and George Kantrowitz recount briskly the storms provoked by the suspension of several high-school athletes in *The Michigan Athletic Awards Rule*. These are exceptionally absorbing pieces.

The narrative in a number of others is interrupted or slowed by the introduction of a great deal of essential, though not especially exciting, technical and historical background information, but they manage to sustain a high level of interest just the same. Roscoe C. Martin, for example, is compelled to brief the reader on forest economics and management, area history and sociology, and federal administrative structure and procedure, in order to make intelligible his gracefully written study of the problems of a paper corporation in getting permission to erect a huge paper mill in East Tennessee; *From Forest to Front Page* is one of the best of the case studies, but, inescapably, it lags a bit in spots. In *The Army Flies the Mails*, Paul Tillett has to depart from the thread of a dramatic story of the disastrous attempt by the Army Air Force to take over air mail transportation in 1934 in order to explain the intricacies of air mail policies

and history. Kathryn Smul Arnow, in *The New Bedford Manpower Incident*, succeeds in outlining the complicated administrative arrangements for manpower management during World War II and the economics of part of the textile industry in the course of telling how the War Manpower Commission was frustrated by local opposition to its measures designed to force workers into unpleasant but critical war work. Similarly, a substantial portion of *The Flagstaff Federal Sustained Yield Unit*, by Paul W. Bedard and Paul N. Ylvisaker, is given over to extensive economic analysis in order to furnish the setting for a relatively short description of the making of a sustained-yield contract between the Forest Service and local lumber millers. Gerald G. Schulsinger's *The General Accounting Office: Two Glimpses*, though it has considerable charm in its intimate vignettes of clerks disallowing expenditures by government officers and employees, and conveys much of the flavor of a vigorous battle between GAO investigators and Commodity Credit Corporation personnel, is heavily burdened with the intricate history, and with the translations of the arcane jargon, of the federal fiscal world. *The Coterminous Boundaries Dispute*, by Edwin A. Read, is in good part technical background for a report on the struggle of a Canadian community against the school redistricting recommendations of a provincial commission. I found myself sometimes skimming paragraphs and even pages of these studies when the action stopped for the interpolations. But it is also true that I never was so little stimulated by anyone of them that I put it down without following it to the end, or that I failed to go back to fill myself in on the background data once it became clear that the action was difficult to understand without them.

I found the five remaining cases somewhat less satisfying, not because they are not as skillfully written in most instances, but because they lack the inherent dramatic qualities, the sense of urgency, of most of the others. The deliberate, cautious, extended negotiations by which test construction, pay administration, and position classification were gently and relatively quietly fused and assigned to personnel "generalists" in Freder-

ick C. Mosher's *The Reorganization of the California State Personnel Board* are reported with painstaking care and intelligence, but Professor Mosher himself observes in his Postscript, "This story, unlike some other cases in administration, contains little drama. There are no villains and no bloodshed." (p. 55) This observation applies also to *The Public Advisory Board and the Tariff Study*, by David S. Brown; the decisions about the role of the board, the contents of its report, and whether to submit to an incoming administration a report instituted under the preceding administration, are consistently low pressure. There is substantially more controversy in *The Transfer of the Kansas State Civil Service Department*, by Peter Bart and Milton Cummings, Jr., yet I am inclined to sympathize with those state legislators to whom, in the words of the authors, "... the transfer of control [of personnel administration] from the Civil Service Board to the Finance Council appeared to be an academic issue." (p. 24) It is never clear that the shift made any real difference in personnel management despite its importance to some of the bureaucrats involved. *The Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget*, by J. D. Williams, and *Appointed by the Mayor*, by William N. Kinnard, Jr., are less concerned with *what* to do than with *how* to do it. The former portrays the Bureau of the Budget nervously withholding, against congressional objections, funds appropriated for public works projects, sometimes yielding to pressure and backing away from its original position, sometimes standing fast in spite of everything, but always committed to its policy on the whole. The latter, covering nine mayoral appointments in fifteen pages, shows the mayor of a small town managing to get his candidates for appointive positions into those jobs whenever he really wants to; there is little real suspense here. Professor Mosher's observation about his own California personnel case is true of all of the studies in this group; "... it relates," he says, "... [the] authentic workings of dynamic administration—normal people trying to do their jobs and do them better over the long run." (p. 55) Thus he warns against exclusive concern with instances of administrative violence simply because they make

more exciting reading. The fact remains, however, that the cases focused on controversy are more gripping, even if they are only part—perhaps a small part—of the entire administrative process.

But even the relatively unexciting ones are more interesting than most textbook treatments of public administration, for they are more concrete. They are peopled by human beings, bargaining, negotiating, fighting, acting, in situations everyone can identify himself with. Of course, they are not comprehensive enough in their coverage ever to replace systematic, abstract treatments of the field, but they may well rescue public administration from the charges of dullness and excessive generality.

II

THE cases are instructive as well as enjoyable. Their lessons have been summarized admirably by Harold Stein in his introduction to the original case book, by many of the reviewers of that volume, and, more recently, by reviewers of the fifteen cases preceding the present group but published after the case book.² The gist of these evaluations

² *Public Administration and Policy Development* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952). See also Harold Stein, "Case Studies in Public Administration in the United States," 29 *Public Administration* (London) 252-56 (Autumn, 1951), and "Human Relations and Administration," 24 *Harvard Educational Review* 59-70 (Winter, 1954). Reviews and notes on the case book have appeared in 12 *Public Administration Review* 193-200 (Summer, 1952); 12 *Louisiana Law Review* 541-44 (May, 1952); 17 *American Sociological Review* 523 (August, 1952); 46 *American Political Science Review* 876-79 (September, 1952); 5 *Western Political Quarterly* 552-53 (September, 1952); 61 *Yale Law Journal* 1238-41 (November, 1952); 5 *Review of the International Union of Local Authorities* (March, 1953); 31 *Public Administration* (Sydney) 35-44 (Spring, 1953); 14 *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration* 74 (September, 1952); 3 *Revue Française de Science Politique* 832-48 (October-December, 1953). Further comments on the cases appeared in Kenneth Culp Davis, "Some Reflections of a Law Professor on Instruction and Research in Public Administration," 47 *American Political Science Review* 728-52 and 48 *American Political Science Review* 174-85 (September, 1953, and March, 1954); York Willbern, 4 *Public Service* (New Zealand) 3-7 (December, 1954). Reviews of, and comments on, later cases appeared in 15 *Public Administration Review* 115-20 (Spring, 1955); 49 *American Political Science Review* 876-77 (September, 1955); 22 *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 153-72 (Summer, 1956).

is that the case studies compel caution in the application of the "principles" of administration to life situations, call attention to the dilemmas of conflicting loyalties besetting almost all who participate in large-scale organizations, point up the intricate process of negotiation, mutual accommodation, and reconciliation of competing values from which policy decisions emerge, and reveal administration as process and as politics.

Every one of these observations applies with equal force to the current group. The cases warn us to view suspiciously all sweeping generalizations about administrative behavior, to avoid the uncritical idealization and automatic denunciation of participants in the governmental process (whether bureaucrat, politician, or interest group). They alert the student of government to the dangers of oversimplification, which the writers of even the most sophisticated textbooks find it difficult to escape entirely. They make him conscious of the fact that virtually every proposal for any kind of change deprives someone—sometimes "inside" government, sometimes external to it—of something he is accustomed to or would like to have, and that routine actions often embody sweeping changes from somebody's point of view. They throw into prominence the strategies and the tactics of the people involved, displaying techniques of coalition, delay, persistence, and circumvention and manipulation of formal rules in the pursuit of personal and organizational objectives. These same elements appear in virtually every case regardless of the level of government, the substantive programs, the administrative echelons, and the period described. The cases thus illuminate the textbooks, but they also modify them, fill in their omissions, and carry the discipline beyond them.

The cumulative impact of the cases is only one of their values. In addition, each of them individually is richly suggestive and often highly provocative. The California Personnel Board reorganization, for instance, gives the impression that consultation and negotiation prior to administrative change smooth the way for the new arrangements, illustrating by specific example a point commonly made in administrative literature. At the same time, it may make one wonder whether the same prac-

tice in other situations might not merely serve to put the potential opposition on notice, with the result that they mobilize their defenses and dig in for battle instead of yielding meekly to surprise moves which present them with *faits accomplis*. The New Bedford manpower incident indicates that a seemingly powerful, high-level agency can be blocked by the resistance of some people in a local community, and leaves the reader speculating on whether it was because of a lack of legal enforcement devices, a failure of interagency cooperation, the conviction on the part of a field officer that compulsion could not succeed (and a possible tendency in his behavior to make his own prophecy come true), or something else in this particular episode. The study of the Public Advisory Board suggests that the activities of government agencies are sometimes simply reflections of the drives and preferences of individual bureaucrats, but it leaves open the possibility that such a situation can occur only when the agency in question is authorized to do nothing more than make recommendations. Every case calls to mind at least a few propositions about administrative behavior, and frequently a case will give rise to many; every proposition, in turn, evokes a question or a series of questions regarding the uniqueness or general applicability of the statement.

Since each case thus opens a different facet of administration to inquiry, in addition to illustrating the process of accommodation among competing interests, each makes its own special contribution to our field. Consequently, each addition to the storehouse of cases is a welcome—indeed, a needed—enrichment of the study of public administration.

III

YET there is a sense in which the case program has proved unsatisfying, in which its promise has not been entirely fulfilled. In general, it has demonstrated one thesis—that administration is interaction among groups and individuals—many times over. The twenty-six cases in the original case book firmly established this point; the second series of fifteen strengthened the evidence; the third one, the current series, makes it ironclad. The

higher abstraction has been demonstrated, confirmed, and reconfirmed many times over; in this respect, new cases do not add to what the earlier ones taught us, for the common denominator appears and reappears in each story.

As for the unique contribution of each study—the hypotheses and questions they generate—the cases provide insufficient material to evaluate the propositions or answer the questions; they stimulate speculation without furnishing enough information to enable us to judge which speculations are more useful or convincing than others. Admittedly, the stimulation of discussion and theorizing is one of the justifications of the program, and every teacher who has used the cases will testify to their value for educational purposes; the cases compel thought in class, and they permit the instructor to perform what may well be his most important function: training students in the techniques of rigorous analysis. In this respect alone, the ICP has justified its existence and the continued production of materials. Yet it is also guilty of a measure of dereliction in producing a steady stream of hypotheses and questions while making no effort to inquire into the scores, perhaps the hundreds, the cases already contain.

Indeed, it is not material for speculation we lack in public administration; the literature is rich in tentative hypotheses, even apart from those suggested by the case studies. A cursory survey of a few volumes pulled off my shelf in haphazard fashion, for example, furnishes a number: Luther Gulick and Marver H. Bernstein have argued that there are discernible, recurrent cycles in the history of government organizations.³ Wallace S. Sayre has associated morale with democratic patterns of organization, and characterized what seemed like morale in authoritarian organizations as a "brittle . . . unyielding spirit which when cracked was shattered."⁴ "Parkinson's Law," in a bantering way, avers there is an inverse

³ Luther Gulick, *Administrative Reflections from World War II* (University of Alabama Press, 1948), Chapter II; Marver H. Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton University Press, 1955), Chapter III.

⁴ "Morale and Discipline," in Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), p. 481.

relationship between organizational output and organizational cost and man power.⁵ Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson describe "the tendency to lessen organizational self-containment" through centralization as "one of the most characteristic administrative trends of our age" and add, "As to the forces behind this movement . . . we are highly ignorant."⁶ Fritz Morstein Marx and Henry Reining, Jr., declare, "In the operation of a departmental bureau . . . , it will be profitable . . . for the bureau chief to meet every day for a brief conference with his assistant chiefs; assemble once a week a somewhat wider circle of key officers; spend at least an hour twice a month with all his division, branch, and unit chiefs and their right-hand men . . . ; and to get together once a year with all his field-office managers, and more often with smaller groups of them. . . ."⁷

Do government agencies in fact go through stages of growth, maturity, and decline? Are authoritarian organizations in fact afflicted with lower morale than democratic ones? Is the tendency to increase budgets and personnel really unrelated to what organizations accomplish? Is decentralization, the increase of self-containment, at least as common as centralization? Are agency heads who see little of their subordinates invariably beset by greater difficulties than their more gregarious counterparts? On these propositions and questions, many of which antedate the case program, the cases shed little light. Instead of helping us to validate the former and answer the latter (which *only* the case method can do!), they enlarge the number of untested declarations and unresolved questions with which our discipline already abounds. And this, I submit, is derelict.

IV

THE ICP cannot escape its responsibility by shifting it to the profession as a whole. There is a surface attraction in the contention

⁵ C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957).

⁶ *Public Administration* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 272, 275.

⁷ "The Tasks of Middle Management," in Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 412.

that the case program performs a greater service by discovering and opening new lodes than it would by trying to mine them, leaving to others the task of development of the ground it breaks. The fact is, this does not happen. Given the nature of the profession, it will not; in general, professional recognition and reward come more quickly to those who develop new ideas and interpretations, to those who are "original," than to those who laboriously test the ideas and interpretations advanced by others. Moreover, speculation is often more fun than rigorous investigation. Our best talent is thus driven from the drudgery of testing to the greater delights and material benefits of speculation on the basis of the single instance.⁸ It is a delusion to imagine that political scientists will, under these conditions, devote themselves to systematic exploration of the hypotheses suggested by the cases or by the discursive literature. The ICP is in a position to encourage methodic inquiry, to remedy the defects of the profession; I hold it is remiss if it elects instead to intensify those failings.

The case program can realize its potential if it changes the basis on which cases are elected for development and publication. At present, a number of criteria guide the choice,⁹ literary excellence, penetration beyond formal procedures and public pronouncements, and substantial documentation probably being the most influential because they are the most difficult qualities to find; a well-written, fully substantiated, "inside" story is likely to be favorably considered by the Executive Board of the ICP even if it overlaps one or several published cases in content. Consequently, there are a few propositions on which two or more cases bear, and a much larger number to which only one case is relevant; the latter group, it is apparent from a comparison of the current fifteen with their predecessors, is growing at a far more rapid rate than the former. Moreover, even when one subject is dealt with in several cases, it is often ap-

proached so differently in each, and occurs under such widely varied circumstances, as to make almost impossible any effective comparisons. I should be among the first to object if competent style, behind-the-scenes reporting, and high minimum standards of evidence were sacrificed, but it does not seem to me that these must be surrendered in order to achieve more systematic selection for purposes of testing hypotheses. But it *does* seem to me that we cannot go forward if the ICP continues to operate as it has.

Therefore, I propose that another criterion of selection be added to the existing set. Specifically, I would urge that from the great reservoir of propositions contained in our textbooks and treatises and monographs and case studies, we choose a number for investigation, and that a series of cases be written around each in such a fashion as to permit judgments about their validity. This means more than merely having them deal with the same agency or process or problem; rather, it requires that each situation shall be as similar as possible to the others with respect to designated variables, or that they shall be different from one another in all respects except a few specified ones—in other words, that they shall conform as closely as we can make them to the classic formulations of the canons of scientific proof.¹⁰ When the ICP is convinced that a proposition has been refuted, it would be dropped; when the evidence of validity seems convincing to the board, no further evidence on that proposition would be gathered; while it remains in doubt, or in need of refinement, additional carefully chosen cases would be assembled until its status is clarified.

The framework of the case program would thus be a moving one, leaving behind it over the years a series of tested propositions—some with a wealth of corroborating data, some clearly refuted by the facts—and containing within itself those hypotheses of uncertain status still under scrutiny by the case method. The method would become accretive and probative as it now is not and cannot be. It would be systematic and disciplined where there is now a large element of chance in its choice of

⁸ A notable exception is the outstanding volume by Arthur W. Macmahon and John D. Millett, *Federal Administrators* (Columbia University Press, 1939).

⁹ Harold Stein, "Preparation of Case Studies: The Problem of Abundance," 45 *American Political Science Review* 479-87 (June, 1951).

¹⁰ E.g., Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), Chapter XIII and pp. 343-44.

materials. Above all, it would be rescued from the dual problem of confirming and reconfirming loose abstractions about policy formulation as a process of accommodation (to which virtually all of us already subscribe anyway), and, at a more concrete level, from the suggestion of new hypotheses without any examination of the old ones.

V

ADoption of the approach here proposed requires a number of acts of faith. It assumes, for example, belief in the cumulativeness of human knowledge about society, a point of view about the social sciences upon which human history casts many serious doubts. I know of no way to resolve this dilemma; perhaps all that can be said in defense of the assumption is that only by continued efforts to demonstrate the additive properties of such knowledge can we determine whether the properties do in fact apply. Not to try at all is to prejudice the issue; perhaps new methods will succeed where earlier ones failed.

Second, there is no compelling reason, on the basis of available evidence, to assume that administrative situations can be matched closely enough to isolate particular variables for comparison; the number of variables in social relationships is so great that any two situations, no matter how carefully selected, will differ in many respects. If so, some people argue, we cannot hope to make the cases really probative. However, not all differences are significant for a given purpose. Some are totally irrelevant, just as most differences between individuals are medically irrelevant when the persons have contracted the same disease. Until we know which are important and which can safely be overlooked in specific connections, the variations appear overwhelming; once we identify the ones that count, our analytical and experimental problems become much simpler. As the case method is now handled, everything about every situation seems relevant. Perhaps the chief value of the approach proposed here is that it reduces the dimensions of our task to manageable proportions. We can be sure this will not occur if we proceed as we have heretofore; there is a pos-

sibility it might if we sharpen our research tools.

Third, though a given selection of test cases might support (or refute) a particular hypothesis, we have no guarantee that it has not excluded an equally impressive volume of countervailing cases; the risk is particularly high when the number of illustrations never exceeds six or eight. But the danger can be kept as small as possible by entrusting the choices to a body as diverse in outlook, as varied in experience, and as dedicated to the highest standards of intellectual integrity as the Executive Board of the ICP. Once the board has decided to order its search for materials around the examination of specific hypotheses, it might sometimes try for randomness of choice among a group of relevant studies, or strive for representation of opposing views, or publish one or two cases illustrating (or contradicting) a proposition and invite contrary case proposals from the profession at large. Whatever the mode of balance, certainly the ICP Board can be relied on to find appropriate ones. That is not to say the Board would "endorse" or "repudiate" propositions, or place an "official interpretation" on the facts. But it would be as impartial as possible in the selection of cases, and it is unlikely that a more judicious and objective group could be found anywhere for this purpose.

Fourth, while assembling cases around particular hypotheses might provide a criterion for the selection of *events* and *variables* for reporting, there is nothing in this approach that indicates which *hypotheses* should be chosen for testing. This leaves us only with the intuition of the research planners to guide us. But there is nothing dismaying about this; it is true of every discipline, and the men we honor for their contributions are generally those whose hunches are borne out by investigation. The distinguishing mark of science is not that it eliminates trial and error, but that it gives us a standard for distinguishing good guesses from bad ones. Intuition is thus a built-in component of the process, not a reason to despair.

If, however, the hypotheses are selected by intuitive means, then they will not be related to each other; even those that are verified will not form a coherent, internally consistent, uni-

fied body of knowledge. To this objection, it can only be said that beginning at the beginning may be a regrettable necessity, but it is inescapable all the same. Higher orders of synthesis can be constructed only when there are lower orders to synthesize. Ordering the hypotheses can hardly take place until there are demonstrated propositions to relate to one another. The all-or-nothing argument strikes me as unpersuasive; the way to go forward is step by step, increment by increment.

This is a long, slow procedure at best. The ICP, with considerable resources in money and voluntary manpower, has produced an average of five cases a year; at this rate, progress would be measured in generations, perhaps in centuries, and even doubling or trebling the rate would not yield results over a short interval. This may deter the impatient and discourage the fainthearted. But they have yet to show any equally promising, quick alternatives.

Perhaps the faith on which this proposal rests will in the end prove to be misplaced. If so, we shall be no worse off than we are now—indeed, we shall be better off, for we shall at last be fairly sure that this road leads nowhere, and we shall at the same time have as many cases for class use as we would have under any circumstances. With nothing to lose and everything to gain, the experiment is certainly worth undertaking.

VI

IN A sense, the ICP has already taken a step in the direction indicated. Under the terms of a five-year grant from the Ford Foundation, it will concentrate its efforts on the development of case "clusters," each cluster consisting of "as few as four or as many as eight or more case studies designed to have a common theme and a similar focus and illustrating how different administrators have dealt with similar problem situations." By this means, it is hoped the cases will "present a representative spread of conditions, thereby avoiding a limitation of the single case, which may sometimes describe a somewhat eccentric condition," and

that they "will encourage comparative analysis . . . [and] have an additive effect and suggest hypotheses and generalizations."

However, what the cases in each cluster will share with their fellows is a concentration on areas of governmental operation rather than convergence on specific propositions whose validity is being investigated. The areas are executive leadership, planning, overseas operation, the regulatory process, and cases for the first-year course in political science. These seem to me so broad that the results will not be significantly different from what has been done thus far; the clusters will probably illustrate the process of negotiation and reconciliation of competing interests, and they will doubtless suggest many new propositions, but they will not be sufficiently restricted to tell us which propositions appear to be borne out by the evidence and which are refuted. If, to take a particular example in the executive leadership category, a group of studies were designed to test the hypothesis that chief executives in two-party jurisdictions appoint people from outside the ranks of their respective parties significantly more frequently than do chief executives in one-party constituencies, or that there is no correlation, negative or positive, between the influence of a mayor in the "strong-mayor" and "weak-mayor" forms of municipal government, it might be possible to draw some conclusions and move on to other propositions. Executive leadership itself, by contrast, is so general as to be subject to precisely the same disabilities as currently beset the case program. And the same may be said of the other areas.

The ICP decision to shift to the cluster technique may be interpreted as an admission that past methods have fallen short of what the case program can reasonably be expected to accomplish, although its achievements have been considerable and its excellent reputation richly deserved. But the cluster technique does not free it from its present limitations; it only lengthens the tether. The managers of the ICP should not hesitate to break their bonds entirely and step out boldly in new directions.

"The Decision-Making Schema": A Reply

By HERBERT A. SIMON, Carnegie Institute of Technology

PROFESSOR EDWARD BANFIELD published in the Autumn, 1957, issue of the *Public Administration Review* (in the form of a review of *Administrative Behavior*) a defense of proverbs and "wisdom"—a defense against the austerities and pretensions of the scientific method. His lines had so much more the tone of advocate than of judge, that I should like the privilege of pleading the case of the opposing party. I will not dispute whether the three topics he discusses are my "main methodological points," as he asserts, but will simply consider each of them in turn.¹ The first has to do with the "proverbs of administration"; the second with the need for operationalizing the concepts of our science; the third with decision-making as a schema for analyzing administrative processes.

The Proverbs Again

MR. BANFIELD agrees that the usual "principles" are fundamentally ambiguous and mutually contradictory, but despairs of experimental science as a means for resolving the ambiguities and contradictions.

If one cannot study important matters under controlled conditions, one must either seek out unimportant ones which can be scientifically studied or reconcile oneself to relying on common sense (meaning here judgment which does not rest entirely upon logical or nonarbitrary [sic] grounds).

The latter is, of course, what administrators do every day. The administrator who invokes the twin "proverbs" of span of control and level of organization, for example, considers as best he can how the various advantages associated with each appear in terms of the vague objectives of his organization.

The trouble is, "of course," that administrators *don't* weigh the competing proverbs nearly as often as they should, with the result that we have periodic fads and fashions in organization. For a long while, reorganization

studies could always be counted on to recommend a reduction in span of control—whatever the existing span was (the "levels" proverb was not even in the literature until it was put there by James Worthy and me). At the present time "flat" organizations are all the rage.

A second example: I have seen not one, but a dozen large organizations plump for "decentralization" without even bothering to examine just how much centralization or decentralization they already had. It is an observed fact that large numbers of business organizations are advocating decentralization of their labor relations activities (and are believing that they are practicing it) at the very time that they are centralizing them further. Neither Mr. Banfield's common sense nor my science has been applied to questions of organization nearly as much as his remarks imply, and there is plenty of room for the improvement of administrative organization through the application of both.

If present knowledge is unsatisfactory, Mr. Banfield would still doubt whether scientific method (and experimentation, in particular) can help us. He introduces into evidence a study in which I participated, which I have no desire to defend in detail (since I could do better now with fifteen years of hindsight), but which I am prepared to defend in general.

In order to derive policy recommendations from the findings of the study, we had to weigh a number of administrative objectives—accuracy of eligibility determination versus service to clients, for example. Mr. Banfield observes, correctly, that the weighing is in itself a value judgment and not empirically testable. (This is the main point of Chapter 3 of *Administrative Behavior*, also clearly stated in the study he refers to.) Since the study had applied aims as well as methodological objectives, its authors took the empirically tested findings (about the consequences for various goals of changing work loads), combined these with the objectives the administrators of the agency said they wished to accomplish (these

¹ I should not like anyone to interpret my silence on other points Mr. Banfield makes as agreement with them. In the interest of brevity, I have restricted my reply to a few central issues.

were not "imputed" by the researchers), and arrived at a policy recommendation. There is nothing unusual or "unscientific" about this procedure, since the authors made clear what value premises they were accepting, and where values left off and facts began.

In consuming food, I attach values both to good nutrition and to gustatory pleasure. I sometimes eat too many calories because I enjoy them; and I sometimes don't eat as many as I otherwise would for nutrition's sake. The numbers and kinds I eat are much influenced by what has been learned about human physiology and nutrition, even though this scientific knowledge is relevant to only one of my two goals in eating, and contributes nothing to the weighing of them. What distinguishes this knowledge from common-sense proverbs of the eat-well-but-not-too-much variety is that it tells me how much (i.e., about 2,500 calories per day) is enough and not too much. If we applied Mr. Banfield's argument literally to nutrition—as he does to administration—we would conclude that the science of nutrition has contributed nothing to the practical arts of eating. I can't accept the conclusion.

To answer Mr. Banfield's specific query, the "principles" are useless because, at best, they preach moderation without giving any measure of the consequences of departing from moderation in any direction. Even if we know how much weight we wish to give to various goals, the proverbs (unlike studies of the kind he objects to) provide us with no connections between actions and consequences.

Mr. Banfield makes more technical criticisms of our empirical study, criticisms that were made first by the authors of the study. They, too, would have liked to reduce the unreliability of their data. The route to reliability, however, is more likely to lie through more, and more careful, experimental and observational studies than through a return to "common sense" methods for examining complex situations and drawing conclusions from them.

In saying this, I am not taking the controlled experiment as the model for all science. Celestial mechanics is a good example of successful nonexperimental (until Sputnik) science whose conclusions are based on a

single case history. We badly need reliable general methods for observing and drawing inferences from the single case; but we need methods that are more objective, less subject to the "filtering" of the observer, than those the arts of history, biography, and journalism have provided us. Mr. Banfield can surely see the missing premise in his argument when he says, in effect: scientific method hasn't taken us very far in organization theory; *therefore*, let's go back to common sense.

The preceding paragraphs will answer Mr. Banfield's question as to how far the repudiation of pages 41-44 of *Administrative Behavior* is intended to go. I hope it is clear that I do not accept the dilemma of either studying unimportant matters scientifically, or important ones by common sense. The third route—studying important matters scientifically—is a steep and rocky one, but the only one, I am convinced, that leads to our destination.

Operational Definitions

MR. BANFIELD uses the definition of "authority" to illustrate his argument that "narrowly behavioristic concepts are likely to obscure the making of the distinctions which it is the purpose of a good conceptual scheme to facilitate." He says that, from the definition in *Administrative Behavior*, he can't distinguish the authority of a stick-up man from that of a boss. This is true—it is equally true that from the definition of "mammal" in Webster, I can't distinguish a mule from a man.

Authority is defined on page 125. The gentle reader who perseveres to pages 130-133, or who reads the chapter on authority in *Public Administration* (written with my former colleagues Smithburg and Thompson), will find the stick-up man distinguished from the boss. The point in having a common term covering the influence relation in both cases is that there is, in fact, an important generic similarity. In most organizations I have examined or lived in, negative sanctions (which I understand to be the peculiar earmark of the stick-up man's authority) are not absent as pillars of authority. In fact, their presence raises some of the same problems for the boss that the stick-up man faces, and that have

been remarked on in discussions of pedagogical uses of punishment.

Mr. Banfield's second point on operationalism is that, while I have criticized Gulick for not defining the "unit function," I have lapsed in not defining the "unit decision." The point he misses is that if we have a structure made up of parts within parts within parts—and so on—we need to define "unit part" only if we intend to attribute some property to unit parts that is not shared by compound parts. Mr. Gulick makes use of the concept of an organization having a single unitary function, while I do not make use of the concept of a unitary decision. Hence, he needs such a distinction, while I do not. As a matter of fact, an attempt is made in *Public Administration* to provide Mr. Gulick's concept with operational content, and hence to make it useful for organizational science (see the discussion in that volume of "unitary organizations" and "operational goals"). Likewise, since decisions can become, and usually do become, premises in other decisions, Mr. Banfield doesn't need to be concerned about the location of the decision. There isn't any "the decision."

The Decision-Making Schema

MR. BANFIELD imputes to me something less than complete candor for asserting in the introduction to the second edition that the "decision premise" rather than the "decision" was the building block of my theory. I can't say that I never called "decision" a building block, since I can't find "building block" in the index; but I do remember that I called "decision" the "heart of administration." I often mix metaphors; seldom that badly.

The important point, and one that does not involve any change in framework from the first edition, is that throughout the book the principal technical means that is employed to analyze the decision process is to dissect decisions into their component premises and then to study where the premises come from. The actual outline of Chapters 7 through 10 is based on this idea, and the point is stated explicitly and *ad nauseam* in the text—e.g., on pages 96, 123, 220, 223. In a casual search, I found 42 occurrences of the term "premises"

in the text, together with many synonyms, like "elements." I don't know what Mr. Banfield is trying to prove when he asserts that I appear "reluctant to acknowledge changes" when I see them, but he used a singularly poor example to prove it. What he should have concluded was that "the book does not have an adequate index."

Mr. Banfield is right in observing that in the introduction I place more emphasis on "satisficing" and less on "maximizing" than in the original text. Far from refusing to acknowledge this change, in the new introduction I describe the first edition as "schizophrenic" on this point, and refer to my change in view again on page xxxv.

Now has this change, as Mr. Banfield claims, "destroyed the rationale of the old conceptual scheme"? The change certainly does not interfere with the process of analyzing decisions in terms of the premises that enter into them—which is the conceptual scheme. What Mr. Banfield means is that the change, like his recognition that there may be multiple and incommensurable goals in organizations, adds one further link to the process of going from propositions in a "pure" or "sociological" science of administration to policy recommendations in the "applied" science of administration.

Under favorable circumstances, a criterion of maximizing guarantees that there will be a single, uniquely determined "best" course of action; the criterion of satisficing provides no such guarantee. My argument is that men satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize. I think this is a verifiable empirical proposition. It can be turned around, if anyone prefers: If you have the wits to maximize, it is silly to satisfice. Since my views on this subject are spelled out in greater detail in the essays in Part 4 of *Models of Man*, I will say no more here.

In Conclusion

MR. BANFIELD has a lot to say about what he's against. He has little to say about what he's for. I have inferred that what he is for is "common sense" and "wisdom," and I think this is a fair reading of his lines and of his books. He would be more candid if he

presented the case against "wisdom" with the same fervor with which he presents the case against "science." Since he has not done so, I will state briefly what it is:

1. We have applied "wisdom" to administration for 2,000 years. It has allowed us to carry out many administrative tasks reasonably well. However, I don't detect much progress from the "wisdom" literature in administrative theory during the past fifty years. Aristotle and the Hoover Commissions sound much alike, except that the former was a good deal more sophisticated than the latter about the relation of politics to administration.

2. Many other areas of human knowledge began to progress—in both their theoretical

and applied aspects—when scientific method was applied to them. I refer not primarily to the physical sciences, but to the much closer parallel of biology and medicine. You can find the same kinds of impassioned pleas for "wisdom" in medicine a century ago as we find in administration today. Meanwhile, the sale of Lydia Pinkham's Vegetable Compound has fallen off; the sale of thyroid extract has increased.

As knowledge advances—and it will—administrative practice will come to rest largely on scientifically tested knowledge of fundamental underlying mechanisms. Moreover, the present generation will see very rapid progress in this direction.

P I & E

Although they deal with different subjects, one can detect a common theme running like silver binding thread through the first five *Provocative, Informative, and Enjoyable* books for today. They are all intimate descriptions of administrative leaders—the nonfiction ones written by former subordinates or coworkers. Each brings out in a different way the fact that some executives get things done not only by using regular administrative methods but because they can make their associates like them, admire them, or respect them. This may not strike you as earth-shaking news, but it would seem to be news to our theorists and, to use a term that makes administration sound like a boxing match, to our trainers.

Much of our contemporary theory depicts "administrative man" moving others—or himself being moved—by rational persuasion, identification with agency goals, the lures of higher pay or grander institutional status, the presumption of authority or greater knowledge on the part of hierarchical superiors, or the indoctrination that comes from agency training programs or through properly channeled information. The fact that some officials get others to do things because they can make these associates like them, admire them, or respect them as individuals is certainly not made much of, and this may be one reason

why current theory is not altogether lifelike. Indeed, from the standpoint of a good deal of current theory, this personal element, this charismatic behavior, is as out of place among career officials as chasing typists around the file cabinets. One gets the impression that our theorists would probably prefer that if this sort of thing is to be done at all it should be carried on by the political appointees who are beyond the pale of administrative theory and therefore at liberty to make free with emotions and heroics. Thus the existence of bureaucratic charmers, leaders, or even, let's face it, heroes has not been widely noted.

Nor do our training programs, for the most part, give any attention to the extra leverage some administrators regularly obtain through charm, likability, admirability, or forcefulness. Granted, the current trend is to gather all varieties of administrators—the budding, the blooming, or the deflowered—into executive development programs at which they are taught the artful technique of how to make other people believe that what you want them to do is really what they wanted to do all along. (The prospect of an agency staffed entirely by suave administrators all working this black art of reciprocal thought transference upon one another, with each having to be polite and pretend that he has been out-

manipulated by the next man's devilishly clever skill at "interpersonal relations," is something that should send flow-chart designers posting to their drawing boards.) But whatever it bodes for administrative efficiency or for the rebirth of satire in America, current training on how to manipulate the cooperation or acquiescence of colleagues does not have the effect of alerting trainees to the role of personal charm or forcefulness in "real life." In fact, it tends to suppress appreciation of the personal factor because it calls for the concealment of the official's true personality behind a bland (required) and affable (extra credit) exterior.

Thus, the following five volumes offer evidence that may come as news to that part of the profession that steep itself heavily in theory or in training programs, the news that some administrative leaders can get more things done than others because they are able to make their associates like, admire, or respect them.



Let us start with the military and with *Drive* (Little, Brown & Co., 1957) the autobiographical account of his war experiences by General Patton's wartime aide, the late Colonel Charles R. Codman. A debonair Boston-Groton-Harvard man who went from bomber pilot in World War I to a civilian career as wine selector for S. S. Pierce, Codman was on the face of it the sort of person least likely to end up as chief aide-de-camp and jeep companion of "Blood and Guts" Patton. And if no man is a hero to his valet, how would a man of this somewhat precious background regard the driving commander of the Third Army? Based largely on diary entries and letters home, the book offers fascinating evidence of the gradual ripening of respect, affection, admiration, and almost love for the General on the part of a man who was nothing if not a civilized civilian. One sees how one-sided was the conception of Patton that was widespread during World War II, a conception deliberately and somewhat clumsily fostered by the General himself. On his headquarters staff, from which he continuously extracted more than a full measure of enterprise and effectiveness, Patton directed other aspects

of his personality that won admiration and devotion from persons quite different from front-line troops or, for that matter, from Codman. The General is revealed as a person of great learning as well as an exceptional planner and leader, but also as a person whose furious dedication to combat evoked in him emotions which he was not always able to blend into a harmonious whole. There are several classic anecdotes, including one of Patton stating flatly in 1945 that the reason Eisenhower had paid a flowery tribute to the Third Army was because he intended some day soon to run for President and the "Third Army represents a lot of votes." There is also the time the aide came on Patton shaving:

"Codman," he said without turning round, "I wish to hell I had a real fighting face. . . . You are either born with a fighting face or you are not. . . . Having practiced for hours in front of the mirror, I can work up a fairly ferocious expression, but I have not got, and never will have, a natural-born fighting face." (p. 275)



CHARLES S. ASCHER (Brooklyn College) notes two books by C. S. Forester to supplement Norton Long's mention of *The Good Shepherd* two issues back:

The Ship (Little, Brown & Co., 1943; Bantam reissue, No. A1619, 1957) chronicles eight hours in the life of a British light cruiser in the Mediterranean in World War II, engaging and routing an Italian flotilla. Each chapter portrays the contribution of a different member of the crew, building a mosaic of corporate action. At one crucial moment, the fate of the ship is seen to depend on the lowly stoker oiling the bearings in a dark and flooded shaft tunnel. The supreme pictures are those of the Italian and British commanders on their bridges. The Italian Vice-Admiral suffers a failure of will—for only half a minute, but for a decisive half-minute—when he is deflected from giving his order to engage the British by the worry: what will the Nazi "observer" on the bridge report to the Ministry, to Mussolini, about his conduct? It simply never occurs to the British Captain that he will not succeed.

Forester's *The General* (Little, Brown & Co., 1936; Bantam reissue, No. 1170, 1957)

sold unaccountably poorly in the United States. It paints the career of a mediocre British Army officer, married to a less attractive daughter of nobility, who is marked as a man of substance because of his comment ("Hrrumph!") on the Big Man's utterance at the right dinner party; who is given high command responsibilities in World War I and sends 100,000 men to death because he cannot depart from his rigid but unsuccessful tactic. Yet Forester paints the portrait of this man, thrust into decisions far beyond his scope, so humanly that one has sympathy for him as a broken old man in a wheel chair on the promenade at Bournemouth. The only way he could break out of his intolerable responsibilities was to lose a leg in a burst of personal bravery in the front line—for all of which his grateful country honored him as Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Curzon, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.



Rexford Tugwell's downright fascinating new book, *The Democratic Roosevelt* (Doubleday & Co., 1957), deserves fuller discussion than the one that follows, particularly of its insightful glimpses into politics, the operation of the executive branch, and the personal and private influences (including the forces of the late Justice Brandeis) that struggled for control of the Executive during the New Deal period. What we may discuss briefly here is the book as a study of one of the most potent, charming, and withal one of the most enigmatic personalities of the twentieth century.

This volume is presented as a biography and as such it will probably not gain much credit with historians because it is too freely written. There are things in this book that scholarly biographers will usually accept only in eyewitness, "I-knew-him-then" accounts. It is, for example, suffused with awe and affection, even devotion, for FDR. Its third-person biographical narrative is frequently interrupted with evaluations, commentaries, and undocumentable suppositions and guesses. Yet because it does violate many canons of historical writing the book becomes extraordinarily interesting and valuable.

Like the Codman book on Patton, this vol-

ume offers direct evidence of the emotional hold that Roosevelt had on at least one of his close associates, Tugwell himself. It is this hold that made Tugwell write the book:

When I first met him, in the early spring of 1932, I met the product of the environment and the experiences I have heretofore described. I should have been a strange young man had I not been instantly fascinated. . . . I was taken out of myself. . . . That my inquiring has gone on since that spring day in 1932 is my credential for writing this account. It will be understood, since I have said this, that meeting him was somewhat like coming into contact with destiny itself. It was a tremendous, an unnerving experience, only to be realized and assimilated over a long time. (p. 213)

Tugwell has not shirked the risky but fascinating task of explaining what was at the core of Roosevelt's personality or how the core was formed in those early years for which there are few meaningful and reliable data. To some this attempt may seem unsuccessful because of its heavy reliance on supposition, its use of what FDR did *not* say or write to bolster a hunch about what he was really feeling, and its uncomfortably prominent use of heredity to account, for example, for postulated similarities between FDR and Theodore Roosevelt. But someone had to dare this assignment, and, whether he comes off feeling Tugwell has failed or succeeded, the reader will profit by following the attempt.

It is fortunate that someone as sensitive, as subjective, as frank, and as literate as Tugwell has written this volume and such other pieces as the series of remarkable administrative vignettes that appeared some years back in the *Western Political Quarterly*. He has, in addition, a genuine humility that enables him to record his subjective impressions and misimpressions with not a trace of conceit about how he is making himself appear in the frequently censored pages of political history.

It is an unusual—but not always a political—man who can get others to believe that he is a bigger person than they are. And it is not often that one of his associates will attempt with frankness, insight, and first-hand experience to explain why this was so. There are always these two levels of character in *The Democratic Roosevelt*: FDR, the unusual man, and Tugwell, the not unusual one

through whose nervous system we feel and understand what Tugwell felt and what Tugwell now feels, assumes, and guesses. From the bench mark Tugwell himself provides us of a decent, not-unusual man, it is thrilling to watch the ascent of Roosevelt's character to the higher levels of unusual attractiveness, unusual capacity for growth, unusual thirst for political success, unusual confidence of being in harmony with the universe, and unusual capacity for heartening and reassuring less confident associates.



Our fifth book is *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon* (Methuen, London, 1957); Being the Memoirs of William J. Braithwaite, 1911-12, edited and with an introduction by Sir Henry N. Bunbury and with a commentary by Richard M. Titmuss. It consists of selected excerpts from the bitter memoirs of a higher British civil servant who had an outstanding hand in the formulation of the National Health Insurance Act of 1911 but who was then sidetracked into a post as special commissioner of income tax, and thereby kept from participating in the administration of the act, because he clashed with that legendary British administrator, Sir Robert Morant.

The memoirs themselves were set down in the thirties, showing that Braithwaite carried within him for twenty years a hot resentment against what he considered his unfair treatment in 1911. The book carries its own built-in reviews and commentaries by two extraordinarily sophisticated men in their own fields, Sir Henry and Titmuss. It offers revealing though sometimes rather petty and bitter illustrations of the operations of the higher civil service before World War I, of relationships between higher officials and political chiefs, of departmental maneuverings, and of negotiations between officials and interest groups. The book illustrates how an administrator can become almost pathologically identified with an official project.

The book is also interesting for the light it sheds on Morant, that brilliant and controversial higher civil servant who could not tolerate mediocrity whether in civil servants or ministers, a man who by dominating his political

chiefs was able to secure the passage of the Education Act of 1902. To implement new programs Morant recruited talented civil servants who worked under him with great dedication. Others saw him as a petulant, ruthless seeker of power who cared little for the constitutional proprieties of the role of the civil servant.



Persons interested in international administration, particularly its special personnel problems, will find much tasteful food for thought in A. Loveday's *Reflections on International Administration* (Oxford University Press, 1956). Loveday is what is known as "an old League hand." He is not intimately acquainted with the day-to-day operations of the UN Secretariat in New York, and his book will probably be read with most profit as a study in comparative international administration (the League in Geneva and the UN in New York) by those who are familiar with the atmosphere and administrative mechanics that prevail under Mr. Hammarskjöld's thirty-eighth floor office. However, much of what Loveday has to say about the worries and strains of personnel working for an international organization is directly relevant to contemporary international agencies whether they are located in New York, Paris, Rome, or Montreal. There is also this passage on the special responsibilities of international officials:

The international official . . . must be much more than a civil servant carrying out instructions received from a minister or a parliament. His most important task is to promote understanding among the very persons from whom he may later receive instructions. The Secretariat of an international organization, moreover, is the only permanent body whose sole function and whose only instructions are to further the purposes for which that organization was constituted. All the delegates . . . represent sectional interests. . . .

. . . the art of promoting a real understanding among persons coming together for the first time from many different countries is not one which can be mastered immediately. The official new to international work, however wide his experience may have been at home, will prove of little value. (pp. 21-22)

—E.A.B.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Staff Officer

American Society for Public Administration

Big City Management— "Better Than Many U.S. Corporations"

"Today the big city must rank as one of the most skillfully managed of American organizations—indeed, considering the problems it has to face, it is better managed than many U. S. corporations." Thus *Fortune* magazine begins an analysis of big city administration. ("New Strength in City Hall," 56 *Fortune* 156 (November, 1957).)

"Since the 1930's, and at an accelerating rate after the second world war," the *Fortune* article continues, "the electorate in city after city has put into office as competent, hard-driving, and skillful a chief executive as ever sat in a high-backed chair behind the broad mahogany desk."

He does not, however, follow what is often considered the "good-government" pattern typified by tight civil service and the council-manager plan. He is a politician. And often, the story notes, he must fight to retain the authority of the chief executive against "... the staff experts and civil service bureaucrats [who] threaten to nibble him to death in their efforts to increase their own authority," and against public authorities independent of him, the state legislature, and the suburbs.

The big city mayor, according to *Fortune*, is similar to chief executives of large corporations with one difference: salary. The simi-

larities: he is a college graduate with legal or business background, he is in his late fifties, and he puts in a hard work week.

Although he gets along with businessmen well, he is likely to feel they know little of politics and like it less. "These businessmen like everything to be nice and orderly—and non-political," the article quotes a City Hall man as saying.

Unlike the reformers of the past who drove the rascals out of City Hall, served "an undistinguished term or two," and left or were beaten, the big city mayor of today knows politics and uses it—and politics is essential in running a big city. That is the reason the biggest cities do not use the council-manager form of government: "it failed to produce political leadership on which responsibility for the city government could be pinned." The article relates that Philadelphia city commissioners went to Cincinnati, the largest manager city, to see whether the system could be applied to Philadelphia. Mayor Charles Taft said "no" and the Philadelphia charter, approved in 1951, is a strong mayor charter.

Still, professional administration is essential and "the professionalization of his staff is a great help to the mayor. . . ." The article points to Luther Gulick, first New York city administrator, and Carl Chatters, currently Chicago's comptroller, as symbols of the new

professionalization in big city administration which, the author observes, is fast following the rapid professionalization of such manager cities as Dallas, San Antonio, Cincinnati, and Kansas City.

"To many a big-city government, hard-pressed to find money to maintain essential services, much less to provide new ones, the presence of a band of top professionals at City Hall has probably meant the difference between success and failure in operating the big service machine."

Now, the article asserts, quoting Professor Wallace Sayre of Columbia University, "the . . . concern . . . is how to curb the bureaucrats . . ." One barrier to controlling the bureaucrat is the semi-independence of civil service. In most cities, too-entrenched public employees "develop a clique feeling . . . opposed to all change. . . ." Also, the noncompetitive salary ranges for professional personnel make it difficult for the mayor to bring in new blood.

The independent authority is perhaps a greater threat to the mayor's leadership and to democratic government—and here the mayor must take some responsibility because often it is he who has encouraged independent boards for such things as housing, airports, and parking.

The mayor's main job is to provide "vigorous programs of development and expansion—if possible, within an organized plan." But these programs require money and for that he must look outside the city's tax base. Rural-minded state legislators make this difficult.

Summarizing recent proposals for metropolitan government, the article notes that "even without a formal arrangement cities can do a great deal," and cites the case of Dallas which has established a County League of Municipalities and whose communities work together on such problems as water supply and zoning.

The mayor's chief weakness is his preoccupation with day-to-day activities. He does not seem to have a concept of what the city should be like. And, the article points out, "planning is ultimately a line rather than a staff function. . . . It is here more than anywhere else that he is required to serve as a center of leadership and responsibility: if he is unwilling to mesh

planning and execution, no one else can."

Still, the article concludes, "the omens are promising."

Recruitment and Organization of Scientific Work in Government

The federal government late last year authorized paid advertising to recruit scientists and engineers and raised their salaries to the maximum in GS6 and GS8 through 17 "on the basis of evidence the Government is unable to obtain critically needed scientists and engineers in sufficient supply at present rates," according to the Civil Service Commission (*News Release*, December 10, 1957).

Attitudes of American Scientists

An attitude survey of 17,439 federal scientists and engineers (10,000 in Defense) and 3,317 from outstanding industrial laboratories employing similar research personnel may provide information that will help toward solutions. Conducted late in 1956 by an inter-agency committee task force headed by Albert F. Siefert, executive officer, National Institutes of Health, U. S. Public Health Service, the study sought to compare attitudes of government and industrial researchers toward their working conditions (*Survey of Attitudes of Scientists and Engineers in Government and Industry*, U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1957, \$0.50).

Some conclusions:

The most important job factors, according to the non-Defense government personnel and private researchers, are interesting work and integrity of management. Among government employees, opportunity to discover and do creative work came next. Both groups ranked high the opportunity for advancement and good supervision. Pay was seventh among government personnel, a less important factor than among those in industry.

A majority of the federal personnel rated private employment superior to public service in all of the following factors (listed in order of the greatest to the least agreement on the superiority of private industry): take-home pay, advancement opportunity, encouragement of initiative, competence of top management, chance to use maximum skills, chance

to attend professional meetings, professional recognition, training programs, participation in community activities, and competence of colleagues. A majority felt government employment is superior to industry in providing service to country, opportunity to publish, security of employment, stability of location, and some fringe benefits.

Scientists Look at Working Conditions

However, when looking only at their own jobs rather than comparing them to industry, nearly as high a percentage of government as industrially-employed research workers indicated satisfaction with specific working conditions. One exception was promotion: two-thirds of those in government were dissatisfied with the rate of promotion and 43 per cent with the criteria for promotion, compared to only about one-fourth of those surveyed in industry.

Nearly all of those questioned found their work interesting and professionally satisfying; 65 to 80 per cent found freedom to develop technical and research ideas and to follow up research ideas—about the same percentage in public as in private employment. However, fewer federal employees felt the environment encouraged effective research.

Nearly all of those surveyed were satisfied with their supervisors and the percentages were equal among all groups, private, Defense, and federal non-Defense. Nearly half, however, felt their supervisors discussed individual performance too little with them. Half of those in government and over half in industry do not know whether management appreciates what they do.

About half of the industrial and Defense employees had had training at the organization's expense; only 27 per cent of the non-Defense federal employees had. But 47 per cent of the government employees had taken training courses at their own expense compared to 37 per cent of the private employees. While nearly all felt their training was worth while, only one in five indicated that there were plans to pass on what they learned to colleagues.

The survey found great interest in management training among scientists and engineers in Defense agencies and industry.

Although almost as many government as industrial scientists and engineers indicated that they wanted to stay with their present agency (78 and 72 per cent), and even more in government felt that their work was highly important to their agency (70 and 61 per cent), fewer in government were willing to recommend employment in their agency to professional colleagues, and far fewer in government than in private employment saw their jobs as prestigious (51 and 78 per cent).

Two out of five in both government and industry felt their jobs required less capability than they possessed. The same number said that they spent more than a quarter of their time on nontechnical work and half of these felt that nonprofessionals could do such chores.

British Scientific Civil Service

Some British civil service practices for scientific and engineering personnel appear to be aimed at answering many of the objections to U. S. government employment noted by those surveyed.

Based mainly on recommendations by three top scientists in 1943, the British personnel system for scientists includes the following characteristics (as described by Edward McCrensky, director, Civilian Personnel and Services Division, Office of Naval Research in the United Kingdom, "Scientists in the British Civil Service," 184 *Science* 28 (September, 1956); reprinted in 35 *Professional Public Service* 7 (December, 1956) and in 36 *PPS* 5 (January, 1957).

A high-level scientist commissioner in the Civil Service Commission heads a staff that spends full time finding and selecting scientists and engineers. He sits on the Commission's Selection Board which is responsible for internal personnel management; generally the chief of the section makes all proposals for appointment, promotion, reassignment, and training. (Nearly half of the Americans surveyed disapproved of the criteria for promotion; only one in 12 felt that a nonscientist or nonengineer could classify positions in their field, although half were satisfied with their own position classification.)

Scientists regard themselves as a separate civil service corps with their own leadership, which "enhances their morale and prestige."

Some scientists may be promoted without addition of supervisory responsibilities, and a few high-level positions are saved for scientists without administrative tasks. Actually, some additional responsibility usually accompanies a promotion, but narrow position classification similar to that in the U. S. does not exist for British government scientists.

Permanent civil servants (who make up 70 per cent of scientific personnel) usually enter the service immediately after their university work and must enter by age 31. Emphasis is on promotion from within, though temporary civil servants may be appointed at all levels at any time and top personnel may be recruited intensively.

Employees are represented in discussion of personnel problems by the Institution of Professional Civil Servants. Disagreements may be appealed to an arbitration tribunal. The Whitley Councils also provide a forum for management-employee discussion. Fellowships, training at government expense, and encouragement of attendance at professional meetings are part of the policy. An interdepartmental committee keeps continuous track of organization and policies related to research and promotes acceptance of governmentwide policies.

On the other hand, promotion in Great Britain is even slower than in the United States and salary scales for top positions are not equal to those of top administrators.

Some Organizational Problems of Research

In addition to personnel problems (and perhaps contributing to them), there are specific organizational problems related to research, according to Robert K. Stolz, senior consultant, McKinsey & Company, Inc., in a view of the problems of industrial firms.

"Judging from my experience, the typical research and development laboratory is beset by far more organization difficulties than . . . any other major function of business." There is conflict between project teams and the laboratory staff, too much administration, waste of scientific skills, and an unprofessional, unproductive atmosphere.

The reasons? Many laboratories have grown too fast, without building the organization to match responsibilities. Many organizations

have been patterned after other departments although "research and development work is different" and "the standard, essentially military, line of command is not suited for the creative work of R/D." Also, research and development "are somewhat incompatible and it is somewhat difficult to mesh them smoothly." Development, often broken into component parts handled by different sections, requires more continuous coordination; time is shorter and the administrative load greater.

Some suggestions for R/D management:

Three levels—laboratory director, research supervisors, and project leaders—are enough.

It is better to split the department than to introduce an additional level. Many firms believe in small laboratories in any case.

The organization should discourage the supervisor from supervising rather than consulting and participating.

To eliminate friction between project teams and permanent staff, make sure (1) they have different jobs to do, (2) they understand their different responsibilities, and (3) each has the authority necessary to match responsibility.

Trained researchers are doing too much routine or administrative work that could be handled by others, often better.

Informal relationships should be encouraged, rank deemphasized.

"Departures from the orthodox will pay dividends." ("Organizing for Effective R/D", *3 Research and Engineering* 28-31 (February, 1957).)

Automation and the Public Service: Impact on Program and Method

Public Program Needs of the Automation Age

Automation in industry and government not only will bring new public administration methods but also must bring changes in at least nine major programs, Herman Limberg, senior management consultant, New York City Division of Administration, reported to a conference of educational administrators last year:

1. Increased job placement and training services to smooth the radical shift of skill needs.
2. More attention to public problems of locating industry, including planning and zoning laws to accommodate possible new types and relationships of industries.

3. Building code changes to suit the new type of work place.

4. Transit pattern adaptations to new work and recreation schedules.

5. Aid to small business to adjust to new methods.

6. New leisure-time services such as recreation and adult education.

7. Adjustment of retirement schemes for persons too old to switch to new jobs.

8. More emphasis on mental health to ease adjustment problems.

9. Expanded mediation and conciliation services to meet new bargaining issues.

Effects and Uses in Government

Automation in government will mainly mean automatic data processing. Though data-processing facilities will be centralized, they will make possible decentralization of decision-making through faster, more complete communication. One insurance company already has demonstrated this outcome.

In using computers, procedures must be carefully examined "because the elimination of a single step may save hours of complex programming and expensive machine time." Since lost production time becomes very expensive, an organization must be capable of moving fast.

As in private industry, jobs will change considerably, requiring new job evaluation and classification and new mechanisms for assuring fair treatment to persons no longer able to do their work within the automation scheme. (*Automation: Its Meaning for Educational Administration* (Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1957), a report of the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, Tenth Annual Meeting, August 26-31, 1956, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.)

A draft report of a Civil Service Commission study of "The Personnel Impact of Automation" points out that there is a shortage of trained personnel to design and develop the equipment, operate it, and redesign systems to fit it. "... the ADP pay problem ranks with the similar and related scientist and engineer pay dilemma as a critical problem in federal personnel management. . . ." (*The Government Standard*, November 22, 1957, p. 3.)

The General Accounting Office has instituted an inventory of electronic computers in the federal government as a beginning for a clearinghouse of experience in their use and an analysis of their effect on controls and audit requirements.

As of the middle of 1957, the following federal uses of large-scale computers were recorded by GAO:

Social Security Administration: wage records and statistical data.

Treasury: payment and reconciliation of checks.

Internal Revenue Service: tax return statistics and analysis.

Census Bureau: processing statistics.

Bureau of Standards: scientific computations.

Weather Bureau: scientific computations and statistics.

Defense Department: inventory control and supply requirements and other uses.

Medium-sized computers were operating in:

Federal Bureau of Investigation: general ledger and payroll, statistical data.

Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture: invoices and settlement.

Geological Survey: scientific computations.

Bonneville Power Administration: cost accounting, inventory accounting, payroll.

Weather Bureau: scientific computations and statistics.

Civil Aeronautics Administration: processing flight-program data.

Defense Department: inventory accounting, payroll, and other uses.

Many more activities are planned for ADP. (C. R. Jauchem, "The Importance of Controls in Electronic Data-Processing," 7 *The Federal Accountant* 38 (September, 1957).)

Costs—Does EDP Pay?

"I am convinced that companies never save anything by converting to electronics. . . . The costs are *always* higher than the estimates," *Fortune* quotes a management consultant as saying. "I have never yet recommended EDP to a single client," another consultant has stated. (Perrin Stryker, "What Management Doesn't Know Can Hurt," 56 *Fortune* 153 (November, 1957).)

Among costs neglected in the estimates, the article continues, are those of programming,

which may run to \$250,000, converting programs to codes (nearly the cost of programing), preparing a place for it (\$100,000 or more), upkeep, operations, and rental (\$30-75,000 or more a month). (Mr. Limberg, in the talk reported above, noted that preparatory costs alone run from \$150,000 to \$1.5 million.)

Does the added speed or amount of information provided for management by EDP justify the cost? Not in business, according to the *Fortune* article.

Mr. Limberg adds a warning: EDP imposes a heavy dependence on equipment and on a very small group of key personnel. The probability and results of a break down should be analyzed.

More optimistically, the Treasury expects to save \$1.7 million a year on check payment and reconciliation alone, and the Federal Reserve Banks will save an additional \$500,000. The planning secretary of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, which recently figured that electronics would save money over their punch card and manual system, said: "... you can hardly lose ..." in making a preliminary survey because "it is quite possible that the cost of the study will be more than offset by the savings obtained by streamlining and housecleaning your existing routines, even if you don't decide you can justify a large electronic system.

"Secondly, if you find that you are in the area of a large scale system, you will very possibly save money through combination of files and elimination of duplication of effort alone. You will be able to offer your customers faster, better, and more accurate service, and through such techniques as Operations Research, you will be able to run your business with less reliance on guesswork and more reliance on complete and up-to-date facts." (Stevens L. Shea, "Organizing for Electronics," 22 *Advanced Management* 5-9 (December, 1957).)

ADP for Public Assistance Processing

The ratio of clerical personnel to social workers was cut far below the national average, clerical time of social workers was pruned, widespread errors were eliminated, and checks were speeded by centralized machine computation in the Washington State Department of Public Assistance. The department started

with punched card machinery and, after a four-year study, converted to an electronic computer. (Loren Keely, "Mechanization in Public Administration," 30 *State Government* 240 (November, 1957).)

The many changing elements that determine assistance payments make integrated data processing particularly useful in eliminating clerical time and the high rate of errors found before machine computation (25 per cent of the figures were wrong in some counties as revealed in one survey; 10 per cent error was found in nearly every county in the relatively simple Old Age Assistance computation as discovered in another survey).

The clerical to case-worker ratio shifted from 100 clerical to 128 case worker (which is also the ratio in all states combined) before centralized machine computations to 100 to 168 under present staffing plans. Savings are estimated at nearly \$500,000 a year in salaries.

ADP also throws up the exceptions for examination, for example when a druggist bills the department for more than 200 prescriptions a month or the average cost per prescription is over \$4. Similarly, it aids in measuring county services, assuring uniform interpretation of the laws. Added information is available for public discussion of the program and to develop program budgeting. Finally, ADP coupled with teletype (which punches paper tape that automatically converts to punched cards for the computer) speeds the first assistance check to the needy.

Control of Data Entered

GAO is studying the auditing aspects of EDP. Changes will be radical because, unlike punched cards, magnetic drums, etc. cannot be read except by the machine itself. (C. R. Jauchem, "The Importance of Controls in Electronic Data-Processing," 7 *The Federal Accountant* 38 (September, 1957).)

Control of data used in computers should be maintained outside of the data processing center, the Institute of Internal Auditors warns. A predetermined total must be kept of some of the elements, such as hours or money, either "on original documents or an arbitrary 'hash' total to assure that all transactions are entered."

Control of Big Government: No Proposal Can Succeed

None of the five major proposals that have been made in recent years for assuring administrative responsibility in big government can succeed, Arch Dotson of Cornell University writes in "Fundamental Approaches to Administrative Responsibility," 10 *The Western Political Quarterly* 701 (September, 1957).

The proposals fail to take into account the cause of the growing administrative power in the government system.

1. The "conservative reaction" that calls for reduction of U.S. programs until government is again small enough to be controlled by elected officials ignores the need "to create public agencies to restrain or supplement the application of private power."

2. The "rule of law" approach to administrative control, emphasizing court-like procedures and judicial review, is an inadequate answer because it ignores the reasons that administrative determinations came about—speedy and cheap proceedings and expert decisions on technical questions. "The vast bulk of the determinations of the administrative agencies are not subject to review, because they are made in informal proceedings."

3. Streamlining the executive branch to improve control by its elected chief can never achieve widespread administrative responsibility because clientele and legislative relationships of administrators are too pervasive, the chief executive cannot by himself bear the burden of political control of all administrative decisions, and, even if he could, the build-up of the executive staff needed for control "would surely be too large and too specialized to be controlled by the chief."

4. Freeing the administrator even more from political controls and relying on control by his professional colleagues in and out of government ignores the fact that many decisions are not simply technical but are political, and it is hard to distinguish one from the other. And how is the profession to judge all the administrator's acts?

5. Nor can the legislature's information be built up to the point where it can specify in detail what administrators are to do and continuously satisfy itself that these things are being done. A legislative bureaucracy which

could compete with the executive bureaucracy in specialized knowledge and oversee its work would, in turn, be difficult to control, but— even more important—Congress is not disciplined or national enough in outlook properly to be involved in detailed supervision of administration. (Senator John L. McClellan recently has proposed a Joint Committee on the Budget, composed of members of the appropriations committees of both houses with an expert staff, to analyze the budget and expenditures all year round. "A New Watchdog Agency for Congress," 18 *Tax Review* 55 (December, 1957).)

Finding that none of the solutions offered in recent years can solve the problem of administrative responsibility, Mr. Dotson warns, "As the capacity to influence public policy and to affect the rights of citizens becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of administrative officials, some systematic regulation of that capacity becomes more and more urgent."

Congress Increases Attempts to Supervise Executive Action

Increasing attempts by Congress to "secure for its committees some degree of continuing influence in the exercise of powers delegated to the executive" is revealed in a study of foreign affairs and economic or military emergency legislation since 1953.

Control has been sought by requiring reports to policy committees, consultation with committees, and, on occasion, committee approval before action may be taken. Some examples of recent requirements to consult with congressional committees are:

1. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, in which a joint committee of Congress was set up to consult with the administrators.

2. The Defense Production Act of 1950, in which a joint committee was established to study continuously the programs authorized by the act and officials were ordered to "consult with the committee from time to time."

3. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which established a joint committee to receive all "regulations, instructions, and all other information as requested by the committee relative to the administration of this Act" and also provided for consultation of the administrators with the committee.

Recent acts in which congressional committees actually participate in decisions delegated to administrators include the fiscal year 1956 Defense Appropriations Act and the Atomic Energy Act which order the executive to inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of any arrangements with other nations concerning atomic secrets 30 days before the arrangement would be consummated and while Congress is in session. In another act, administrators are told "to come into agreement with" the two Armed Services committees on real-estate transactions. (J. Malcolm Smith and Cornelius P. Cotter, "Administrative Accountability: Reporting to Congress," 10 *The Western Political Quarterly* 405 (June, 1957).)

Administrative Procedures and the Rule of Law

The government's right to refrain from producing documents in court and the lack of a "rule of law" in administrative hearings in England have been attacked recently by the legal profession and a study committee headed by Sir Oliver Franks.

Following criticism by the Bar Council of England of the complete discretion of a minister to produce or not produce documents requested by a court, the Government in 1956 waived its privilege in a number of types of cases, for example those concerning accidents involving government servants or premises. The Bar Council, however, has asked that in all cases not pertaining to national security, the government satisfy the court that the detriment to the litigant in not producing the documents is outweighed by the public's interest in not producing them.

Sir Oliver's committee recommends that generally all administrative tribunals and certainly those with appellate functions have legally qualified chairmen, that with some exceptions all hearings be held in public, generally with right of counsel, that reasons for decisions should be given and there should be right of appeal on both facts and law, and that such appeal should not lie to the minister.

In regard to compulsory acquisition of property and town planning, the minister's decision should be accompanied by an explanation relating his reasons to the findings of fact

by the inspector, which should be published along with the decision.

Generally, tribunals should be separated from the ordinary administrative machinery and be supervised by a Standing Council on Tribunals appointed by and answerable to the Lord Chancellor, the highest judicial officer in England. Inspectors should constitute a separate corps under the Lord Chancellor.

Somewhat similar recommendations were made here by the second Hoover Commission.

In Sweden, too, the rule of law in administrative proceedings has been studied by two Royal Commissions. One aimed at strengthening safeguards of citizens detained in administrative procedures. (There is no habeas corpus procedure there.) The second is drafting a bill to improve appeals procedure in administrative hearings. Last year, too, the jurisdiction of the "people's tribunal," responsible for assuring the individual's rights in court and administrative hearings, was enlarged to include local authorities. (*Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists* No. 7 (October, 1957).)

Knowledge of Public Attitudes and Information

The extent to which government employees know the public's attitudes toward their program and the amount of information the public has about it tends to vary according to the level of the employee in the organization, according to a study of the Detroit Board of Education and field offices of the Michigan Employment Security Commission and the U. S. Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance in Detroit. (Morris Janowitz and William Delaney, "The Bureaucrat and the Public: A Study of Informational Perspectives," 2 *Administrative Science Quarterly* 141 (September, 1957).)

Except for the school administrators, the higher-level executives in these organizations more accurately appraised the general public's attitudes and information about their programs, while lower-level employees had a more accurate view of their clientele's attitudes and information. "It would be well to develop internal official and formal channels designed with a recognition of the difference in authority and perspective between upper and

lower level administrative personnel," the authors suggest.

Also, the more educated employees seem to know the attitudes of the general public better than the less educated, though they do not know the clientele's attitudes and information better. "For those concerned with formal education for civil servants, our findings seem to support those who prefer generalist training and point out the dangers of overprofessionalization."

Long-term service seems to dull attention to clientele attitudes rather than increase it. The study shows that length of service in the agency is inversely related to knowledge about clientele. The authors speculate that when the job becomes routine, the focus of attention of the lower-level public employee tends to narrow. This "can only be overcome by positive management involving such approaches as in-service training, job rotation, and the like."

Frequent contact with clients also is related to knowledge about their attitudes and information. Similarly, frequent contact with leaders of voluntary associations in the community seems related to knowledge about public attitudes and information. In general, the lower-level employees have more contact with clients, the upper-level with voluntary association leaders. In one of the agencies there was close relationship between active membership in voluntary associations and extent of knowledge of public attitudes and information; in a second one there probably was correlation; but in the school organization there was no correlation. The authors speculate that the voluntary associations in which public school officials frequently are active are more narrowly focused on public education problems, with correspondingly narrow membership.

Other factors would tend to indicate that a close identification of the employee with the community, such as long residence in his neighborhood, was not correlated with knowledge of attitudes and information.

Broader or More Specialized Education for Public Health

The graduate school of public health must educate students in the social sciences, which increasingly they need to know to do their

work, rather than training them vocationally in techniques applicable today but obsolete tomorrow.

"Although we recognize that anatomy and physiology must precede the study and practice of surgery, let us say, we do not yet acknowledge a comparable significance of cultural anthropology or sociology to the study and practice of epidemiology, although we have long known that illness has important socio-economic determinants," Chief Dental Officer John W. Knutson, U. S. Public Health Service, declared in his presidential address to the American Public Health Association, presented at the first general session of the eighty-fifth annual meeting in Cleveland, Ohio, November 12, 1957.

Public health is changing and demands different knowledge and skills, he added. Programs related to public health now are administered by numerous public and private agencies; the role of government public health departments has become one of leading and coordinating programs of others as much as operating. "... the victories of the future will require the active participation of the many in the community, not merely their willingness to obey laws." Much of the public health department's work will be providing resources for the private practitioner to do a better health job.

"In the future, public health workers, whatever their professional speciality, will need a much greater familiarity with the structure of communities than most of us in the field now possess. . . . In place of rapidly outdated factual information, I would have them gain from graduate education in public health a fundamental knowledge of four fields: cultural anthropology, human ecology, epidemiology, and biostatistics.

"Above all, I should like to see schools of public health raise their standards of academic excellence. They should emphasize true scholarship, a concern for fundamental understanding, and an acquaintance with the larger world of ideas, a dedication to conceptual thinking about our world of unknowns and what lies beyond the obvious."

Specialists Advocated for Records Work

At the same conference, however, two speak-

ers urged an increasingly specialized graduate training for certain public health workers.

Two records management experts deplored the state of public health records and called for the training and hiring of specialized public health records managers.

"Records management involves a body of knowledge of sufficient magnitude to merit specialization of higher order than normally accorded to it," Alpha K. Kenney, consultant in records training, Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, Georgia, asserted. Graduate training in the field and high status within the public health team were proposed.

Also taking a specialized view of records management, Nancy W. Lucas, supervisor, Records Consulting Unit, Ohio Department of Health, said: "Within the past decade there has been the establishment and recognition of the place of administrative management in public health. A parallel development is indicated in records management."

Training Specialists for Generalist Administration

"A large proportion of the highway department officials throughout the United States are engineers. They have a considerable knowledge of the exact science of engineering, where 2 plus 2 always equals 4. But those who have advanced through the ranks to top administrative positions often find themselves confronted with problems that are much more difficult to define and solve than are the strictly engineering problems involved in highway construction. More and more they are called upon to practice the art or science of administration—which is more exacting than exact. Two plus two sometimes equals four only after many indefinite and intangible factors have been added, weighed, and considered, and then the final solution cannot always be considered the right one."

This was a comment of Wyoming's deputy state highway engineer and a University of Wyoming business administration professor in evaluating a course on administration recently given 30 division and assistant division heads in the Wyoming highway department. Some of their comments on the extension course

(briefly described in Spring, 1957 *Review*, p. 143):

1. Attendance, although voluntary, was extremely high, averaging 85 to 90 per cent.
2. Before the course ended, there was active interest in a similar course for middle management and top supervisory personnel.
3. Better understanding of human relations "has already led to decreased friction and better personnel relations."
4. "Better and more proper delegation of authority . . . resulted from the course."
5. "It is doubtful if any of the trainees realized the importance or the existence of the informal organization and its definite influence on the formal organization before attending the course."
6. While discussion of such tangible subjects as merit ratings, dictation, organization charts, and business letter-writing "undoubtedly were very helpful, . . . it is the considered opinion of many Wyoming highway officials that the time spent studying the elements of human behavior was the most interesting and should prove the most productive in the years to come."

(T. D. Sherard and O. D. Turner, "Administrative Training for Highway Officials," 36 *American Highways* 8 (April, 1957).)

Growing Internship Program in School Administration

Internships for school administrators are increasing and some states are considering an internship requirement for certification. This new emphasis reflects the recognition that a superintendent does not need "to be a former practitioner at every educational level," and "that we need more top executives in education who are in their energetic thirties and forties. . . ."

Recommendations for a good program include:

1. The university must take the initiative, providing leadership, promotion, and supervision.
2. The internship should last at least one year, preferably full time.
3. Since interns should be in their 30's, minimum pay should be \$400 a month.
4. The university should recognize an internship as an opportunity to funnel ideas to practitioners.

(Robert W. Brittell, "A Program for the Gifted in School Administration," 135 *American School Board Journal* 4 (October, 1957).)

Macy "Valedictory" on Federal Personnel Problems

What might be considered the valedictory to the federal service of John W. Macy, Jr., recently resigned executive director of the U.S. Civil Service Commission (now Executive Vice President of Wesleyan University, Connecticut) was delivered to a group of the Society for Personnel Administration in November. (U.S. Civil Service Commission, *News Release*, November 26, 1957.)

While most of Mr. Macy's recent speeches have emphasized the challenge of public employment and the satisfying career the federal service offers, this speech—to federal personnel people—emphasized rather the "outmoded and vestigial requirements that operate as obstacles to effective personnel management."

Among obstacles to effective personnel administration, Mr. Macy named:

1. Prohibitions on reimbursement of interview travel, medical examination costs, travel to first duty station, and relocation costs of transfers.
2. Depression-oriented apportionment and members-of-family rules.
3. Restrictions on attendance at conferences or training sessions. ("Great strides have been made toward meeting training requirements in the agencies within the last few years, but still more training opportunities must be developed. And the Federal Government should not attempt to handle the entire training job itself; facilities of much greater variety and scope than we could provide could be responsive to Federal needs and are available outside the Government.")
4. Restraints on management discretion "calculated to cause hesitation if not rejection on the part of the very type of job applicant whose services are most needed in the Federal Government."
5. A pay schedule that can only be changed by political action.

One of the most pressing problems, he observed, "is the need for continued improvement at the top. . . . But I sometimes wonder if everybody wants executive development except executives. I have been puzzled at how difficult it has been to secure acceptance by career people at or near the top of the service for programs to improve the effectiveness of the service."

Unions in the Public Service

Is Neutrality Enough?

The federal government should encourage membership in unions rather than taking a neutral attitude, James A. Campbell, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees, argued at a recent personnel seminar of the Sixth Civil Service Region. (*The Government Standard*, November 22, 1957, p. 2.)

Mr. Campbell asserted that many federal employees are afraid to join a union despite the official neutrality of personnel officials. ". . . there are so many *don'ts* for federal employees that it needs a rather positive *Do* in order to reassure employees that they won't be labeled as troublemakers if they join and actively participate in a union." The net impression a new employee gets about unionism from the orientation pamphlet of the Civil Service Commission is negative, he said, quoting: "You are free to join or not to join employee organizations. But you may not join an organization that asserts the right to strike against the government. . . ."

" . . . I believe we are in agreement that unions are good for the federal service and can make easier the problems of management. . . . I think it is proper and desirable to . . . [say] plainly that the agency welcomes employee organizations. . . ."

Mr. Campbell pointed out that the British government manual for new employees does encourage active participation by civil servants in an association "which can support him in his reasonable claims and put his point of view before the authorities on all kinds of questions affecting his conditions of service. . . ."

Supervisors in Unions?

Should executive and supervisory employees in government join unions? Here is a view expressed recently by Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell (*The Government Standard*, December 6, 1957, p. 2):

Generally in industry, supervisors are not members of the unions which are collective bargaining agents for employees. There is sound reason for this, as supervisors may be responsible for conditions of work, and for hiring, promotion, and discharge.

In Government, however, a different relationship exists between the supervisor and the employee. Within the framework of Government personnel policies, the conditions of work, and the hiring, promotion, and discharge of employees are not solely in the hands of supervisors, but are closely regulated by law and civil service regulations.

Because it is generally accepted in Government service that supervisors may join employee unions, and because Government employee unions do not have the same relationship with management as they do in industry, I can see no objection to a supervisor in Federal service joining an employee union provided that he does not permit union membership to interfere with the proper execution of his official duties.

Organization for Long-Range Planning

"Long-range planning has been high on the hit parade at management meetings and conferences in recent months, and as a technique it promises to be the next addition to the formula for 'progressive' management," H. Edward Wrapp, associate professor of business administration, Harvard University, has written in "Organization for Long-Range Planning," 35 *Harvard Business Review* 37 (January-February, 1957). Some of his observations on organization for long-range planning for business are of interest to public managers.

Two examples of apparently successful business organizations for long-range planning are described:

Company A appointed a senior vice president to head a planning committee, which he named with the president's advice. It was composed of the immediate subordinates of company vice presidents representing major functional divisions. A junior executive served as secretary, devoting about one-third time to this work. Staff was provided by company personnel, except a consultant hired as an adviser. After forecasts of future demands for the company's services were agreed upon, a five-year program to meet the demand was worked out by subcommittees representing each functional area. In some instances, the planning is being done one level too low, i.e. some policies promulgated by the vice presidents have made the committee's plans obsolete.

Company B appointed a committee composed of all of the company's fifteen vice presi-

dents and headed by the president's closest assistant. Planning is done project by project rather than on a comprehensive five-year basis, and an *ad hoc* subcommittee headed by one of the committee members reports on each project. When a pattern becomes apparent in these projects, subcommittees are made permanent. The subcommittee chairman can call on any staff needed. The committee reviews the subcommittee reports which are being made about four times a year.

Some of Mr. Wrapp's comments are:

1. Long-range planning almost inevitably appears to administrators as a reflection on their work. Therefore "... I would venture the hypothesis that the most serious obstacle to long-range planning is ... the subtle, but occasionally open, opposition of some executives which appears in the early stages. ..."
2. While it is difficult to free present executives to plan, bringing in consultants or appointing a special staff to have complete planning responsibility generally will not succeed. One reason is that part of the gain of long-range planning is the thinking-through process whose value may be lost if done by outsiders.
3. The planning group might do well to start with an operating problem which has long-term implications so the group can learn how to work together and have an early sense of accomplishment.
4. Planners should be expected to make recommendations, preferably in writing.

New Team for Organization Study

A new kind of team for a thorough organization study has been established by the French Ministry of Agriculture. It is composed of seven private industry consultants, ten high-ranking civil servants, and two officials from the Budget Directorate. The civil servants were taken from various sections of the Ministry. (Gilbert Constant, "Organisation Experiments in French Ministry," 12 *O & M Bulletin* 131 (June, 1957).)

Before the study, the civil servants took a two-week full-time course in organization and methods from the seven outside consultants.

Two cochairmen are high-ranking civil servants. The O & M division of the Ministry performs secretariat duties. The group has been formed into teams for task force work.

Commenting on the approach the author, a Ministry official, has noted:

1. Without the O & M organization within the Ministry to coordinate the work, such an approach would not be useful.

2. Some uniformity in work methods by the task forces is necessary to allow the secretariat to supervise and spur on the work.

3. To maintain the interest of those under study, concrete achievements should be made during the course of the work even though they deal with relatively small points.

Status of Government Accounting Rises

The status of accounting work in government appears to be rising in the profession, according to the District of Columbia Institute of Certified Public Accountants. ("The CPA and His Government," 104 *The Journal of Accountancy* 49 (December, 1957).)

"The most significant progress in the federal government's financial management program has taken place during the years following World War II," the Institute observes. "It is not a coincidence that this same period has seen the greatest influx of professional accountants into the government in history."

One indication of the improving status is the increasing number of state boards of accountancy that accept government accounting experience toward CPA certificate requirements. Such experience was not generally accepted in the past, but a recent survey by the Federal Government Accountants Association shows that twenty-eight states now accept such experience, though nine of them restrict acceptance to experience in certain agencies.

Refinement, Expansion of Government Statistics Sought

Greater use of government data for economic analysis both by government and private organizations has been emphasized recently by (1) the first national conference of the Federal Statistics Users Conference, held in October, 1957; (2) a report recently published called "The National Economic Accounts of the United States: Review, Appraisal, and Recommendations," prepared by the National Accounts Review Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research at

the request of the Office of Statistical Standards, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; and (3) hearings in October, 1957, on that report by the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. (*The National Economic Accounts of the United States* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957).)

The Users Conference is composed of some 130 business firms, labor unions, farm organizations, and research groups. Among subjects they discussed with some 50 representatives of governmental agencies at the meeting were: data of interest to enterprises of international scope, improving timeliness of federal statistics, and making better use of indicators in current business activity.

"The need for improved economic statistics stems from the importance of prompt and accurate information on the functioning of our economy in reaching wise policy decisions . . .," Raymond T. Bowman, assistant director for statistical standards, Bureau of the Budget, told the House Subcommittee. ". . . we need to know more about profits, wages, and productivity, and about the relationship of these factors to prices."

The committee recommended expansion of some data collected and additional breakdowns of other data, but most emphasis was on integration of five separate series, each describing a different facet of the national economy but in unrelated terms. Decentralization of data collection will continue, but all data should be brought together in a single integrated system of economic accounts.

Among new information items requested by the committee are: identification of government transactions in the national economic accounts, including transfer of payments within government; finer classification of federal government expenditures and extension of these estimates to state and local governments; a break down of federal expenditures by object, following the standard industrial classification, and at least a sample break down for state and local governments (now only federal obligatory authority is detailed by object classification); quarterly sample surveys of major components of state and local finances—at least tax collections, construction expenditures, and wage and salary

payments; biennial surveys between governmental censuses on finances of state and local governments (the Census Bureau suggests that annual surveys would be far more efficient and useful); a census of governments every five years; additional data on nonfinancial assets of state and local governments (the Census Bureau suggests that data of individual governments about their property are not sufficiently reliable or uniform to obtain useful information by census and that sample-scale survey work would be necessary).

While all spokesmen before the House Subcommittee generally agreed that additional economic information would be valuable (witnesses included business, trade union, government, and economic association spokesmen), the director of the census pointed out that the bureau receives many urgent requests for new data and all such requests must be considered in competition with these dealing with national income. Another witness pointed out that much of our economic measurement still is in the experimental stage and "perhaps that process is better accomplished almost *in vacuo* than it is tying it into an integrated system of international accounts. . . ." Integration, he cautioned, perhaps should wait for refinement of the individual series of data. Another witness, agreeing, warned that the basic data were not sufficiently complete and reliable for a system of integrated accounts, so the result might mislead the public.

Generally, however, witnesses felt that integration of national economic accounts ought to be kept in mind as the ultimate goal, recognizing that it still might be a long way off.

Simplified Consolidation Accounts Urged for Governments

Governments should present a simplified consolidated financial statement to the public, including depreciation of capital assets, Professor Delmer P. Hylton, Wake Forest College, advocates.

The citizen ". . . tends to view his local government as one operation, not as a series of disconnected enterprises . . .," so dividing the financial report to the public into funds—

even where legally required for internal records—should be avoided.

Depreciation should be included because it makes the report more understandable and shows real costs otherwise ignored. "More than one new administration has found itself in trouble because the preceding elective officials had allowed the physical equipment of the government to deteriorate. The information is not now supplied . . . nor in most cases can it be determined. . . ." (32 *The Accounting Review* 51 (January, 1957)).

Changes in State and Local Administration Voted by Legislatures

Several state legislative actions affecting administration have been reported since the summary in the Summer, 1957 *Review*, pp. 214-16.

Twenty-two states and Hawaii raised salaries of career employees this year—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.

Vermont voted \$35,000 for a "Little Hoover Commission" and the Maine Legislature set up a committee to survey state government.

Central executive authority was strengthened in North Carolina with the creation of a Department of Administration and a Division of General Services which can be placed in the Department of Administration. West Virginia created a centralized Department of Finance and Administration with divisions of accounting, budget, purchasing, personnel, and general services. The department is headed by a director appointed by the Governor but for a six-year period. The director appoints division heads. Maine set up a Budget Division.

Maine also consolidated responsibility for state building, Ohio established an office building commission, and North Carolina authorized a central architecture and engineering office.

Administrative responsibility for highway construction and planning was centralized in a career official in North Carolina instead of in a commission and in the director of high-

ways in Ohio where a Highway Construction Council was abolished. A State Purchasing Commission was established in Florida. The Ohio Legislature assured central data processing by giving the Finance Department sole authority to purchase data-processing machinery, with a few exceptions.

Reassignment of program responsibilities occurred in Pennsylvania, with the consolidation of the Department of Welfare and the Department of Public Assistance into a new Department of Public Welfare. Functions of the Oklahoma Emergency Relief Board were also transferred to the Department of Public Welfare. Three departments were made from the Nebraska Department of Roads and Irrigation: Roads, Water Resources, and Motor Vehicles. Oregon established a Department of Planning and Development and a State Conciliation Service. Connecticut combined functions of a number of agencies into a Water Resources Commission. New Hampshire established a Department of Employment Security.

Freedom of information laws opened most state agency meetings to the public in California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Vermont and required local government meetings to be opened to the public in Pennsylvania; certain records were opened to the public under these laws.

The merit system was expanded in Minnesota to cover state civil defense agency personnel. New Hampshire established a Department of Personnel under a commission. Connecticut replaced an Advisory Personnel Committee with a three-man Civil Service Commission which may make regulations and which nominates a list of eligibles for the office of Personnel Director to be appointed by the Governor but removable by the Commission. Oklahoma created an employee personnel administration system.

Minnesota permitted public employees to join labor unions and allowed them to use the state labor conciliator in wage disputes with local government bodies. Arkansas barred policemen from joining unions.

A code of ethics for Texas officials and employees was passed by the Legislature. Connecticut established a commission to handle claims against the state.

Court administration was reorganized in Connecticut where the Chief Justice was designated as Chief Administrative Officer of the state's court system, and in Minnesota where the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court was allowed to reassign judges among districts when necessary. New Hampshire created an administrative committee of probate courts to prescribe rules and forms for conducting their business, and South Carolina established a State Judicial Council.

Standard accounts were ordered for local governments in Maine and Utah to ease state auditing. Minnesota opened local government auditing to public accountants, and New Mexico created a Local Government Division and School Finance Division in the State Finance Department to oversee local finances. Texas provided for state audit of county records on petition of 30 per cent of the county's qualified voters.

Housing Code Administration in Fifteen States

Housing administration in 53 upstate New York communities and in 19 cities in 14 states of the northeast quarter of the United States has been analyzed by the New York State Division of Housing under a contract with the Urban Renewal Administration of the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

The first report, published May 1, 1957, "shows a general lack of regulations in upstate New York applicable to existing housing, and that considerable difficulty is encountered in enforcing existing regulations." (Interim Report Number 1—*Code Enforcement in Fifty-three New York Communities* (Division of Housing, Bureau of Community Development, May 3, 1957).) The second study, published November 1, covered cities with systematic inspection programs directed at rehabilitation and conservation which have housing and climatic conditions similar to those of upstate New York and lie within relatively easy reach of New York. The selected cities ranged in size from Chicago (population, 3,620,962) to Portland, Maine (population, 77,634).

The concluding part of the study will be a draft housing code for New York State com-

munities, including a set of performance-type housing standards.

In the second study (Interim Report Number 2—*Housing Law Enforcement and Related Problems* (Division of Housing, Bureau of Community Development, November 1, 1957)) some of the findings were:

Enforcement Problems

1. When the local redevelopment agency is a public corporation not directly responsible to the city, coordination problems sometimes arise.

2. There has been no difficulty in enforcing housing codes on existing buildings. Wisconsin and New Jersey, in fact, have moved beyond the basic principles of health and safety toward enforcing concepts of protection of property values and aesthetics. However, "no state or local official thought that the answer to the problem of adequate housing regulations had been found either in the new construction field, or in the control of existing buildings to insure adequate minimum standards of space per occupant, required sanitary equipment, facilities, light, ventilation, heating equipment, and safe and sanitary maintenance."

3. Minimum state codes to be enforced by local authorities have not been successful. Smaller cities and rural areas do not have competent enforcement personnel; cities which have professional enforcement staffs usually adopt standards higher than the minimum state codes. "If suburban and rural areas are to adequately regulate new construction and preserve existing housing inventories, most officials . . . agree that some means must be found to supply necessary guidance and expertness not now present in the majority of these communities." Lack of state government leadership in the northeast and middle west "appears to have materially retarded progress in suburban and rural areas." There is one minor exception: Ohio takes responsibility for inspecting multiple residences and places of public assembly in smaller jurisdictions.

4. In addition to poor enforcement by local authorities, state minimum codes generally are not flexible enough to cover both rural and urban needs and cannot be changed speedily enough to keep abreast of technical

developments. To meet these problems, the Massachusetts Legislature has delegated to the Department of Public Health powers to formulate and maintain a code of minimum standards, but this is not mandatory; it is simply a recommendation to local authorities.

Coordination in Metropolitan Areas

5. Fifteen of the 19 cities reported some efforts to coordinate planning on a county or regional basis; 11 were part of a regional planning association—both private and government supported, 7 were covered by county planning agencies, 6 of which were city-county.

Licensing of building craftsmen was coordinated in only 3 of the 16 cities which require such licenses; reciprocal licensing in one metropolitan area, state in another, combined city-county in another.

The reciprocal system (in the Detroit area) depends upon agreed standards among the well over 100 communities in the area. The Detroit Examining Board serves those communities which have no board of their own. An Electrical Council representing about 130 local jurisdictions has been established, and all of these units use the same electrical code. Similar councils are being developed for other mechanical installations. "The municipalities in this study and in the state of New York might profitably follow the example of Detroit (and certain West Coast cities) in this matter. . . . In some instances there was evidence that informal working relationships did exist which might lead to more systematic arrangements." Most officials contacted in the study agreed that local cooperative arrangements were feasible.

Citizen Support

6. "Code enforcement for rehabilitation purposes is as much an educational effort as an enforcement one." Organized citizen support is needed, but in most urban situations government must foster citizen support groups. The minimum public relations personnel needed is an information officer. In addition, supervisory personnel must be prepared to speak to and guide neighborhood groups. Indeed, the inspector's role is to advise as well as to enforce. One city's inspec-

tors have proved their talent for this part of their work by gaining acceptance of a relatively high percentage of their recommendations above the code requirements.

Of the 19 cities studied, only 2 had public relations or information officers attached to the code enforcement staff. In these cities, supervisory personnel also gave much time to public relations work, generally outside of working hours. In another city, the public relations aspect of the inspection work was emphasized by leaving an inspector in a small area until substantial compliance is achieved. In this way, he could work with individuals and neighborhood groups to generate social pressure as well as win personal confidence, and thus agreement. The other 16 city enforcement agencies relied on established neighborhood groups and on mass media with at least moderate success.

Administrative Coordination

7. Coordination is needed both at the enforcement and at the policy level. All but 3 cities have formal coordination mechanisms, generally a committee representing city agencies with related programs. Three cities use a coordinator, responsible directly to the mayor; 2 are gradually centralizing all directly related programs, but here coordinating committees still are necessary to relate indirectly affected programs.

Location of Responsibility

8. Housing code enforcement is about equally located in the health and in the building departments, with a slight trend toward assigning responsibility to the building department where it is newly considered. Two cities gave both departments strong responsibility. While there would seem to be a natural tendency for building departments to be more interested in structural violations and health departments in maintenance and sanitation, since a single set of personnel is assigned to housing in either department there is little evidence of underemphasis on one phase.

Legal Requirements of Enforcement

9. Three plans for legal enforcement of housing standards are in use in the 19 cities. Five immediately go to court after an initial

notice and two or three follow up inspections and notices. A special housing court, usually sitting particular days of the week, hears these cases. Even under this system, informal hearings by administrative personnel often are used to work out satisfactory solutions, and in some cities real estate groups and church organizations provide advisory conciliation services for owners and tenants.

The second plan relies on a formal hearing system with appeal to the agency head or deputy. A record of the hearing is developed for use in court if necessary. Orders resulting from such hearings may be appealed to a court, but they seldom are. If the order is not followed, the building is condemned for occupancy purposes and placarded. Under this arrangement, inspectors are not in effect placed on trial when the case comes to court, the number of cases is reduced, and some control is obtained over those going to court. On the other hand, a hearing system requires sophisticated administrators, inspectors, and city attorneys.

Hearings are not popular with officials; in some cases where appeal is provided for, there is reluctance to use it, even to the point of failing to inform violators of their right to appeal.

Under a third plan, legal enforcement is used almost entirely as a shotgun in the corner. These cities "go to extreme lengths to avoid having to prosecute. . . ." Persuasion, harassment by inspectors, and informal hearings all are used to achieve enforcement without legal sanction. Informal hearings have proved highly successful.

Although 15 cities regularly prosecute housing violations, only 5 do so "as the principal enforcement tool." There is common agreement that a special court for housing cases, good working relations between the city attorney or corporation counsel and the housing agency, and a procedure that would produce records with adequate evidence to support legal action are essential for successful prosecution.

Government Affairs Foundation: The First Five Years

The first five-year report—1953-1957—of the Government Affairs Foundation reveals the

foundation's growing interest in metropolitan problems. Following GAF sponsorship of the National Conference on Metropolitan Problems in the spring of 1956, a continuing Conference on Metropolitan Area Problems was set up which recently inaugurated a bi-monthly newsletter and identifies and stimulates needed research.

Publications of the conference include the proceedings of the first meeting, a bibliography on metropolitan problems covering the first 55 years of the century, and a forthcoming digest of metropolitan surveys. In progress are a general book on metropolitan government by Victor Jones, professor of political science, University of California (Berkeley), a handbook on making metropolitan surveys, research into the county's role in meeting problems of urban growth in New York State, assistance to the educational radio and television center in preparing an outline for a series of television programs on metropolitan problems, and a study of constitutional limitations on borrowing and property taxing in localities in all 48 states. The foundation's gradually growing library contains a special section on metropolitan area problems.

Before its concentration on the metropolis, the foundation prepared studies on federal block grants to states for public welfare purposes, trends and relationships in public assistance in the United States, federal-state relations particularly in the public health field with alternative federal approaches suggested, and a study of alternatives for authorizing states to obtain old-age assistance benefits for its citizens through payments into the old-age and survivors insurance trust fund and for making related adjustments in the federal-state-local share of public assistance.

In addition, the Foundation's president, Frank C. Moore, has served on numerous national and state committees and has provided consultation to all levels of government.

New Home Rule in Age of Metropolis

"We now recognize that every major local governmental responsibility has broader regional connections, and that the local government cannot be given full or final power over such matters. . . . Home rule consists then in giving to the locality the largest possible 'bundle of aspects' to handle within the

framework of state and national or regional policies."

Thus, Luther Gulick, president of the Institute of Public Administration, defined the new home rule in a speech at the National Municipal League Conference on Government last fall. ("Do It for Yourself," 46 *National Municipal Review* 559 (December, 1957).)

For those aspects which the local unit of government cannot handle, ". . . the right to be heard and consulted before higher decisions are made by the superior levels of government is a most valuable home rule right. . . ."

"This right of the locality to participate in the higher decision-making process may be exercised both at the political level, with politically responsible officials, and at the technical level with civil servants." Particularly in dealing with such functions as education, health, water supply, river pollution, crime control, urban renewal, airports, or highways, "the technical and professional plans and administrative decisions . . . affect the localities even more than the broad legislative decisions made at the political levels."

Russell Forbes:

Prototype of the Future Administrator

In many ways, Russell Forbes, who died late last year at the age of 61, is the prototype of the ideal administrator that has been predicted for the future. A distinguished specialist, he also was outstandingly successful as an organizer and manager. A prime example of the interchanging administrator, he served in New York City, a number of federal agencies, research and professional associations, the Louis J. Kroeger and Associates consultant firm, as vice president and general manager of a business firm, Air Cargo, Inc., professor at New York University, and a consultant to city, county, and state governments. A successful researcher whose Ph.D. thesis, *Governmental Purchasing* (Harper & Brothers, 1929) became the standard work in the field, he also spent at least fourteen years as a line administrator, generally installing what he had recommended as an adviser.

His public service was recognized outside of government: he received the Shipman Medal "for conspicuous service to purchasing," from

the National Association of Purchasing Agents in 1934; the Griffith Hughes Honorary Medal "as an outstanding public servant," from New York University in 1937; and an award of the City Club of New York "in recognition of outstanding public service to the people of the City" in 1940. His undergraduate college, Westminster (New Wilmington, Pennsylvania), awarded him an LL.D. in 1942.

He demonstrated skill in two facets of public administration of growing importance—working with committees and military-civilian relations.

Altogether, his impact on governmental purchasing—primarily toward organizing central purchasing—was extensive: organizing and heading the first New York City central

purchasing system; developing the U. S. General Services Administration; advising the cities of Chicago, Newark, Boston, and New York; the states of Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia and Montgomery County, Maryland; heading and advising task forces of both Hoover Commissions; writing *Purchasing for Small Cities* (Municipal Administration Service, 1932), *Centralized Purchasing* (National Association of Purchasing Agents, 1931), *Organization and Administration of a Purchasing Office* (National Association of Purchasing Agents, 1932); and working from 1923 to 1933 with the National Association of Purchasing Agents, the Municipal Administration Service, Governmental Research Association, and National Municipal League.

Research in Progress

Press-Local Government Relations

The attitudes and behavior of North Carolina local officials and newspapermen toward one another and the effect on public information will be studied by Roy E. Carter, Jr. of the University of North Carolina.

One purpose of the study is to sharpen understanding of the respective roles and the possible sources of friction between them to contribute materials to journalism and public administration training. A last step of the project may be a seminar for local officials and newspapermen in 1959.

Intensive interviews in 10 larger cities and questionnaire surveys of editors, reporters, mayors and/or city managers, and city councilmen in all of the 37 North Carolina cities with daily newspapers are planned.

Among questions to be investigated are differences between newspaper and government people about what constitutes news and what the public is entitled to know, how much each group knows about the other's job, whether form of government (mayor vs. manager) affects press relations, and whether the administrator regards public relations as a primary responsibility.

Some hypotheses to be checked are:

1. Friction between reporters and news sources increases with difference in age.
2. Frequent contacts improve the news source's attitude toward the press.

3. When newspaper people regard local officials as professional they have a more favorable impression of them and vice versa.

Citizen Participation in Planning

A study of the effects of widespread citizen participation in a Chicago urban redevelopment project has been planned and financing has been earmarked for the Chicago Community Conservation Board under demonstration grant provisions of the 1954 Housing Act. (14 *Journal of Housing* 382 (November, 1957).)

The redevelopment project for the Hyde Park-Kenwood area of Chicago has been developed over a four-year period and is scheduled for final approval by the City Council early in 1958. Throughout planning stages, citizen organizations have taken an active part. Participating in every step of the planning were the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, block organizations covering nearly every block in the area, the South East Chicago Commission (composed of the University of Chicago and other institutions and large businesses in the area), and a Conservation Community Council, appointed by the Mayor from the neighborhood following a new state law. This last organization must approve the renewal plan. Before giving approval, this council held seven hearings that were attended by from 50 to 300 persons. At

least one major part of the plan was revised according to counter-proposals of citizen groups.

The proposed study would seek answers to the questions:

1. How many people took a real part?
2. How much did they affect the planning?
3. Did extensive citizen participation speed or delay the final plan?
4. Did it allay or intensify controversy?
5. What types of meetings or other communication media proved most successful?
6. How could they be improved?
7. How important was the thorough and careful coverage of the plan by the neighborhood newspaper?
8. Was the planner's relations to the program most effective?

Satisfying Individual Needs in a Large Organization

A two and one-half year study of employee relations programs to develop instruments that can ascertain the needs of individuals in large organizations and the extent to which these needs can be satisfied without threatening the organization's goals will be undertaken by Chris Argyris, Department of Industrial Administration, Yale University, under a \$34,000 grant from the National Institute of Mental Health.

Mr. Argyris' latest book, *Personality and Organization* (Harper & Brothers, 1957), raises serious questions about most employee relations programs and points to obstacles to treating members of organizations as mature individuals.

Administrative Decision-Making Bibliography

An administrative decision-making bibliography is being prepared by the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University. It will list books, journal articles, and papers on the theory of the decision-making process, values in decision making, organization for decision-making, the decision-maker, decision-making in small groups, community decision-making, communications and information handling, mathematics and statistics in decision-making.

Newsletter of Political, Behavioral Research

"An informal newsletter of research ideas" of political and behavioral scientists began publication last year under the name PROD (Political Research: Organization and Design). Editors are Alfred de Grazia of Princeton, New Jersey, Karl Deutsch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Richard Snyder of Northwestern University. "Academic" subscriptions are \$2.00 a year; the newsletter is published about every two months. (Address inquiries to Mr. de Grazia, 306 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey.)

Future issues will include sketches of political research agencies, their history and plans; a calendar of research conferences; a bibliography of significant research memorandums; a "materials and ideas wanted" column for readers moving into new research areas; and a series on "some problems I should like to see political scientists solve" by leaders of various fields.

Study of Government Manpower Needs

The National Manpower Council is studying future manpower needs of all levels of government and their ability to meet the needs.

A regional conference of some twenty officials of government and public affairs organizations, including ASPA Executive Director Robert Matteson, recently discussed five of the questions under study: significant changes in demands for state and local government employees; how adequately these units of government have met their requirements and the prospects for meeting them in the next decade; relative advantages and disadvantages of state and local government employment; opportunities for training, promotion, and self-improvement; and criteria for determining whether state and local employees are being used effectively.

Publications of the Council, established at Columbia University in 1951 under a Ford Foundation grant, are: *Womanpower* (1957), *Improving the Work Skills of the Nation* (1955), *A Policy for Skilled Manpower* (1954), *Proceedings of a Conference on the Utilization of Scientific and Professional Manpower* (1954) and *A Policy for Scientific and Professional Manpower* (1953).

Research Compiled, Fostered in New Zealand

New Zealand's Institute of Public Administration and the School of Public Administration, Victoria University College have begun to record all public administration research in progress and recently completed. Annually the two institutions consult about possible future research projects.

Some recent projects are: a study by public administration students of the staff work and consultation that goes into the making of regulations by a minister (a preliminary survey shows extensive consultation with interest groups), about twenty case studies on administrative decision-making which are still kept confidential and used only in class work at the university ("... the cases have diminished further the declining belief in universally applicable 'principles' of administration and organization," according to a professor), and a full-scale study of committees in administration by a study group of the Wellington Branch of the Institute of Public Administration.

Study Group Report on Committees

After describing the wide variety of committees used in government in New Zealand, the study group made the following observations, among others:

Although clear-cut principles cannot be formulated to define when a committee or when an individual should be used, committees can be valuable:

1. To provide a wide range of technical information to assist a generalist.
2. To smooth policy implementation by having representatives of those most affected take part in the formative stage.

3. To provide an appearance of impartiality.
4. To provide interdepartmental coordination.
5. To provide intradepartmental coordination where the top administrator cannot do it and where it seems better than adding staff assistance to the top administrator's office.
6. To educate division heads "to take a broad view of a department's . . . activity" while keeping the top administrator and division heads informed of the work of the entire department.

Among disadvantages of committees, the study group noted their cost in time and money; unwillingness of some capable men to serve on committees because they "prefer full scope for their individualism . . ."; the tendency of committees to compromise even when it is not the best solution; the proclivity of committees to perpetuate themselves; reliance, if a large committee, on subcommittees, thus putting the stamp of the full committee on a product which is not theirs; and the excessive influence of expert advocates on the committee's reports. (R. J. Polaschek, "Trends in Research in Public Administration" and "The Place of Committees in Administration" 20 *The New Zealand Journal of Public Administration* 13-23, 25-86 (September, 1957).)

Two Additional Studies

The Twentieth Century Fund has undertaken a study of the urban agglomeration beginning north of Boston and continuing south of Washington.

The Office of College and University Presidents will be studied by Harold W. Dodds, recently retired president of Princeton University, under a \$100,000 grant from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

Public Administration Correspondents Appointed

Beginning with the Spring, 1958, issue, a number of items in this section will be compiled from material supplied by the newly appointed Public Administration Correspondents, listed on the inside back cover of this issue of the *Review*.

Eventually covering every state, as well as sections of some states, the correspondents also will provide information for *Public Administration News*, other ASPA publications, and information files on public administration problems, accomplishments, and personalities.

Society Perspectives

SCIENCE IS NOT ENOUGH

SINCE the Russians launched sputnik, the cry that the United States needs more scientists and engineers, and better trained ones, has been loud and insistent. The call for more education, more research, more facilities, and more money in the physical sciences and their application is heard everywhere, from speeches of the President to editorials in small-town newspapers. Such unanimity, coupled with a tenor of urgency, seems to support the validity of the claim. This commentator has no inclination to dispute it.

But some voices have suggested that more scientists, trained in more elaborate educational facilities and equipped with more extensive laboratories, will not by themselves enable us to get ahead and stay ahead in competition for the mastery of space. An example is the recent congressional testimony of Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover, directing genius behind the development of the atom-powered submarine, stressing the importance of imaginative leadership, freedom from picayune supervision, and close liaison between government and business in establishing major new weapons. Other men responsible for big jobs in this field have made similar references to the organizational environment which the theoreticians, researchers, engineers, and production experts require to be effective. In fact, a careful reading of the views of those with operational responsibility for work in missiles and other fields points more to deficiencies in administration than in basic science as the root cause of our present national difficulties.

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THE great scientific programs in aeronautics, electronics, rocketry, and the atom cut through our whole society. They involve the universities and the laboratories, big busi-

nesses and small, the inventor and the assembly line, the military man and the civilian, and of course government at all levels and in hundreds of projects. Though much of their subject matter is technical and some of it secret, these programs of life-or-death significance for the nation go forward in a climate of intense public interest.

Administration in such circumstances—including all the usual complexities, uncertainties, and give-and-take of a free-enterprise democracy—is a supreme challenge. To succeed, the public administrator needs to focus on policy goals, adjust to political realities, be both energetic and diplomatic, call forth the best in his colleagues, and utilize managerial skills wisely. The scope and requirements of his task, be he the director of a major enterprise or a unit head down the line, are great. Among other things he should be able to—

Give clear leadership, suited both to the opportunities and to the limitations of his mission.

Work effectively, frequently on an informal basis, with administrators from other agencies.

Link public and private interests and resources to serve program objectives.

Operate effectively through budget, personnel, purchasing, and other standard procedures.

Maintain good communications with superiors and subordinates, legislative authorities, and the general public.

See his place in governmental affairs in fair perspective, recognizing interdependence between his job and others.

These qualities are most likely to be found in persons experienced in government, often at several levels and considerably acquainted

also with private business. They tend, too, to be associated more with a broad than with a narrow interest in public service programs. A sense of professional identification with administration as an aspect of government is apt to be another earmark of the individual thus equipped.

Administrators with these qualifications, like outstanding scientists and engineers, are products of design as well as accident. Without university programs in public administration, in-service and internship training, the business schools, and the various associations of public officials, American government would have fewer administrative people of top competence. This is true in the scientific and developmental programs, military and civilian, as elsewhere. It would seem, therefore, only good sense to provide incentives for discovering and improving administrative talent parallel with the nationwide drive to move ahead in science.

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THE need for better management to strengthen the country scientifically lends added significance to the public administration movement. The goals of this movement—more effective government through fuller administrative knowledge, more favorable rewards for public service careers, and greater general esteem for public administrators—point the roads to follow if the nation is to have the kind of administration it requires. Reasons of national good and career advancement were never more nicely joined than in the incentives for those administering govern-

mental programs to work together professionally to improve their own competence and standing. Furthermore, university educational and research opportunities both in public managerial skills and in the whole social setting of public administration ought to widen as professional groups become more active.

For ASPA, then, the current crisis in scientific development (since it is so much a crisis in administration also) is further reason for pressing forward with the Society program. Wherever possible, moreover, ASPA ought to encourage the exchange of administrative ideas and experience and the enhancement of public service standards not only within its own membership but more widely through mutually agreeable cooperation with other like-minded public affairs groups. With membership drawn from all levels and programs of American government, the Society and its chapters can promote good administration through appropriate liaison activities as well as direct services. A particularly important liaison function, for which special funds are now being sought, would be the administration of a nationwide fellowship program to expand preentry and postentry education in public administration.

To remain great, to move ahead in achievement and abundance, America needs both those who plan, organize, and execute and those who dream, study, and enlarge knowledge. The administrator and the scientist must understand each other and work together. In the space age, this is a law of survival.

ROBERT J. M. MATTESON

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